

International Security

**POL 591
Spring 2020**

**Wednesday 5:05PM - 7:50PM
Dooly Memorial 118**

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Office hours: Wednesday and Thursday 2:00-3:00, Campo Sano 240 C.

Course Overview:

This is an advanced undergraduate/graduate introduction to the field of international security. The course focuses on issues concerning the conduct of war and military strategy, surveying both classic texts and recent works on important security policy issues. Questions animating this course include: What is military strategy? What kind of violent and non-violent means do states use to influence one another's behavior? What makes threats credible? Do states acquire a reputation for resolve? What determines battlefield outcomes in modern warfare? How can governments prepare to prevent wars, or to win them if they occur? How does technology affect the way wars are fought? How does technological change affect international security and the conduct of war? What are the political and military effects of nuclear weapons? By what criteria should the use of force be considered legitimate?

The syllabus is organized in 13 thematic sections corresponding to each week of class, with frequent use of historical examples and case studies.

Learning objectives:

- Introducing students to the complexities of the relationship between political ends, military means, and their "bridge" – strategy
- Familiarizing students with major theoretical perspectives in international security
- Surveying key substantive areas and debates in the field
- Sharpening students' analytical and research skills with a research project

Requirements:

This course will be run as a seminar.

Class participation counts for **40%** of the grade. Students will obtain an A in class participation only if they regularly take part in class discussion and contribute to it thoughtfully, clearly displaying familiarity with the assigned readings. Mere class presence without any sign of involvement (e.g., spending all class-time staring at a laptop screen) and without contribution to

discussion will result in a poor class participation score. I am happy to provide feedback to students about their ongoing class participation and how to improve it. Students must do all the required readings in advance of the corresponding class meeting.

A research proposal counts for **20%** of the grade. The proposal is due in class on March 4. Details will be discussed in class some time in advance. Late proposals will be penalized.

The final research paper counts for **40%** of the grade. The research paper (20-25 pages) will focus on the topic discussed in the research proposal. The normal format for the paper will be to use case studies to test a theoretically grounded hypothesis. The final draft is due on May 6, by midnight, in electronic copy. Late papers will be penalized.

Readings: The course requires reading and pondering about 100/120 pages of political science materials per week. All required readings are available on Blackboard under “Course Documents” or at links specified in the syllabus.

Recommended readings are included in the syllabus only as suggestions for students especially interested in a given topic and are available upon request.

Students are strongly encouraged to read the world news section of a major daily—e.g. *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, *Financial Times*, etc.—or their online equivalents.

Prerequisites:

POL 203 or INS 101.

Rules and procedures:

Email correspondence. I am happy to address any issue via email, but I prefer to meet in person during office hours or by appointment to discuss substantive (rather than procedural/organizational) course-related issues. Please allow 24/48 hours for me to respond.

Read your emails. From time to time, I will make announcements related to the course via email (in particular related to scheduling issues or readings) and will assume you have read those emails.

Don’t cheat. The standard caveats about academic honesty obtain. Collaboration is encouraged, but cheating will result in the matter being turned over immediately to the Dean’s office, with a high risk of failing the class.

Please consult the UM’s honor code at:

http://www.miami.edu/sa/index.php/policies_and_procedures/honor_code/

Phone and laptops. I strongly encourage you not to use laptops and phones while in class, so as to achieve the best possible learning experience for you and your classmates.

There is quite a bit of evidence indicating that taking notes with pen and paper, rather than typing, facilitates student learning; moreover, laptops and cellphones are a source of distraction

for both the students using them and their peers sitting nearby when inappropriately employed to navigate the internet, watch videos etc. (see, for example, Pam A. Mueller and Daniel M. Oppenheimer, “The Pen Is Mightier Than the Keyboard: Advantages of Longhand Over Laptop Note Taking,” *Psychological Science*, 2014; Faria Sana et al., “Laptop Multitasking Hinders Classroom Learning for Both Users and Nearby Peers,” *Computer & Education*, 2013; “Attention Students: Put Your Laptops Away,” NPR, <http://www.npr.org/2016/04/17/474525392/attention-students-put-your-laptops-away>) .

Don't miss deadlines. Prompt (i.e., within one business day) written permissions from doctors, deans, and coaches may excuse late submissions (and class absences). Once a make-up deadline is scheduled, students will have to respect it.

Disabilities. Students with disabilities should contact the Office of Disability Services (ODS, <http://umarc.miami.edu/arc/ODS.html>) to obtain appropriate academic accommodations and support.

1. Introduction: The Nature of War and Competing Philosophical Approaches (January 15)
[93 pp.]

- 1) William James, "The Moral Equivalent of War" (1910). [7 pp.]
- 2) Paul Fussell, *Wartime* (Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 18. [31 pp.]
- 3) Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton University Press, 1976), Book I, chs. 1, 2. [15 pp.].
- 4) Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, Roger Ames, trans. (Ballantine, 1993), Part I, chs. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 (the Sawyer, Griffith, Mair, or Huang translations are also acceptable; the Sawyer translation is available in electronic copy at <http://library.miami.edu/>; the Ames translation is on Blackboard). [40 pp.]

Recommended:

Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in Peter Paret, ed. with Gordon A. Craig and Felix, *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986).

Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17:3, 1992/93.

Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25: 2, 2000.

Dan Reiter, "Exploring the Bargaining Model of War," *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (1), 2003.

Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Science of War: Defense Budgeting, Military Technology, Logistics, and Combat Outcomes* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009) (electronic copy available at <http://library.miami.edu/>).

2. Coercion, Air Power, and the Vietnam War (January 22) [118 pp.]

- 1) Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Cornell University Press, 1996), chs. 2-3 and 6. [118 pp.]

Recommended:

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966) (electronic copy available at <http://library.miami.edu/>).

Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (2nd ed., Longman, 1999).

Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security* 27: 3, 2002-03.

Daniel R. Lake, "The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO's "Victory" in Kosovo Revisited," *International Security* 34: 1, 2009.

3. Credibility and Reputation (I) (January 29) [111 pp.]

- 1) Daryl G. Press, "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the 'Appeasement' Crises of the 1930s," *International Security* 29: 3, 2004-05. [33 pp.]
- 2) Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Cornell University Press, 2005), ch. 4. [25 pp.]
- 3) Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics," *International Organization* 69: 2, 2015. [23 pp.]
- 4) Alexander Downes, "Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the Success and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove Foreign Leaders," in *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics*, eds. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). [30 pp.]

Recommended:

Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Cornell University Press, 1996).

Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Cornell University Press, 2005).

4. Credibility and Reputation (II) (February 5) [95 pp.]

- 1) Danielle L. Lupton, "Signaling Resolve: Leaders, Reputations, and the Importance of Early Interactions," *International Interactions* 44: 1, 2018. [28 pp.]
- 2) Roseanne W. McManus, "Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining," *Security Studies* 28: 5, 2019. [34 pp.]
- 3) Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret," *Security Studies* 26:1, 2017. [33 pp.]

Recommended:

Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors: The Logic and Practice of Secret Reassurance," *Security Studies* 22: 3, 2013.

Vaughn P. Shannon and Michael Dennis, "Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation," *Security Studies* 16: 2, 2007.

Todd Sechser, "Goliath's Curse: Asymmetric Power and the Effectiveness of Coercive Threats," *International Organization* 64: 4, 2010.

Alexander B. Downes and Todd Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *International Organization* 66: 3, 2012.

Andrew S. Bowen, "Coercive Diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian Strategy in Eastern Ukraine," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42: 3-4, 2019.

5. Policy, Strategy, and Operations: Integrating Political Ends and Military Means

(February 12) [101 pp.]

1) Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, ch. 7; Book II, ch. 3; Book III, ch. 1; Book VI, chs. 1, 5. [22 pp.]

2) Stephen Biddle, *Military Power* (Princeton University Press, 2004), chs. 2-3 [37 pp.]

3) Michael Beckley, "The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion," *International Security* 42: 2, 2017. [42 pp.]

Recommended:

Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," *International Security* 9: 3, 1984-1985.

Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific," *International Security* 41: 1, 2016.

Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), *Military Effectiveness*, Volumes I-III (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12: 2 (1948).

Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army* (Oxford University Press, 1991) (available in electronic copy at <http://library.miami.edu/>).

Anthony King, "On Combat Effectiveness in the Infantry Platoon: Beyond the Primary Group Thesis," *Security Studies* 25: 4, 2016.

Jasen J. Castillo, *Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion* (Stanford University Press, 2014).

Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18: 2, 1993.

Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War* (University of Nebraska Press, 2002).

Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (Simon & Schuster, 1991).

Stephen Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security* 19: 4, 1995.

6. Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War (February 19) [111 pp.]

- 1) Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VII, ch. 22; Book VIII, chs. 1, 2, 3, 6. [26 pp.]
- 2) Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Little Brown, 1995), chs. 18-20. [85 pp.]

Recommended:

Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," *Security Studies* 6: 4, 1997.

Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (Simon & Schuster, 2010), chs. 18-19, 21-25, 28, 30.

7. Non-Kinetic Forms of Influence: Cyber and Economic Sanctions (February 26) [95 pp.]

- 1) Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion," *International Security* 44, no. 1, 2019 [38 pp.]
- 2) Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization* 57: 3, 2003. [17 pp.]
- 3) Jon R. Lindsay, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare," *Security Studies*, 22:3. [40 pp.]

Recommended:

Robert Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22: 2, 1997.

Erik Gartzke, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth," *International Security* 38: 2, 2013.

Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness, *Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," *International Security* 33: 1, 2008.

Costantino Pischedda, "Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance," *Security Studies*, 2020 (forthcoming).

8. Regime Types and Public Opinion (March 4) [105 pp.]

[Research proposal due in class]

- 1) Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3, 2011 [20 pp.]
- 2) Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," *International Security* 30: 3, 2005/06. [47 pp.]
- 3) John D. Ciorciari and Jessica Chen Weiss, "Nationalist Protests, Government Responses, and the Risk of Escalation in Interstate Disputes," *Security Studies* 25: 3, 2016. [38 pp.]

Recommended:

Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, 2002).

Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 4 (2004).

Alexander B. Downes, "How Smart (and Tough) Are Democracies Anyway? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War," *International Security* 33: 4 (2009).

Adam J. Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 69: 4, 2006.

William A. Boettcher III and Michael D. Cobb, "Echoes of Vietnam? Casualty Framing and Public Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50: 6, 2006.

Richard Eichenberg, "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005," *International Security* 30: 1 (2005).

Caitlin Talmadge, "The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War," *Security Studies* 22: 2 (2013).

March 7-15 Spring Recess – No class on March 11

9. Technology and War (March 18) [73 pp.]

- 1) Stephen Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: the Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq," *International Security* 30: 3, 2005-6. [16 pp.]
- 2) Erica Borghard and Costantino Pischedda, "Allies and Airpower in Libya," *Parameters*, 2012. [12 pp.]

- 3) Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli. "Military-Technological Superiority: Systems Integration and the Challenges of Imitation, Reverse-Engineering and Cyber Espionage," *International Security* 43: 3, 2018-19. [49 pp.]

Recommended:

Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay," *International Security* 24: 2, 1999.

Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *Journal of Politics* 63: 3, 2001.

Eliot Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 27: 3, 2004.

Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75: 2, 1996.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2000, pp. 11-22

Daryl Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," *International Security* 26: 2, 2001.

Stephen Biddle, et al. "Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation," US Army War College, 2004.

Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, "The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Infrastructural and Organizational Challenges," *Security Studies* 26: 1.

No class on March 25th (I am attending the International Studies Association annual conference)

10. Threat Assessment and Intelligence (April 1) [95 pp.]

- 1) Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," January 1, 1907, and Thomas Sanderson, "Observations on Printed Memorandum on Relations with France and Germany, January 1907," in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. III: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6* (London: HMSO, 1928) (NB: Read pp. 399-405, 414-419; skim the rest.) [11 pp.]
- 2) Documents 551, 553, and 650 on the Munich crisis in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 3d Series, vol. II: 1938 (London: HMSO, 1949). [7 pp.]
- 3) Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," *World Politics* 31, no. 1, 1978. [29 pp.]

- 4) Robert Jervis, "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29: 1, 2006. [48 pp.]

Recommended:

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," Richard Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2013).

Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37: 4 (2013).

Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is Chinese Nationalism Rising? Evidence from Beijing" *International Security* 4: 3, 2016.

Alastair Iain Johnston and Kai Quek, "Can China Back Down? Crisis De-Escalation in the Shadow of Popular Opposition," *International Security* 42: 3, 2017/18.

Marcus Holmes, "The Force of Face-to-Face Diplomacy: Mirror Neurons and the Problem of Intentions," *International Organization*, 2013.

Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence* (Columbia University Press, 2007).

Keren Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries," *International Security* 38: 1, 2013.

11. Nuclear Weapons (April 8) [104 pp.]

- 1) Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Cornell University Press, 1989), ch. 1. [45 pp.]
- 2) Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail," *International Organization* 67, 2013. [pp. 23]
- 3) Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Nuclear Blackmail: The Threat from North Korea and Iran," in *America's Nuclear Crossroads*, eds. Caroline Dorminey and Eric Gomez (Cato Institute, 2019). [14 pp.]
- 4) Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 5, 2016. [12 pp.]

Recommended:

John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *International Security* 13: 2 (1988).

Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment," *International Security* 13: 2 (1988).

Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (3rd ed., Palgrave, 2003).

Richard K. Betts, "Nuclear Weapons," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (Yale University Press, 1984).

Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18: 4, 1994.

Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Daryl Press and Keir Lieber, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, 2006.

Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, "The Nukes We Need: Preserving America's Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs*, 2009.

William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64," *International Security* 25: 3, 2000/01.

Whitney Raas and Austin Long, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *International Security* 31: 4, 2007.

Matthew Kroenig, "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance," *American Political Science Review* 103: 1, 2009.

Keir A. Lieber, Daryl G. Press, "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists," *International Security* 38: 1, 2013.

Francis J. Gavin, "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War," *International Security* 34: 3, 2010.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," *International Security* 41: 4, 2017.

Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability," *International Security* 40: 2, 2015. [44 pp.]

Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre Debs, "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation," *International Security* 39: 2, 2014. [45 pp.]

12. When Is War Murder? The Moral Calculus of Killing (April 15) [109 pp.]

- 1) Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 4th Edition (Basic Books, 2000), chs. 5, 9, 16 [52 pp.]
- 2) Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb," in Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (Summit Books, 1988). [22]
- 3) Michael L. Gross, *The Ethics of Insurgency* (Cambridge University Press, 2015), chs. 4-5. [45 pp]

Recommended:

John Mueller, "Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17: 4, 2005.

Richard Betts, Daniel Byman, and Martha Crenshaw, "Comments on John Mueller's 'Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism'," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17: 4, 2005.

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VI, chap. 26.

Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1986).

Simon Collard-Wexler, Costantino Pischedda, and M. G. Smith, "Do Foreign Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58: 4, 2014.

Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Logic of Terrorism," in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Osama bin Laden, "Speech to the American People," in Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*.

Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27: 2, 1975.

Harry Summers Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982).

Seth G. Jones, *Waging Insurgent Warfare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

13. Grand Strategy (April 22) [74 pp.]

- 1) Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won't Overtake the United States," *Foreign Affairs* May/June 2016. [14 pp.]
- 2) Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," *International Security* 35, no. 4, 2011: 7-44. [38 pp.]
- 3) Barry R. Posen, "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 2013. [9 pp.]
- 4) Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement," *Foreign Affairs*, 2013. [13 pp.]

Recommended:

Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Barry R. Posen and Andrew Ross, "Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21: 3, 1996-97. [48 pp.]

Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

Joseph Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, *Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

Patrick Porter, "Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment," *International Security* 42, no. 4, 2018.

[Final paper due on May 6, by midnight, in electronic copy]