Online Appendix for "Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Non-Violent Resistance"

This online appendix consists of two documents – Robustness Checks and a Codebook.

When referring to this online appendix or to the corresponding dataset on Nonviolent Ethnic Challenges (NEC), please cite Costantino Pischedda, "Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Nonviolent Resistance," *Security Studies* 29 (2) (2020).

Clara Luisa Janzen and Adam Kozloski provided very valuable research assistance in coding the ethnic character of nonviolent campaigns.

Robustness Checks

The following tables present robustness checks and additional tests not reported in the article for reasons of space.

Tables A1-A2 report robustness checks of the logit analysis (Table 2 in the article) to the inclusion of the main battery of controls used for the competing risks analysis (Tables 3-4).

Tables A3-A5 replicate the main analysis presented in the article (Tables 2-4) using the same sample for all specifications – 164 observations for which no data is missing – to ensure that the findings are not affected by nonrandom missing data.

Table A6-A10 include a broad range of additional controls to the competing risks analysis to assuage residual concerns about omitted variable bias.

Tables A11-A13 replicates the logit and competing risks analyses in the article (Tables 2-4) using an alternative database including campaign-years not meeting NAVCO 2.0's criteria.

Tables A14-A16 report robustness checks of the logit and competing risks analyses (Tables 2-4) to dropping the First Intifada campaign.

Tables A17-A18 report robustness checks of the competing risks analyses (Tables 3-4) to dropping the East Timor campaign for the years 1989-1998.

Tables A19-A20 report robustness checks of the core model for both logit and competing risks analyses (Table 2, column 4, Table 3, column 4) to inclusion of anti-colonial campaigns.

Tables A21-A23 report robustness checks of the logit and competing risks analysis to re-coding Kenya's anti-Arap Moi campaign as a success (as in the original NAVCO 2.0's coding).

Tables A24-25 present logit and competing risks analyses of violent campaign outcomes using basic specifications from Table 2.

Table A26 reports the results of tests of the proportional sub-hazards assumption for competing risks models (Tables 3-4) by interacting *ethnic conflict* and all variables from main battery of controls with the log of time.

Table A1: Robustness check of logit analysis (Table 2) to inclusion of controls used in Tables 3-4 (I)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ethnic conflict	-2.201***	-2.246***	-2.869***	-1.978***
	(-4.03)	(-3.90)	(-4.12)	(-3.74)
late USSR	2.469***	1.959***	2.766***	2.079***
	(4.26)	(3.97)	(3.42)	(4.68)
liberal democracy	0.949	0.697	1.223	1.290
	(0.61)	(0.48)	(0.65)	(0.86)
ethnic exclusion	-1.404	-1.566*	-1.027	-1.847*
	(-1.39)	(-1.65)	(-0.92)	(-1.75)
urban population	0.002			
	(0.13)			
youth bulge		-0.108		
		(-0.99)		
GDP per capita			0.119	
			(0.38)	
regime durability				-0.024
				(-1.51)
N	88	88	75	96

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A2: Robustness check of logit analysis (Table 2) to inclusion of controls used in Tables 3-4 (II)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ethnic conflict	-2.075***	-2.484***	-2.838***	-1.182**
	(-3.21)	(-3.60)	(-3.83)	(-2.01)
late USSR	1.075*	0.778	3.284***	3.206***
	(1.71)	(1.06)	(4.76)	(3.74)
liberal democracy	-0.005	1.630	1.849	2.651
	(-0.00)	(1.09)	(0.93)	(1.26)
ethnic exclusion		-1.889**	-0.548	-1.922*
		(-2.01)	(-0.58)	(-1.95)
human rights	0.266*			
	(1.95)			
regional campaigns		0.203***		
		(3.03)		
western aid			0.192**	
			(2.14)	
self-determination				-1.918*
				(-1.72)
N	70	99	72	99

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: column 1 drops *ethnic exclusion* due to separation (the corresponding sample does not contain any observation of campaign failure for cases of no ethnic exclusion). Scott J. Cook, John Niehaus, and Samantha Zuhlke, "A Warning on Separation in Multinomial Logistic Models," *Research and Politics* (April-June), 2018: 1–5.

Table A3: Robustness check of logit analysis (Table 2) to using a sample with no missing values

	(1)	(2)	(3)
ethnic conflict	-2.026**	-2.874***	-3.037***
	(-2.43)	(-3.30)	(-3.57)
late USSR		2.455***	2.689***
		(4.77)	(4.51)
liberal democracy			1.472
			(0.69)
urban population			
youth bulge			
N	61	61	61

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *ethnic exclusion*=0 perfectly predicts campaign success, so the variable cannot be included in the analysis with the restricted sample.

Table A4: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 3) to using a sample with no missing values

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ethnic conflict	0.352**	0.245***	0.222***	0.209***	0.220***
	(-2.37)	(-4.59)	(-4.30)	(-4.82)	(-4.40)
late USSR		3.591***	4.324***	5.933***	3.033**
		(5.56)	(5.72)	(5.07)	(2.24)
liberal democracy			4.445	7.501*	3.612
			(1.33)	(1.91)	(1.08)
urban population				0.991	
				(-1.11)	
youth bulge					0.941
					(-0.88)
Outcome=failure					
ethnic conflict	5.005***	6.301***	6.492***	6.720***	6.545***
	(3.38)	(3.79)	(3.79)	(3.84)	(3.61)
late USSR		0.270***	0.249***	0.193***	0.226
		(-4.53)	(-3.75)	(-3.08)	(-1.57)
liberal democracy			0.574	0.362	0.535
			(-0.45)	(-0.72)	(-0.47)
urban population				1.007	
				(0.65)	
youth bulge					0.985
					(-0.11)
N	164	164	164	164	164

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *ethnic exclusion* is not included due to separation.

Table A5: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 4) to using a sample with no missing values

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.220***	0.242***	0.224***	0.208***	0.221***	0.381**
	(-4.47)	(-4.07)	(-4.44)	(-4.44)	(-4.26)	(-2.44)
late USSR	5.781***	2.530***	3.221***	1.890	5.442***	4.614***
	(4.69)	(3.13)	(3.53)	(1.12)	(5.71)	(5.99)
liberal democracy	7.251*	2.690	2.938	5.139	4.723	5.631
	(1.87)	(0.84)	(0.98)	(1.58)	(1.42)	(1.42)
GDP per capita	0.861					
	(-0.93)					
regime durability		0.964**				
		(-2.29)				
human rights			1.182*			
			(1.73)			
regional campaigns				1.081		
				(1.39)		
western aid					1.062**	
					(2.21)	
self-determination						0.417**
						(-1.97)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	6.620***	6.023***	5.646***	6.578***	4.872***	3.779
	(3.74)	(3.38)	(3.39)	(3.83)	(2.82)	(1.54)
late USSR	0.277**	0.299***	0.431*	2.371	0.213***	0.256***
	(-2.13)	(-2.99)	(-1.75)	(0.54)	(-4.27)	(-3.49)
liberal democracy	0.693	0.621	0.853	0.662	0.664	0.393
	(-0.26)	(-0.40)	(-0.14)	(-0.36)	(-0.33)	(-0.73)
GDP per capita	0.938					
	(-0.23)					
regime durability		1.008				
		(0.63)				
human rights			0.820*			
			(-1.66)			
regional campaigns				0.815		
				(-1.56)		
western aid					0.855	
					(-1.20)	
self-determination						2.182
						(0.94)
N	164	164	164	164	164	164

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *ethnic exclusion* is not included due to separation.

Table A6: Robustness check of competing risks analysis to inclusion of additional controls (I)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ethnic conflict	0.265***	0.156***	0.260***	0.289***	0.242***
	(-3.71)	(-3.08)	(-4.92)	(-4.20)	(-3.35)
late USSR			3.149***	59.200***	43.309***
			(5.02)	(2.63)	(2.65)
liberal democracy	1.142	5.558	2.911	4.956**	5.308**
	(0.12)	(1.40)	(1.10)	(2.03)	(2.02)
ethnic exclusion		0.751	0.465***	0.504**	0.516**
		(-0.91)	(-3.21)	(-2.31)	(-2.23)
armed forces	0.832**				
	(-2.13)				
manufacturing		0.965*			
		(-1.71)			
cold war			0.471***		
			(-2.88)		
#ethnic groups				0.948*	0.945**
				(-1.79)	(-1.99)
#ethnic groupsX ethnic conflict					1.013
					(1.44)
Outcome=failure					
ethnic conflict	2.749**	7.624***	3.475***	2.391**	3.292***
	(1.97)	(3.07)	(3.67)	(2.35)	(2.95)
late USSR			0.170***	0.028***	0.027***
			(-8.64)	(-10.44)	(-12.57)
liberal democracy	2.615	0.382	0.873	1.475	1.509
	(0.71)	(-0.45)	(-0.18)	(0.50)	(0.55)
ethnic exclusion		1.726	5.203*	4.322	3.694
		(0.55)	(1.88)	(1.56)	(1.36)
armed forces	1.782**				
	(2.44)				
manufacturing		1.053**			
		(2.55)			
cold war			2.028**		
			(2.00)		
#ethnic groups				1.040***	1.070***
				(4.37)	(4.37)
#ethnic groupsX ethnic conflict					0.967**
					(-2.13)
N	137	141	275	271	271

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z standard statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *late USSR* is dropped from columns 1-2 because of perfect collinearity (there is no instance of *late USSR*=1 in the corresponding samples), while *ethnic exclusion* is dropped from column 1 due to separation (there is no instance of campaign failure when *ethnic exclusion*=0 in the corresponding sample).

Table A7: Robustness check of competing risks analysis to inclusion of additional controls (II)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ethnic conflict	0.233***	0.256***	0.287***	0.332***	0.246***
	(-4.33)	(-4.62)	(-4.47)	(-4.07)	(-4.35)
late USSR	5.137***	4.298***	2.072***	3.205***	4.491***
	(5.41)	(6.05)	(2.83)	(5.74)	(5.76)
liberal democracy	6.809**	7.220**	1.548	4.381	5.257*
	(2.38)	(2.38)	(0.46)	(1.64)	(1.95)
ethnic exclusion	0.625*	0.407***		0.294***	0.439***
	(-1.90)	(-3.24)		(-3.69)	(-2.86)
population size	0.871				
	(-1.60)				
#coups		8.979			
		(1.54)			
human rights			0.778		
			(-1.11)		
human rights square			1.057**		
			(2.04)		
ethnic diversity				2.404***	
				(2.86)	
sanctions					0.692
					(-0.92)
Outcome=failure					
ethnic conflict	3.252***	3.440***	3.559***	2.567***	2.982***
	(2.84)	(3.66)	(2.81)	(2.58)	(3.16)
late USSR	0.132***	0.149***	0.433*	0.197***	0.154***
	(-8.82)	(-9.33)	(-1.68)	(-9.08)	(-8.11)
liberal democracy	1.374	0.803	2.042	0.963	0.763
	(0.38)	(-0.23)	(0.57)	(-0.04)	(-0.31)
ethnic exclusion	2.675	4.757*		5.949**	5.609*
	(1.11)	(1.67)		(2.12)	(1.85)
population size	1.303**				
	(1.97)				
#coups		0.279			
		(-0.50)			
human rights			1.301		
			(0.63)		
human rights square			0.926		
			(-1.15)		
ethnic diversity				0.429**	
				(-2.38)	
sanctions					0.815
					(-0.50)
N	246	263	202	243	269

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z standard statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *ethnic exclusion* is dropped from column 3 due to separation.

Table A8: Robustness check of competing risks analysis to inclusion of additional controls (III)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.277***	0.266***	0.260***	0.225***	0.248***	0.208***
	(-4.21)	(-4.54)	(-3.61)	(-4.85)	(-4.81)	(-5.32)
late USSR	4.445***	4.203***		3.046***	4.147***	5.102***
	(5.73)	(5.72)		(2.77)	(5.87)	(5.47)
liberal democracy	21.851***	26.928***	3.246	6.037*	6.584**	5.003**
	(3.83)	(4.11)	(1.33)	(1.76)	(2.30)	(2.08)
ethnic exclusion	0.400***	0.416***	0.342***	0.405***	0.411***	0.448***
	(-2.91)	(-2.98)	(-3.54)	(-2.60)	(-3.25)	(-2.64)
alternative media	1.492*					
	(1.71)					
alternative media dummy		1.989**				
		(2.26)				
ethnic polarization			1.935			
			(1.14)			
mass media access				1.005		
				(1.34)		
radical flank					0.856	
					(-0.50)	
Latin America						0.598
						(-0.78)
Eastern Europe						0.666
						(-0.64)
South Asia						0.875
						(-0.20)
South East Asia						1.130
						(0.19)
MENA						0.613
						(-0.47)
Sub-Saharan Africa						1.017
						(0.03)
East Asia						0.288
						(-1.53)

Outcome=failure	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	2.891***	3.370***	2.831***	3.265***	3.016***	3.324***
	(2.72)	(2.96)	(2.83)	(3.13)	(3.37)	(2.94)
late USSR	0.140***	0.135***		0.210***	0.160***	0.116***
	(-9.97)	(-10.89)		(-3.22)	(-8.30)	(-9.74)
liberal democracy	0.120	0.073	1.303	0.863	0.757	1.025
	(-1.23)	(-1.58)	(0.27)	(-0.17)	(-0.29)	(0.03)
ethnic exclusion	5.932**	5.988**	6.395**	4.038	5.584*	4.893**
	(2.05)	(2.15)	(2.14)	(1.53)	(1.85)	(2.08)
alternative media	0.554					
	(-1.37)					
alternative media dummy		0.359***				
		(-2.59)				
ethnic polarization			0.362			
			(-0.97)			
mass media access				0.996		
				(-0.90)		
radical flank					1.100	
					(0.22)	
Latin America						1.165
						(0.15)
Eastern Europe						1.488
						(0.42)
South Asia						0.903
						(-0.10)
South East Asia						0.732
						(-0.32)
MENA						0.816
						(-0.19)
Sub-Saharan Africa						0.541
						(-0.64)
East Asia						2.211
						(0.73)
N	202	202	223	236	268	275

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *late USSR* is dropped from model 3 due to perfect collinearity. The baseline world region dummy in column 6 is Western Europe.

Table A9: Robustness check of competing risks analysis to inclusion of additional controls (IV)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ethnic conflict	0.291***	0.287***	0.282***	0.284***
	(-4.71)	(-4.79)	(-4.87)	(-4.86)
late USSR	3.888***	3.952***	3.597***	3.545***
	(6.18)	(6.02)	(5.96)	(5.24)
ethnic exclusion	0.442***	0.412***	0.370***	0.398***
	(-2.78)	(-3.10)	(-3.77)	(-3.25)
personalist	1.524			
	(1.40)			
democratic	1.497	1.508	1.353	1.346
	(1.06)	(1.08)	(0.80)	(0.74)
personalist2		1.321		
		(0.97)		
military			0.737	
			(-0.74)	
military2				0.909
				(-0.30)
Outcome=failure				
ethnic conflict	2.856***	3.027***	3.069***	3.069***
	(2.97)	(3.28)	(3.40)	(3.41)
late USSR	0.155***	0.148***	0.154***	0.144***
	(-9.82)	(-9.45)	(-9.49)	(-8.60)
ethnic exclusion	4.542	4.901*	4.939*	5.185*
	(1.59)	(1.70)	(1.73)	(1.72)
personalist	0.562			
	(-0.70)			
democratic	0.933	0.916	0.956	0.895
	(-0.18)	(-0.23)	(-0.12)	(-0.27)
personalist2		0.754		
		(-0.66)		
military			0.735	
			(-0.35)	
military2				0.759
				(-0.70)
N	268	268	268	268

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location county. Note: the regime type dummies are from Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2), 2014: 313-331. *Personalist* flags regimes coded as "personal" by Geddes and coauthors, while *personalist2* includes also mixed regimes as "party-personal" and "party-personal-military." Analogously, *military* flags regimes coded as "military," while *military2* includes also "military-personal," "indirect military," "party-military," and "party-personal-military." The omitted regime category in all specifications corresponds to other types of authoritarian regimes.

Table A10: Robustness check of competing risks analysis to inclusion of additional controls (V)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ethnic conflict	0.246***	0.269***	0.248***	0.240***	0.238***
	(-4.99)	(-4.78)	(-4.95)	(-4.98)	(-4.78)
late USSR	3.691***	2.642***	4.413***	2.799***	4.446***
	(6.83)	(3.86)	(6.16)	(4.53)	(4.20)
polity2	1.071***	1.063***			
	(3.18)	(2.76)			
ethnic exclusion	0.380***	0.371***	0.362***	0.397***	0.445***
	(-3.44)	(-3.49)	(-3.49)	(-3.14)	(-2.98)
polity2 square		0.990*			
		(-1.87)			
polity2 dummy			2.261***		
			(3.00)		
autocracy dummy				0.342***	
				(-3.15)	
anocracy dummy				0.872	
				(-0.42)	
liberal democracy					6.815**
					(2.35)
latent human rights					1.015
					(0.10)
Outcome=failure					
ethnic conflict	3.290***	3.229***	3.381***	3.330***	3.057***
	(3.60)	(3.49)	(3.54)	(3.51)	(3.06)
late USSR	0.155***	0.226***	0.145***	0.195***	0.117***
	(-11.41)	(-6.19)	(-10.35)	(-6.63)	(-6.91)
polity2	0.967	0.970			
	(-1.13)	(-1.27)			
ethnic exclusion	5.127*	5.894*	4.794*	4.847	4.517
	(1.78)	(1.82)	(1.69)	(1.62)	(1.60)
polity2 square		1.015**			
		(2.57)			
polity2 dummy			0.844		
			(-0.45)		
autocracy dummy				1.668	
				(1.34)	
anocracy dummy				0.623	
				(-1.05)	
liberal democracy					0.870
					(-0.15)
latent human rights					0.817
					(-1.12)
N	271	271	258	271	270

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: *polity2 dummy* in column 3 is based on *polity2*'s component variables, indicating cases in which a regime holds competitive elections (*exrec*>7) *and* has effective political participation (*parcomp*=0 or >2). Column 4 introduces a trichotomous variable based on *polity2* indicating democratic (values from 6 to 10), autocratic (-10 to -6), and mixed regimes (-5 to 5), with democratic being the baseline category.

Table A11: Robustness check of logit analysis (Table 2) to using an alternative database including campaign-years not meeting NAVCO 2.0's criteria

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ethnic conflict	-1.633***	-2.033***	-2.177***	-2.010***
	(-3.31)	(-4.69)	(-4.90)	(-4.24)
late USSR		2.524***	2.699***	2.746***
		(8.50)	(7.28)	(7.23)
liberal democracy			1.062	0.984
			(0.80)	(0.74)
ethnic exclusion				-1.579**
				(-2.29)
N	107	107	107	107

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: compared to the dataset used for the main analysis, the alternative database includes seven campaigns that do not appear to have met NAVCO 2.0's criteria (including some whose occurrence could not be confirmed at all) (Anti-Rawlings (Ghana), 2000; Druze resistance (Israel), 1982; Indonesian leftists/Anti Sukarno (Indonesia), 1956-60; IRA (United Kingdom), 1994-95 and 1999-2006; Marxist rebels (URNG) (Guatemala), 1964; Tanzania pro-democracy movement (Tanzania), 1992-1995), and it treats the last year (1992) of the anti-Burnham /Hoyte (Guyana) campaign as violent (following NAVCO 2.0), even if there is no evidence of a shift to violence.

Table A12: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 3) to using an alternative database including campaign-years not meeting NAVCO 2.0's criteria

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.345***	0.269***	0.218***	0.236***	0.220***	0.206***
	(-3.38)	(-5.36)	(-5.27)	(-4.85)	(-4.56)	(-4.65)
late USSR		3.161***	4.099***	4.717***	4.191***	3.168***
		(6.50)	(6.60)	(6.55)	(4.92)	(3.68)
liberal democracy			4.796*	4.840**	4.445**	3.660
			(1.90)	(2.02)	(1.98)	(1.64)
ethnic exclusion				0.429***	0.528**	0.468***
				(-3.41)	(-2.56)	(-3.00)
urban population					1.001	
					(0.09)	
youth bulge						0.937
						(-1.33)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	2.879***	3.543***	3.645***	2.997***	3.523***	3.528***
	(3.14)	(4.19)	(4.30)	(3.40)	(3.41)	(3.46)
late USSR		0.157***	0.150***	0.148***	0.224***	0.183***
		(-11.97)	(-10.05)	(-10.13)	(-4.10)	(-5.24)
liberal democracy			0.747	0.775	1.524	1.025
			(-0.41)	(-0.37)	(0.51)	(0.04)
ethnic exclusion				3.192	2.597	2.416
				(1.61)	(1.32)	(1.24)
urban population					0.989	
					(-1.33)	
youth bulge						1.027
						(0.49)
N	296	296	296	296	264	264

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: see note to Table A11 above.

Table A13: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 4) to using an alternative database including campaign-years not meeting NAVCO 2.0's criteria

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.186***	0.316***	0.263***	0.227***	0.220***	0.480**
	(-4.32)	(-4.12)	(-4.21)	(-5.15)	(-4.45)	(-2.48)
late USSR	6.924***	3.218***	2.751***	1.982***	5.753***	4.867***
	(6.17)	(4.65)	(3.50)	(3.08)	(6.55)	(6.97)
liberal democracy	6.043**	5.713**	1.514	9.039***	6.296**	7.448**
	(2.37)	(2.34)	(0.49)	(3.20)	(2.22)	(2.53)
ethnic exclusion	0.570**	0.448***	0.456***	0.461***	0.588*	0.417***
	(-2.02)	(-3.00)	(-2.96)	(-3.25)	(-1.81)	(-3.48)
GDP per capita	0.944					
	(-0.49)					
regime durability		0.985**				
		(-1.99)				
human rights			1.118			
			(1.14)			
regional campaigns				1.098***		
				(3.88)		
western aid					1.007	
					(0.21)	
self-determination						0.315**
						(-2.47)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	5.513***	3.056***	3.508***	3.518***	5.870***	1.963
	(3.79)	(3.21)	(2.74)	(3.54)	(3.66)	(1.43)
late USSR	0.229***	0.154***	0.264***	0.296***	0.195***	0.139***
	(-3.34)	(-9.41)	(-3.82)	(-3.18)	(-4.88)	(-10.10)
liberal democracy	0.969	0.697	1.721	0.470	0.927	0.549
	(-0.03)	(-0.47)	(0.62)	(-0.87)	(-0.06)	(-0.86)
ethnic exclusion	1.703	2.868	2.463	2.852	1.692	3.201
	(0.68)	(1.45)	(0.81)	(1.48)	(0.59)	(1.63)
GDP per capita	0.881					
	(-0.81)					
regime durability		1.003				
		(0.54)				
human rights			0.905			
			(-1.11)			
regional campaigns				0.890**		
				(-2.23)		
western aid					1.012	
					(0.13)	
self-determination						1.919
						(1.52)
N	224	284	218	281	211	296

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: see note to Table A11 above.

Table A14: Robustness check of logit analysis (Table 2) to dropping the First Intifada

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ethnic conflict	-1.759***	-2.201***	-2.338***	-2.077***
	(-3.22)	(-4.66)	(-4.73)	(-4.13)
late USSR		2.408***	2.570***	2.581***
		(8.38)	(7.25)	(7.34)
liberal democracy			1.917	1.956
			(1.23)	(1.28)
ethnic exclusion				-1.923**
				(-1.96)
N	98	98	98	98

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A15: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 3) to dropping the First Intifada

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.342***	0.261***	0.232***	0.260***	0.240***	0.237***
	(-3.35)	(-5.73)	(-5.32)	(-4.68)	(-4.50)	(-4.51)
late USSR		3.063***	3.797***	4.272***	4.349***	2.707***
		(6.60)	(6.42)	(6.43)	(4.97)	(3.33)
liberal democracy			7.393**	8.179**	8.294***	5.955**
			(2.23)	(2.50)	(2.67)	(2.09)
ethnic exclusion				0.425***	0.541**	0.461***
				(-3.23)	(-2.42)	(-2.94)
urban population					0.996	
					(-0.58)	
youth bulge						0.930
						(-1.53)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	3.076***	3.929***	3.945***	3.125***	3.883***	3.910***
	(3.01)	(4.15)	(4.16)	(3.41)	(3.63)	(3.70)
late USSR		0.163***	0.158***	0.156***	0.181***	0.178***
		(-11.03)	(-9.55)	(-9.65)	(-4.83)	(-4.96)
liberal democracy			0.720	0.715	0.964	0.932
			(-0.29)	(-0.30)	(-0.03)	(-0.07)
ethnic exclusion				5.247*	3.536	
				(1.78)	(1.32)	
urban population					0.998	
					(-0.25)	
youth bulge						1.009
						(0.14)
N	268	268	268	268	239	239

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A16: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 4) to dropping the First Intifada

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.208***	0.318***	0.314***	0.227***	0.261***	0.464***
	(-4.25)	(-3.91)	(-4.06)	(-4.77)	(-4.11)	(-2.59)
late USSR	6.181***	3.074***	1.999***	1.897***	5.675***	4.540***
	(5.79)	(4.50)	(2.61)	(2.83)	(6.64)	(6.64)
liberal democracy	8.695**	7.138**	3.447	9.974***	10.047**	11.060***
	(2.50)	(2.31)	(1.22)	(2.97)	(2.27)	(2.65)
ethnic exclusion	0.579*	0.431***		0.442***	0.655	0.419***
	(-1.85)	(-2.93)		(-3.28)	(-1.54)	(-3.24)
GDP per capita	0.941					
	(-0.47)					
regime durability		0.986*				
		(-1.69)				
human rights			1.188*			
			(1.93)			
regional campaigns				1.101***		
				(4.12)		
western aid					1.051**	
					(2.11)	
self-determination						0.371**
						(-2.30)

Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	5.712***	3.264***	3.963***	3.528***	4.871***	2.166
	(3.73)	(3.21)	(3.19)	(3.61)	(3.13)	(1.60)
late USSR	0.260**	0.164***	0.344***	0.307***	0.182***	0.147***
	(-2.44)	(-7.95)	(-2.74)	(-3.01)	(-5.03)	(-9.66)
liberal democracy	0.926	0.866	1.335	0.676	0.423	0.554
	(-0.07)	(-0.14)	(0.25)	(-0.37)	(-0.60)	(-0.55)
ethnic exclusion	2.529	4.680*		5.152*	1.832	5.255*
	(0.87)	(1.65)		(1.82)	(0.62)	(1.78)
GDP per capita	0.868					
	(-0.61)					
regime durability		1.004				
		(0.47)				
human rights			0.812*			
			(-1.81)			
regional campaigns				0.889**		
				(-2.22)		
western aid					0.897	
					(-1.07)	
self-determination						1.787
						(1.36)
N	200	256	202	268	194	268

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: Column 3 does not include *ethnic exclusion* due to separation.

Table A17: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 3) to dropping the East Timor campaign in 1989-1998

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.341***	0.260***	0.224***	0.250***	0.231***	0.226***
	(-3.37)	(-5.69)	(-5.34)	(-4.74)	(-4.57)	(-4.52)
late USSR		3.070***	3.840***	4.333***	4.555***	2.761***
		(6.50)	(6.16)	(6.17)	(5.05)	(3.39)
liberal democracy			6.001**	6.638**	7.155**	4.899*
			(2.04)	(2.29)	(2.49)	(1.89)
ethnic exclusion				0.427***	0.547**	0.463***
				(-3.21)	(-2.39)	(-2.91)
urban population					0.995	
					(-0.76)	
youth bulge						0.930
						(-1.50)
Outcome=failure	265	265	265	265	236	236
ethnic conflict	3.292***	4.239***	4.327***	3.424***	4.380***	4.378***
	(3.11)	(4.25)	(4.28)	(3.53)	(3.82)	(3.78)
late USSR		0.151***	0.144***	0.142***	0.163***	0.172***
		(-11.38)	(-9.30)	(-9.42)	(-5.54)	(-4.97)
liberal democracy			0.642	0.637	0.823	0.793
			(-0.49)	(-0.50)	(-0.22)	(-0.27)
ethnic exclusion				5.283*	3.571	3.605
				(1.79)	(1.33)	(1.40)
urban population					0.997	
					(-0.37)	
youth bulge						1.027
						(0.42)
N	265	265	265	265	236	236

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: The logit analysis using the sample dropping the East Timor campaign in 1989-1998 is identical to the one reported in Table 2 in the article, so the corresponding table is not reported here.

Table A18: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 4) to dropping to dropping the East Timor campaign in 1989-1998

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.199***	0.312***	0.297***	0.219***	0.237***	0.456***
	(-4.20)	(-3.99)	(-3.98)	(-4.77)	(-4.06)	(-2.65)
late USSR	6.441***	3.034***	2.007**	1.891***	5.943***	4.626***
	(5.69)	(4.36)	(2.46)	(2.81)	(6.16)	(6.45)
liberal democracy	7.474**	5.810**	2.400	8.391***	7.214**	9.541**
	(2.30)	(2.08)	(0.90)	(2.74)	(1.98)	(2.50)
ethnic exclusion	0.582*	0.432***		0.443***	0.655	0.420***
	(-1.84)	(-2.90)		(-3.26)	(-1.54)	(-3.22)
GDP per capita	0.928					
	(-0.59)					
regime durability		0.985*				
		(-1.80)				
human rights			1.195*			
			(1.95)			
regional campaigns				1.102***		
				(4.07)		
western aid					1.052**	
					(2.13)	
self-determination						0.353**
						(-2.28)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	6.974***	3.557***	4.383***	3.911***	6.010***	2.159
	(3.81)	(3.30)	(3.40)	(3.76)	(3.24)	(1.59)
late USSR	0.193***	0.149***	0.308***	0.288***	0.143***	0.127***
	(-3.08)	(-7.71)	(-3.02)	(-3.11)	(-5.00)	(-9.74)
liberal democracy	0.614	0.712	1.015	0.514	0.347	0.410
	(-0.43)	(-0.40)	(0.01)	(-0.78)	(-0.90)	(-1.02)
ethnic exclusion	2.501	4.709*		5.180*	1.854	5.299*
	(0.87)	(1.65)		(1.83)	(0.63)	(1.79)
GDP per capita	0.893					
	(-0.58)					
regime durability		1.004				
		(0.49)				
human rights			0.807*			
			(-1.86)			
regional campaigns				0.881**		
				(-2.41)		
western aid					0.900	
					(-1.11)	
self-determination						2.131*
						(1.74)
N	197	253	192	265	191	265

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: column 3 does not include *ethnic exclusion* due to separation.

Table A19: Robustness check of core logit specification (Table 2, column 4) to inclusion of colonial campaigns

	(1)	(2)
ethnic conflict	-2.234***	-2.260***
	(-4.41)	(-4.12)
late USSR	2.662***	2.681***
	(7.11)	(7.19)
liberal democracy	1.786	1.661
	(1.54)	(1.24)
ethnic exclusion	-1.946**	-1.946**
	(-1.99)	(-1.99)
anticolonial		0.164
		(0.14)
N	108	108

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A20: Robustness check of core competing risk specification (Table 3, column 4) to inclusion of colonial campaigns

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)
ethnic conflict	0.219***	0.237***
	(-5.09)	(-4.74)
late USSR	4.791***	4.581***
	(6.64)	(6.42)
liberal democracy	6.182***	7.561***
	(2.77)	(2.58)
ethnic exclusion	0.417***	0.417***
	(-3.22)	(-3.25)
anticolonial		0.680
		(-0.46)
Outcome=failure		
ethnic conflict	3.226***	3.198***
	(3.53)	(3.49)
late USSR	0.149***	0.149***
	(-9.81)	(-10.01)
liberal democracy	0.524	0.471
	(-1.03)	(-0.73)
ethnic exclusion	5.256*	5.257*
	(1.79)	(1.79)
anticolonial		1.107
		(0.11)
N	303	303

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A21: Robustness check of logit analysis (Table 2) to keeping the original coding of Kenya's anti-Arap Moi campaign outcome (success)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ethnic conflict	-1.641***	-2.034***	-2.120***	-1.861***
	(-3.09)	(-4.29)	(-4.43)	(-3.82)
late USSR		2.299***	2.413***	2.422***
		(7.67)	(6.72)	(6.81)
liberal democracy			1.154	1.165
			(0.79)	(0.82)
ethnic exclusion				-1.895*
				(-1.93)
N	99	99	99	99

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A22: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 3) to keeping the original coding of Kenya's anti-Arap Moi campaign outcome (success)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.365***	0.287***	0.250***	0.280***	0.262***	0.261***
	(-3.32)	(-5.16)	(-4.96)	(-4.33)	(-4.25)	(-4.10)
late USSR		2.826***	3.492***	3.900***	4.228***	2.526***
		(5.76)	(5.64)	(5.67)	(4.98)	(3.11)
liberal democracy			5.594**	6.145**	6.900**	4.478*
			(2.00)	(2.24)	(2.53)	(1.81)
ethnic exclusion				0.431***	0.558**	0.477***
				(-3.22)	(-2.36)	(-2.86)
urban population					0.994	
					(-0.96)	
youth bulge						0.937
						(-1.37)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	2.883***	3.593***	3.615***	2.862***	3.499***	3.456***
	(2.88)	(3.88)	(3.93)	(3.16)	(3.40)	(3.35)
late USSR		0.177***	0.174***	0.172***	0.179***	0.196***
		(-10.27)	(-8.48)	(-8.59)	(-5.35)	(-4.39)
liberal democracy			0.850	0.843	0.976	1.093
			(-0.17)	(-0.18)	(-0.03)	(0.10)
ethnic exclusion				5.259*	3.410	3.493
				(1.78)	(1.29)	(1.35)
urban population					1.002	
					(0.26)	
youth bulge						1.003
						(0.04)
N	275	275	275	275	246	246

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country.

Table A23: Robustness check of competing risks analysis (Table 4) to keeping the original coding of Kenya's anti-Arap Moi campaign outcome (success)

Outcome=success	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.236***	0.350***	0.346***	0.246***	0.288***	0.586*
	(-3.90)	(-3.46)	(-3.58)	(-4.46)	(-3.52)	(-1.80)
late USSR	5.731***	2.728***	1.710*	1.707**	5.171***	4.131***
	(5.59)	(3.80)	(1.92)	(2.16)	(5.92)	(6.18)
liberal democracy	6.742**	5.455**	2.130	7.763***	6.260*	9.786***
	(2.30)	(2.06)	(0.80)	(2.70)	(1.93)	(2.58)
ethnic exclusion	0.594*	0.435***		0.448***	0.684	0.423***
	(-1.82)	(-2.91)		(-3.27)	(-1.42)	(-3.24)
GDP per capita	0.916					
	(-0.70)					
regime durability		0.985*				
		(-1.86)				
human rights			1.217**			
			(2.18)			
regional campaigns				1.103***		
				(4.38)		
western aid					1.060**	
					(2.34)	
self-determination						0.276***
						(-2.77)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	4.728***	2.876***	3.339***	3.248***	4.242***	1.593
	(3.43)	(2.82)	(2.82)	(3.40)	(3.11)	(0.91)
late USSR	0.288**	0.187***	0.465**	0.383**	0.176***	0.155***
	(-2.53)	(-6.80)	(-2.05)	(-2.00)	(-5.03)	(-8.80)
liberal democracy	1.170	0.957	1.673	0.700	0.710	0.545
	(0.15)	(-0.05)	(0.40)	(-0.41)	(-0.29)	(-0.68)
ethnic exclusion	2.512	4.716*		5.144*	1.502	5.276*
	(0.87)	(1.65)		(1.82)	(0.44)	(1.79)
GDP per capita	0.916					
	(-0.41)					
regime durability		1.006				
		(0.66)				
human rights			0.762**			
			(-2.42)			
regional campaigns				0.868**		
				(-2.05)		
western aid					0.767**	
					(-2.54)	
self-determination						2.458**
						(2.01)
N	207	263	202	275	201	275

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: Column 3 does not include *ethnic exclusion* due to separation.

Table A24: Logit analysis of the outcome of violent campaigns

Original NAVCO 2.0's outcome coding	(1)	(2)	(3)	Corrected outcome coding	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	-0.162	-0.157	-0.127		0.135	0.138	0.163
	(-0.47)	(-0.45)	(-0.35)		(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.45)
liberal democracy		-0.355	-0.376			-0.206	-0.222
		(-0.32)	(-0.33)			(-0.20)	(-0.21)
ethnic exclusion			-0.359				-0.293
			(-0.54)				(-0.45)
N	127	127	127		127	127	127

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: columns 4-6 use an alternative coding of campaign outcomes, based on case specific research. The following campaigns are recoded as successes rather than failures: "Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh," "Dniestr," "Kosovo Albanian," and "Kurdish Secession against Saddam"; "Liberals of 1949" is recoded as failure rather than success. See codebook for details.

Table A25: Competing risks analysis of the outcome of violent campaigns

Outcome=success	Original NAVCO 2.0's outcome coding			Corrected outcome coding		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ethnic conflict	0.836	0.844	0.895	1.021	0.967	1.084
	(-0.72)	(-0.68)	(-0.40)	(0.08)	(-0.12)	(0.28)
liberal democracy		0.690	0.627		0.396	0.687
		(-0.45)	(-0.55)		(-1.07)	(-0.53)
ethnic exclusion			0.559			0.577
			(-1.13)			(-1.30)
Outcome=failure						
ethnic conflict	1.088	1.105	1.089	0.907	0.922	0.912
	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.35)	(-0.40)	(-0.32)	(-0.37)
liberal democracy		0.797	0.776		0.781	0.755
		(-0.36)	(-0.40)		(-0.38)	(-0.42)
ethnic exclusion			1.000			0.950
			(-0.00)			(-0.13)
N	1269	1267	1259	1269	1267	1259

Inference: p<.01 ***, p<.05 **, p<.1* (Z statistic). Clustered standard errors by location country. Note: columns 4-6 use an alternative coding of campaign outcomes (see note to Table A24 above).

Table A26: Tests of proportional sub-hazards

Models from Table 3 Outcome=success	time	log(time)	Models from Table 3 Outcome=failure	time	log(time)
Model 1	(none)	ethnic conflict*	Model 1	ethnic conflict*	(none)
Model 2	(none)	late USSR*	Model 2	ethnic conflict*	(none)
Model 3	(none)	late USSR*	Model 3	ethnic conflict*	(none)
Model 4	(none)	(none)	Model 4	ethnic conflict*	(none)
Model 5	(none)	(none)	Model 5	(none)	late USSR*; urban population*
Model 6	(none)	(none)	Model 6	(none)	late USSR*; youth bulge*
Models from Table 4 Outcome=success			Models from Table 4 Outcome=failure		
Model 1	(none)	(none)	Model 1	ethnic exclusion*	(none)
Model 2	(none)	(none)	Model 2	(none)	(none)
Model 3	(none)	(none)	Model 3	human rights*	late USSR*; human rights*
Model 4	(none)	(none)	Model 4	ethnic conflict*	late USSR*
Model 5	(none)	late USSR*	Model 5	late USSR*	late USSR*
Model 6	(none)	ethnic conflict*	Model 6	(none)	(none)

Inference: p<.05 *, p<.01**. Note: the table reports variables whose interactions with time and log of time reach statistical significance at least at the 95% confidence level.

Codebook

1. Introduction

This Codebook provides information on the coding procedures followed for the creation of the dataset used for "Ethnic Conflict and the Limits of Non-Violent Resistance." This dataset is built on NAVCO 2.0, using as units of analysis years of large-scale nonviolent campaigns with maximalist goals of regime change, anti-occupation, and self-determination/secession, in the years 1945 to 2006. NAVCO 2.0 defines large-scale campaigns as "series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective" with at least 1,000 observed participants.[1]

Section 2 describes the operationalization of the key independent variable – ETHNIC CONFLICT – and documents the coding of each campaign in the dataset. Section 3 details the coding procedure for the creation of the main dependent variable (OUTCOME). Section 4 details the changes I made to NAVCO 2.0. Section 5 presents a description of all variables used in the analysis.

2. Coding ETHNIC CONFLICT

The dummy variable ETHNIC CONFLICT indicates whether the politically most powerful ethnic group – the "state-controlling" group – differs from the ethnic group(s) "dominating" the non-violent movement – the challenger. Thus there would be ethnic conflict if, say, Sunni Arabs control the state, while the protestors are Shia Arabs and Kurds.[2]

To code the state-controlling ethnic group, I follow the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which provides information on ethnic groups' access to executive power.[3] I consider an ethnic group as the politically most powerful/state-controlling in a given campaign-year if, according to EPR, the group has monopoly or dominant access to executive power, or if it is the only senior partner in a power-sharing system in the government against which the non-violent campaign is being conducted.[4] Thus, for example, the Afrikaners were the state-controlling group in South

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[1] Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, "Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3), 2013: 415–423, p. 416.

[2] NAVCO 2.0 contains a dummy variable (CDIVERS_ETHNICITY) indicating whether a "campaign embraces ethnic diversity." However, this variable is not useful for my purposes for two reasons. First, it does not specify how many ethnic groups are participating in the campaign and their power relations. In a country with only two ethnic groups, ethnic diversity is easily interpreted as participation of members of both groups; but in a country with three or more ethnic groups, interpretation is more difficult: in a country with three groups where A is state-controlling, a coding of ethnic diversity may suggest that members of group A are participating (which could imply the absence of ethnic conflict, for our purposes) or that protesters span the B-C cleavage (which could indicate the presence of an ethnic conflict). Second, the ethnic diversity variable does not identify a threshold of participation by ethnic groups for a campaign to be considered diverse, which makes it inappropriate as an indicator about whether a specific ethnic group plays a dominant role in it.

[3] Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62 (1), 2010: 87–119.

[4] If the EPR dataset codes ethnicity as "irrelevant" in the political life of a country affected by a nonviolent campaign (and thus it does not identify a state-controlling ethnic group), I assume that the campaign is not characterized by ethnic conflict, but I double check the accuracy of the coding by examining the ethnic affiliation of the incumbent and the challenger through case-specific sources.

Africa during the anti-apartheid campaign, as the EPR codes the group as having dominant access to power in the relevant years. Following the criterion suggested by Nils-Christian Bormann and coauthors, in cases with multiple senior power-sharing members (e.g., the former Yugoslavia), I code the demographically largest group as state-controlling (the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia case).[5] Thus only one ethnic group is considered as state-controlling at any given time, which implies that any other ethnic group in the country can in principle dominate an ethnic challenge (for example, the Croat nonviolent campaign in 1970-71 constitutes an instance of ethnic conflict as it was dominated by Croats, which were senior power-sharing members in the former Yugoslavia, but are not considered state-controlling because of the larger Serbian population).

In countries under foreign occupation or in which the bulk of the repressive forces deployed against the challengers are from abroad, the foreign country is considered as state-controlling and thus a coding of ethnic conflict is used (ETHNIC CONFLICT=1). For example, I code the so-called "Cedar Revolution" in Lebanon as ethnic conflict because the country was under Syrian occupation (in fact, ending the long-standing occupation was the main goal of the campaign); similarly, I code the 1953 East Berlin and 1968 Prague uprisings as ethnic conflicts as Soviet forces played a key role in quelling the local unrest in both cases. Following similar logic, non-violent anti-colonial campaigns are coded as ethnic, because, almost by definition, they pit an ethnic-other colonial power against a local population striving for self-determination.

I code the ethnicity of the nonviolent movement based on the identity of its members, i.e., participants in protests, strikes, sit-ins, and members of the main organizations taking part in the movement, such as unions, political parties, student groups, and civil society organizations, rather than its claims. I code a movement as "dominated" by an ethnic group (or multiple ethnic groups) if an overwhelming majority of its participants belong that ethnic group (or those ethnic groups). So in a case in which ethnic group X is state-controlling and members of groups Y and Z dominate the challenger movement, there is ethnic conflict.

While typically case-specific sources do not contain precise estimates of the ethnic breakdown of movement participants, they often provide information about the ethnic background of the movement, which can be used for coding ethnic dominance. In particular, I treat the prevalence of descriptions like "the Black protestors," the "Sunni union organizing the strikes," "most of the participants were of X and Y ethnicity," or "the stronghold of the movement was in the X community" as indicating that the overwhelming majority of movement participants belong to the corresponding ethnic group(s). Absence of references of these kinds in the sources or explicit discussions of the limited or merely symbolic role played by members of certain ethnic groups indicate that they did not dominate the movement. As implied above, the nonviolent campaign may be dominated by more than one ethnic group. For example, in the anti-communist campaign in Czechoslovakia in 1989 (known as the "Velvet Revolution") both Czech and Slovak organizations challenged the government (in particular, the Civic Union and Public Against Violence, respectively).

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[5] Nils-Christian Bormann, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Manuel Vogt, "Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (4), 2017: 744-771.

If the above procedure indicates that the state-controlling ethnic group is different from those dominating the non-violent movement (as in the case of the Black anti-apartheid movement against the Afrikaner-dominated South African government), I code the campaign as characterized by ethnic conflict (ETHNIC CONFLICT=1). Conversely, I code a campaign as characterized by the absence of ethnic conflict (ETHNIC CONFLICT=0) if the state-controlling ethnic group dominates the nonviolent movement, either alone (as with the Serb-dominated movement against Milosevic in Serbia in the years 1996-2000) or with other groups (for example, both Czechs and Slovaks dominated the Velvet Revolution, with the Czechs coded as state-controlling, as they were senior partners in a power-sharing system). In cases in which available sources do not explicitly discuss the ethnic make-up of the non-violent movement, I code the absence of ethnic conflict (ETHNIC CONFLICT=0) if there are indications that the movement bridged the country's ethnic divides, such as references to the fact that its members "belonged to all walks of life;" that they "spanned ethnic lines;" that the "movement mobilized broad social groups like student and teacher organizations, government employee or trade unions" (unless there is evidence that only certain ethnicities tend to belong to these social groups); or that a key organization in the movement is a political party whose constituency spans ethnic lines, including the ethnic group in power.

It is important to emphasize that the fact that members of the state-controlling ethnic group may participate in a non-violent movement does not automatically make the challenge non-ethnic, as the key criterion is playing a dominant role rather than mere participation in the movement. In fact, even in cases that seem to embody our intuitive notion of an ethnic challenge, like the Palestinian Intifada or the anti-apartheid movement, activists belonging to the state-controlling group contributed in some fashion to the nonviolent struggle.[6]

It should also be noted that the ethnic identity of movement leaders does not automatically determine the ethnic affiliation of the movement. However, I do use information about the ethnic background of leaders of the movement or organizations participating in it to buttress coding in cases in which information on movement memberships is limited.

Below I provide the rationale for coding of the ETHNIC CONFLICT variable for each of the campaigns in the dataset. For each of the campaign, I report the coding of the variable ETHID from the Svensson and Lindgren (henceforth Svensson and Lindgren 2010) dataset, if the campaign was included in it.[7] This variable seems to be capturing a similar concept to ETHNIC CONFLICT, but the authors do not provide clear and replicable operationalization criteria or case-by-case coding information, and the variable is described in ambiguous terms in the text: on p. 107 it is noted that ETHID "is coded as 1 if the identity of either the dominant group of the unarmed insurrection or the government has a distinct ethnic feature;" on p. 108 it is observed that the variable indicates whether "the government and group of the unarmed insurrection can be separated along ethnic identities."

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[6] Orna Sasson-Levy and Tamar Rapoport, "Body, Gender, and Knowledge in Protest Movements," *Gender & Society* 17 (3), 2003: 379-40; Yeheskel Hasenfeld, *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 20002); Joshua N. Lazerson, *Against The Tide: Whites in the Struggle Against Apartheid* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).
[7] Isak Svensson and Mathilda Lindgren, "Community and Consent: Unarmed Insurrections in Non-democracies," *European Journal of International Relations* 17 (1), 2010: 97–120.

I use a variety of case-specific sources (newspapers, scholarly works, and reports from NGOs, IOs, and think tanks) in addition to the following general sources on nonviolent resistance and ethnic politics:

- The Swarthmore College's Global Nonviolent Action Database (henceforth the Swarthmore Database) (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/about-database);

- International Center on Nonviolent Conflict's Resource Library (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/resource-library/).

- April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action* (London: Housmans Bookshop, 2006).

- The EPR dataset (https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas).

- The ACD2EPR dataset (https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/acd2epr/).

- Sebastian Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

2.1 Codings of campaign outcomes

Madagascar, Active Forces/Living Forces, 1991-93
Non-ethnic.

There is no indication of the protests being dominated by the Highlanders/Merina – the other ethnic group in the country besides the state-controlling Côtiers – and there is evidence that the movement bridged the country's main ethnic cleavage, warranting a non-ethnic coding.

According to the EPR dataset, the two politically relevant ethnic groups in the country are the Highlanders/Merina (40% of the population) and the Côtiers (48%), respectively junior and senior partners in a power-sharing system in the period 1976-2001.[8] The EPR database country report explicitly says with regard to the country's major political transitions (including those in NAVCO 2.0 in 1993 and 2003; see the second Madagascar case below) that "none of the parties involved could be identified as representing a specific ethnic group."[9]

Richard Marcus and Adrien Ratsimbaharison's observations about the most important organization of the opposition movement (Active Forces), which also won the first multi-party elections following campaign success, consistently suggest that it was *not* exclusively dominated by the country's ethnic minority, rather it spanned the country's ethnic divide:

> "Former President Zafy Albert's Hery Velona (Living Forces) coalition was an electoralist catch-all party distinguished by its shallow organization, superficial and vague ideology, and attempts to aggregate a wide range of social interests with the overriding goal of winning elections and governing."[10]

Other descriptions of the nonviolent movement indicate a broad social base, which would be incompatible with exclusive domination by the country's ethnic minority. For example, Solofo Randrianja refers to the Active Forces as "a broad opposition alliance."[11] Consistently, the Swarthmore Database reports "civil service strikes and protests organized by the Forces Vives [Living Forces] that involved indignant citizens from all over the country" and notes that the "unrest was widespread and apparent, taking hold among the working class citizens of Madagascar, the politicians, and soon the military."[12]

Furthermore, the Swarthmore Database mentions that the National Council of Christian Churches joined the protest movement in 1991 (with no indication of an ethnic slant). Consistent with the coding of the movement as crossing the country's ethnic cleavage, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (citing an article by *Le Monde*) reports that 16 political parties and

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[8] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Madagascar.
[9] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Madagascar.
[10] Richard R. Marcus and Adrien M. Ratsimbaharison, "Political Parties in Madagascar: Neopatrimonial Tools or Democratic Instruments?" *Party Politics* 11 (4), 2005: 495–512, p. 497.
[11] Solofo Randrianja, "'Be Not Afraid, Only Believe': Madagascar 2002," *African Affairs* 102 (407), 2003: 309-329, p 310.
[12] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-citizens-force-free-elections-1990-1992.

over 50 socio-professional organizations were involved in the movement.[13] Finally, the most popular leader of the nonviolent movement, Albert Zafy, was a member of the state-controlling ethnic group, the Cotier.[14] Zafy would become the new president in 1993 (with a 3 to 1 margin, indicating strong support among both ethnic groups) and formed a very broad government coalition, again suggesting that the base of support of the Living Forces bridged Madagascar's ethnic divide.

In sum, the fact that the protest movement occurred across the entire country and involved a large number of opposition parties and socio-professional organizations point to the appropriateness of coding the case as non-ethnic.

As there are only two main ethnic groups in Madagascar, the variable in NAVCO 2.0 indicating ethnic diversity of the movement could provide useful information (if the campaign is ethnically diverse, both groups would need to be involved). However, the variable is missing for this campaign (but it is equal to 1 for the second campaign in Madagascar).

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) consistently code the case as non-ethnic.

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[13] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Madagascar: Information on a general strike launched by the coalition of parties known as the Forces Vives," November 1, 1994, MDG18960.E (http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ab738c.html).

[14] Hery Velona's main political leaders besides Zafy Albert were Manandafy Rakotonirina (I was unable to find any information on his ethnic background) and Richard Andriamanjato (Merina).

Madagascar, Pro-democracy movement, 2002
Non-ethnic.

According to EPR, ethnicity was "irrelevant" from 2002 on, while the Côtiers were senior power-sharing partners up to 2001;[15] as the switch to "irrelevance" occurred after the nonviolent campaign in early 2002 succeeded, I code the Côtiers as the state-controlling ethnic group.[16]

The leader of the opposition movement (and winner of the 2002 presidential election) Ravolomanana, running against Ratisiraka (who had returned to power in 1996), was a Highlander (Merina); but he was at the helm of a broad-based movement cutting across the ethnic cleavage. Ratsiraka tried unsuccessfully to play the ethnic card: "there were few real signs of a radical split in political opinion along ethnic lines. Ravalomanana clearly had the support of a majority of voters not only in the central high-lands but also in the provinces of Fianarantsoa and Antsiranana, and possibly in at least one other, and at least substantial support even in Ratsiraka's own fief of Toamasina province."[17]

In discussing the OAU's mediation, Randrianja notes that this effort was driven by a misunderstanding of the nature of the dispute: "In particular, many interpretations were based on an incorrect assumption that the conflict was ethnic in nature, or could soon become so. Such interpretations portrayed the contest as being between Ravalomanana, from a minor noble family of the central highlands, with a support base limited to Antananarivo or at most the surrounding areas, and Ratsiraka, the champion of the coastal areas, sometimes represented as victims of a permanent oppression from the island's central district. Ratsiraka's strategy was to work on this supposed dichotomy, which had been accepted by a number of protagonists who had overlooked the evidence that Ravalomanana appeared to have majority electoral support."[18] Consistently, Marcus and Ratsimbaharison note that Ratsiraka faced "opposition from a wide array of political parties and civil society groups" and reports a "pattern of nationwide support for Ravalomanana."[19]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[15] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Madagascar.
[16] For a brief overview of the campaign, see Desmond George-Williams, "'Bite Not One Another': Selected Accounts of Nonviolent Struggle in Africa," University for Peace, Africa Programme, Addis Ababa, 2006, pp. 77-79.
[17] Randrianja, "'Be Not Afraid, Only Believe'," p. 318.
[18] Ibid. p. 320.
[19] Marcus and Ratsimbaharison, "Political Parties in Madagascar," pp. 104-105.

Albania, Anti-communist, 1989-91

Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication that ethnic minorities played a dominant role.

EPR codes ethnicity as "irrelevant" during the communist era; from 1990 on ethnic Albanians (82% of the population) hold monopoly political power (and are thus the state-controlling group for our purposes); Greeks and Macedonians constitute 8% and 2% of the population, respectively.[20]

The protestors are described as Albanian students and workers (see, for example, the Swarthmore Database).[21] As "Albanian" may refer to ethnicity or to nationality, it is not clear whether the adjective indicates an exclusive dominant role played by ethnic Albanians or a movement that bridged the country's ethnic lines. Either way a non-ethnic coding is warranted.

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) consistently code the case as non-ethnic.

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[20] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Albania.
[21] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/albanian-workers-force-shift-toward-democracy-1991.

<u>Venezuela, Anti-coup, 2002</u>
<u>Non-ethnic</u>.

I code the case as non-ethnic because there is no indication of a dominant role played by ethnic groups other than the state-controlling whites/mestizos; either the movement crossed the country's ethnic cleavages or it was exclusively dominated by the state-controlling group.

According to EPR, whites/mestizos (84.8% of the population) were politically dominant throughout the relevant period, and thus are the state-controlling group.[22]

Accounts of the protest movement against the coup that deposed Chavez do not refer to the ethnicity of participants; it seems that the cleavage between the challengers and the incumbent was economic/social class-based, with support for Chaves being especially strong in the low-income Barrios of Caracas.[23]

The campaign is not included in Svensson and Lindgren (2010) database.

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[22] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Venezuela.
[23] Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/venezuelans-defend-against-coup-attempt-2002); Randall Parish, Mark Peceny, and Justin Delacour, "Venezuela and the Collective Defence of Democracy Regime in the Americas," *Democratization* 14 (2), 2007: 207-231.

Algeria, Algerian Revolt/ National Liberation Front, 1953-54

Ethnic.

1953-54 are the first two years of the national liberation struggle, which NAVCO 2.0 considers nonviolent.[24] This is a straightforward case of ethnic challenge, as a colonial case, where challengers were Algerians struggling for independence from France.

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) do not include this case.

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[24] On the nonviolent phase of the campaign preceding the Algerian war of national liberation, see Malika Rahal, "Algeria: Nonviolent resistance against French colonialism, 1830s-1950s," in Maciej J. Bartkowski (ed.), *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 2013).

Kenya, Anti-Arap Moi, 1990-91
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic, as there are indications that the movement was dominated by groups other than the state-controlling Kalenjin, in particular the Kikuyo.

The Kalenjin group (15% of the population) is state-controlling as it was the senior member in a power-sharing system that excluded the Kikuyo (27%), the largest ethnic group in the county, and the Luo (12%).[25]

The government publicly depicted the movement for multi-party democracy (i.e., the challenger) as Kikuyo and appealed to its Kelenjin base to defend its ethnic interests against the protestors.[26] The government's characterization of the opposition movement as Kikuyo-dominated, while self-serving, appears to have been broadly accurate. As Sharon Erickson Nepstad notes, the protesters were primarily from ethnic groups other than the Kalenjiin minority in control of the government and dominating the security forces:

> "And in moments of heated conflict, when minority troops faced protesters that were largely from dominant groups, long-standing ethnic hostilities contributed to the troops' willingness to carry out orders. In other words, the troops identified more with Moi's ethnic minority regime than with the ethnic majority resisters."[27]

Consistently, the Online Methodological Appendix of Chenoweth and Stephan's book *Why Civil Resistance Work* notes the ethnic nature of the protest movement: "in 1989, the Moi regime suffered protests, primarily from ethnic groups that were excluded from the patronage system and from agitations over unfair elections."[28]

An additional piece of evidence supporting the coding of the challenger movement as dominated by an ethnic group other than the state-controlling Kalenjin is that the parties that ended up (unsuccessfully) contesting the presidency in 1992 had clear ethnic memberships and were closely associated with the movement for multi-party democracy. On the ethnic nature of the opposition parties that contested the 1992 elections, Stephen Brown reports: "Before the 1992 elections militias attacked members of ethnic groups associated with the opposition, especially the Kikuyu, in several KANU-dominated areas, mainly in the Rift Valley."[29] Similarly, Sebastian Elischer codes the political parties that emerged with the opening to a multiparty system– FORD-K, FORD-A and DP – as ethnic-other compared to the Kelenjin-controlled government

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[25] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Kenya. A consistent account of Kalenjin political control is provided in several sources. See, for example, Sebastian Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[26] Jacqueline M. Klopp, "'Ethnic Clashes' and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya's Electoral Despotism," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 35 (3), 2001: 473-517.

[27] Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 107.

[28] Available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/media/documents/data/navco_1-1_appendix-and-codebook.pdf, p. 89. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

[29] Stephen Brown, "Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power," *Third World Quarterly* 22 (5), 2001: 725–739, p. 727.

and ruling party KANU. For example, Elischer notes that "the communities that had been marginalized by Moi's economic policies and his cabinet appointments left KANU in large numbers and did so under the leadership of the most prominent politicians these communities had produced."[30]

The continuity between the opposition movement and the political parties that emerged to contest the 1992 elections is clear. As Brown notes, "In late 1991 once the constitution was amended to permit multipartyism, the main pressure group, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), transformed itself into a political party."[31]

Note that, contrary to my coding, the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset codes the case as non-ethnic.

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[30] Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa,* p. 77.
[31] Brown, "Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa," p. 728.

Malawi, Anti-Banda, 1992-93

<u>Non-ethnic</u>.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the protest movement appears to have bridged the country's ethnic divides.

The Chewa/Centralers group were the state-controlling group (coded as dominant in EPR).[32]

Elischer codes the two political parties that contested the 1994 election against the incumbent MCP and had been important players in the preceding pro-democracy movement – the UDF and AFORD – as respectively catch-all (with electoral support in all ethnic regions) and mono-ethnic (i.e., Northerner).[33] Nonetheless, the UDF seems to a have been electorally strongest in the south (in spite of its country-wide presence) while the incumbent was strongest in the center. Deborah Kaspin[34] and Daniel Posner[35] also suggest that the three main parties had relatively clearly identifiable regional strongholds in the 1994 election.

But even if the parties that contested the 1994 multi-party elections were to be considered ethnic, the movement that pushed for and achieved the multiparty system – led by the Public Affair Committee (PAC), an umbrella organization putting together the various opposition forces, crossed the country's ethnic divides. Kenneth Ross describes PAC as "the representative organ of a truly national constituency" and notes that it "remained the engine of political reform during the referendum period."[36] Consistently, Stephen Brown describes PAC as broad-based:

> "the Public Affairs Committee (PAC) was established as a Presbyterian initiative for national discussion. PAC members included most established religious organisations: the Church of Central Africa Presbyterian, the Episcopal Conference (Catholics), the Anglican church, the Christian Council of Churches in Malawi (Protestants), and the Muslim Association, as well as newly formed 'pressure groups' (proto-political parties), notably the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and the United Democratic Front (UDF), and two professional organisations – the Law Society and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry."[37]

Multiple sources confirm the general description of the democracy movement in the Swarthmore Database as broad-based, with student groups playing a crucial role at the start of the protests (at

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[32] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Malawi.

[33] Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa*, pp. 204-7.

[34] Deborah Kaspin, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Malawi's Democratic Transition," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 33 (4), 1995: 595-620.

[35] Daniel Posner, "Malawi's New Dawn," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (1), 1995: 131-145.

[36] Kenneth R. Ross, "The Transformation of Power in Malawi 1992-95," *The Ecumenical Review* 48 (1), 1996: 38-52, pp. 42-3.

[37]Stephen Brown, "'Born-Again Politicians Hijacked our Revolution!': Reassessing Malawi's Transition to Democracy," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 38 (3), 2004: 705-722, p. 707.

both campuses of the University of Malawi), which then spread to unemployed youth, workers, civil servants, and various Christian churches (the Muslim community took part too).[38]

All consulted sources note the important role played by Churches' activism against the regime. The religious demographics of the three ethnic groups in the country are quite similar, in particular between Chewa (Centralers) and Southerners (indicating that the role of churches in the movement is consistent with a non-ethnic coding). The Catholic Church started the movement. The Chewa (Centralers) and the Southerners have roughly the same percentage of Catholics: Chewa are 39% Catholic, Southerners 41%. 17 Protestant churches joined the anti-Banda chorus, with 20% and 22% of the two groups being Protestants (the corresponding figures for Islam are 15% and 24%). Importantly even the Church of Scotland, of which Banda was an "elder", contributed to the public criticism of the life-president.

An indirect piece of evidence that the resistance movement was multi-ethnic and that the ethnic nature of political competition remerged only once multi-party elections were instituted is provided by Posner, who notes: "Unfortunately for AFORD, however, the referendum had already given Malawians the opportunity to vote against the old system. By the time the election campaign began, most voters were less interested in holding grudges than in deciding which party would best promote local development. This emphasis on development not only blunted much of AFORD's 'clean hands' appeal, but also raised patronage considerations to central importance. In a country where, thanks to the example set by Banda, patronage ties follow regional lines, AFORD's regional base in an area with only 11 percent of Malawi's total population was just not enough."[39]

The only sources that presents the Churches and the student movements as representing certain ethnic segments were controlled by Banda, which undermines their credibility in the absence of other evidence:

> "Banda and his cohorts tried to diffuse the mounting criticism by using the politics of division, in this case regionalism. They claimed that CCAP leaders and Catholic clerics from northern Malawi had been behind the pastoral letters. University officials also claimed that students from the north had been behind the campus demonstrations. These accusations were part of a government campaign to instill fear among central and southern region inhabitants that the northerners would seize control of any future state in order to build up northern Malawi at the expense of the rest of the country."[40]

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) code the case as non-ethnic too.

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[38] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/malawians-bring-down-30-year-dictator-1992-1993; Julius O. Ihonvbere, "From Despotism to Democracy: The Rise of Multiparty Politics in Malawi," *Third World Quarterly* 18 (2), 1997): 225-247; Tony Woods, "The High Costs of Obstinacy: Banda Hangs On," *Southern Africa Report* 8 (2): 17-21; Denis Venter, "Malawi's Referendum on Multi-Party Politics: Banda's Battle of Hastings?" International Update (January), Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1993.

[39] Posner, "Malawi's New Dawn."

[40] Woods, "The High Costs of Obstinacy."

Guyana, Anti-Burnham/Hoyte, 1990-92
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethic because the opposition to the PNC government, with Afro-Guyanese as the state-controlling group (coded as dominant by EPR), included both Indo-Guyanese (PPP) and African/multiethnic (WPA) groups, united in the PCD.[41] The Africans constituted 30% of the population, while the Indians accounted for 43.5%.[42]

The fact that a large element of WPA was dominated by Afro-Guyanese indicates that it would be inaccurate to code the opposition as primarily Indian. On the African/Black influence on the organization, Bert Thomas reports that "the Working People's Alliance (WPA) of Guyana [was] the successor to Black Power" even if it did not embrace a racial ideology as an opposition movement.[43] The bottom line is that regardless of whether one considers the WPA as multiethnic (i.e., spanning the Black-Indian divide) or primarily black, the indisputable fact that one of the two main opposition groups was not dominated by Indians (the main group other than the state-controlling blacks) warrants a non-ethnic coding. Consistently, David Hinds describes the movement whose pressure contributed to the transition as multi-ethnic.[44]

The Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset codes the case as non-ethnic too.

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[41] David Hinds, "Ethnicity and the Elusive Quest for Power Sharing in Guyana," *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 9 (3-4), 2010: 333-355; David Hinds*, Ethno-politics and Power Sharing in Guyana: History and Discourse* (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2011).
[42] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Guyana.
[43] Bert J. Thomas, "Caribbean Black Power: From Slogan to Practical Politics," *Journal of Black Studies* 22 (3), 1992: 392-410, pp. 401-402.
[44] Hinds, *Ethno-politics and Power Sharing in Guyana*, pp. 18-19.

Mexico, Anti-Calderon, 2006
Non-ethnic.

As there is no indication of indigenous groups and Afro-Mexicans (the two ethnic groups other than the state-controlling mestizos) dominating the campaign, I code the case as non-ethnic.

Mestizos (constituting 80% of the population) have historically been the state-controlling group (coded as dominant throughout by EPR).[45]

As the Swarthmore Database reports, Mexico's 2006 anti-Calderón protests took place in the wake of a highly-controversial election crowning Felipe Calderón of the National Action Party (PAN) as victor against political rivals Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and Roberto Madrazo of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Obrador and his supporters questioned the validity of the election results, and their nonviolent campaign following the election and preceding Calderón's ultimate inauguration centered on a demand for a ballot-by-ballot recount. Tensions were exacerbated by popular anger at corruption and fraud, and associated fear that the election reflected a setback to "democratic progress."[46]

The above account of the movement from the Swarthmore Database does not include any ethnic qualifications, referring to the participants simply as Mexican citizens.

Ethnicity did play a role in the election, and there did exist some ethnic differences among the constituencies of the three candidates. However, as discussed below, these do not warrant an ethnic coding. The movement led by Obrador seems to have bridged the country's ethnic cleavage, with the state-controlling mestizos playing an important role in it. Joseph Klesner breaks down the ethnic support base of each party, writing:

> "[W]e find that Calderón polled very well among those identified by the interviewer as White, whereas White Mexicans showed considerably less enthusiasm for either of his main opponents. Notably, Madrazo did well among darker-skinned Mexicans, indicating that the PRI continues to pull its votes disproportionately from the millions of Mexicans of indigenous heritage. Again, these figures suggest that while Calderón's support comes disproportionately from upper social strata, and the PRI's from lower social strata, López Obrador received votes across social groups."[47]

The fact that "López Obrador's voters spanned the spectrum of socioeconomic groups" and that "the part of the electorate supporting López Obrador's PRD cannot be understood in class or religious terms" points to the broad base of the resistance and confirms that Obrador's protests cannot be described as dominated exclusively by groups out power.[48]

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[45] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Mexico.
[46] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexican-citizens-massively-protest-presidential-election-results-2006.
[47] Joseph L. Klesner, "The 2006 Mexican Elections: Manifestation of a Divided Society?", *PS: Political Science & Politics* 40 (1), 2007: 27-32, p. 28.
[48] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

The PAN, PRD, and PRI all have a contentious history with indigenous groups, suggesting that there is no clear mestizo-indigenous ethnic division surrounding the parties involved in the 2006 elections and associated anti-Calderón campaign. As R.A.H. Castillo notes:

> "Indigenous people's concrete needs have not been among the priorities of either the PRI, which monopolized power for 70 years, or the left parties that came together to form the PRD, much less of the historical right represented by the PAN. Not only have these parties been indifferent to such demands but all three have long histories of confrontation with and even repression of indigenous and campesino organizations."[49]

The Svensson and Lindgren (2010) does not include the case.

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[49] Rosalva Aída Hernández Castillo, "The Indigenous Movement in Mexico Between Electoral Politics and Local Resistance," *Latin American Perspectives* 33 (2), 2005: 115-131, p. 118.

Romania, Anti-Ceausescu, 1987-89
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic, as the movement seems to have bridged the country's Romanian-Hungarian divide.

EPR codes the Romanian ethnic group (89.5% of the population) as politically dominant and so it is the state-controlling group for our purposes.[50]

Denis Deletant suggests that non-violent resistance against Nicolae Ceausescu bridged ethnic lines from the start, exemplified by the workers' strike of November 1986 that led to "unrest" in 1987:

> "Romanian and Hungarian workers went on strike in November 1986 at the Heavy Machine Plant and the Refrigeration Plant in Cluj, and at the glass factory in Turda. Leaflets in both languages demanding 'meat and bread' and 'milk for our children' circulated in Cluj, thus demonstrating inter-ethnic solidarity. …Within three months unrest had spread to the east of the country, encompassing for the first time in decades both workers and students."[51]

When the phase of the campaign typically referred to as the Romanian Revolution occurred in the winter of 1989, it was sparked by Ceausescu's demand for the deportation of outspoken pro-democracy pastor Laszlo Tökes, an ethnic Hungarian.[52] Tökes' ethnicity, however, does not indicate an ethnic challenge. In fact, various authors mention Tokes as they highlight the non-ethnic nature of the protests in their descriptions of the onset of the Romanian revolution:

> "The Romanian revolution…was sparked when a multiethnic group of protestors tried to prevent security police from removing Calvinist minister Laszlo Tökes from his church."[53]

> "Despite the divisiveness of Ceausescu's policies towards the peoples of Romania, their shared experience of suffering under his rule brought them together. It was the defiance of Tokes which provided the catalyst for the display of ethnic solidarity which sparked off the popular uprising against Ceausescu."[54]

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[50] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Romania.
[51] Denis Deletant, "Romania 1948-1989: A Historical Overview," Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 2007 (https://web.archive.org/web/20070911150037/http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch:80/collections/coll_romania/introduction.cfm).
[52] David Oliver Relin, "The Ripples of the Revolution: from Beijing to Bucharest, Student Protesters Are Leading the Effort to Remake the Communist World," *Scholastic Update* 122 (13), 1990, p. 8; Wojciech Kostecki, "Prevention of Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from Romania," Berghof Occasional Paper No. 19, 2002, p. 10)
[53] David A. Kideckell, "The Undead: Nicolae Ceausescu and Paternalist Politics in Romanian Society and Culture," in John Bornema (ed.), *Death of the Father: An Anthropology of the End in Political Authority* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), p. 133.
[54] Deletant, "Romania 1948-1989."

"Several authors who study [the Hungarian minority in Romania] stress the contribution the Hungarians have made to the very start of the Romanian revolution. Indeed, it was an ethnic Hungarian pastor of the Reformed Church in Timisoara, Laszlo Tokes, who became the central figure of the early events. The April 1990 report of the London based Minority Rights Group wrote up: 'His supporters [Tokes'] surrounded the church as a defense but the security officials broke through. Mass demonstrations began immediately and by that afternoon a large crowd – by now predominantly ethnic Romanians – shouting anti-Ceausescu slogans moved into the town centre. What had initially been a local issue concerning the Hungarian minority and church affairs had become a widespread anti-government revolt.'"[55]

"Romanians began struggling to oust the Eastern bloc's last hardline Communist leader. On December 14, Nicolae Ceausescu… ordered that Laszlo Tokes… be deported. Student protesters in the town of Timisoara formed a human chain around Tokes. In two days, tens of thousands of workers had joined the students in the streets and were chanting anti-Ceausescu slogans."[56]

Consistently, the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset codes the case as non-ethnic.

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[55] Kostecki, "Prevention of Ethnic Conflict: Lessons from Romania," pp. 9-10.
[56] Relin, "The Ripples of the Revolution," p. 8.

Zambia, Anti-Chiluba, 2001
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because there is no indication that the movement was exclusively dominated by groups other than the state-controlling Bemba speakers.

The campaign consisted of large-scale student protests against Chiluba's plan to run for a third term (which was prohibited by the constitution; so he was bent on amending it). The three main ethnic groups (Bemba speakers, 43%, Tonga-Ila-Lenje (Southerners), 19%, and Nianja speakers (Easterners), 18%) were senior partners in the power sharing system before and after the campaign; thus Bemba speakers are considered state-controlling throughout the relevant period.[57]

There is no evidence that protests were dominated exclusively by groups other than the state-controlling Bemba speakers. The available sources typically identify protestors as university students and members of civil society, with much support among the country's Churches.[58]

There was opposition to the initiative to amend the constitution even from within the ruling party (which led to the emergence of splinter parties as well as prolonged internal squabbles) and the party remained in power after Chiluba stepped down under pressure. The new president was a Lenje (Southerner). The party had two internal factions, one associated with the president, the other one with Chiluba. As Elischer notes, both factions included members from all communities, and the party was a "catchall party" that "can rely on nationwide support," whose national leadership bridged all major ethnic divides.[59]

Consistently, Svensson and Lindgren (2010) code the case as non-ethnic.

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[57] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Zambia.
[58] "Students protest against Chiluba," *News24*, 2 May, 2001 (http://www.news24.com/Africa/Students-protest-against-Chiluba-20010502; "Zambian protests turn violent," *BBC News*, 5 May, 2001, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1314177.stm); "Chiluba's loss of immunity a lesson for continent," IRIN, 17 July 2002 (http://www.irinnews.org/report/33014/zambia-chilubas-loss-immunity-lesson-continent); Isabel A. Phiri, "President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: the Christian Nation and Democracy," *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (4), 2003: 401-428.
[59] Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa*, p. 212.

Senegal, Anti-Diouf, 2000

Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic, as the movement seems to have bridged the country's ethnic divisions.

The Wolof (the largest group, accounting for 43.5% of the population) were senior members of a power-sharing system, both before and after the campaign and are thus the state-controlling group.[60] Diouf (leader of the Socialist Party) is a Wolof and so is his successor, Wade (from the opposition party Democratic Party of Senegal, PDS).

Elischer codes the PDS as a catchall party with country-wide support.[61]

The protest movement is described as constituted by student groups and the Democratic Party (PDS).[62] The available sources do not contain references to a specific ethnic group dominating the opposition movement.[63]

Thus a non-ethnic coding is warranted by the absence of references to specific ethnic groups dominating the movement (which had an important student base) and the fact that the opposition party was a considered a catch-all party without a specific ethnic constituency.

The Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset also codes the case as non-ethnic.

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[60] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Senegal.

[61] Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa*, pp. 200-202.

[62] E.g., Alieu Darboe, "Senegal: 1974 – present," International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2010 (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Senegal..1974-present.pdf).

[63] E.g., Leonardo A. Villalon, "Senegal," *African Studies Review* 47 (2), 2004: 61-71.

Haiti, Anti-Duvalier, 1985
Non-ethnic.

As the EPR database codes ethnicity as "irrelevant" in Haiti, a non-ethnic coding would be appropriate.[64] However, given that the EPR country report does discuss ethnicity (with Blacks constituting 95% of the population and mulattos/whites the remaining 5%), a deeper look appears warranted. Nonetheless, the available information points to a non-ethnic coding.

Ethnic tensions between blacks and mulattoes have a long history. There is tension "still operative in modern Haiti" between "a privileged minority and a destitute majority, between blacks and mulattos."[65] Additionally, "'Black' and 'mulatto' governments succeed each other and political rivalries add to the generally unspoken undercurrent of mistrust and resentment that separates the two ethnic groups."[66]

The father of Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, Francoise "Papa Doc" Duvalier, cemented his rule, "rising to power on a noiriste platform,"[67] taking advantage of ethnic/racial sentiments to secure and maintain his reign. According to Mats Lundahl, "Papa Doc had crushed the traditional power structure of the country (the army, the mulatto elite, the church and the business community) and constructed – with the general backing of the urban and rural black middle class – a new power structure."[68]

However, this changed under the rule of his son. The government of Baby Doc was marked by an increase in political influence of the mulatto elite. Alexander King reports that

> "[Jean-Claude Duvalier] transformed the political base of the family's domination and entered into a pacte de domination (Dupuy 1997, 2007) with the mulatto elite, consolidated through his 1980 marriage to Michèle Bennett, of the mulatto bourgeoisie… In contrast to his father, who had ruled as an autocrat by decree, Jean-Claude Duvalier built his rule upon a technocratic state apparatus and upon economic incentives to foreign investors as well as the participation of the mulatto bourgeoisie. However, to a large extent he lost the support of the black middle class."[69]

Additionally, "Jean-Claude's loss of support from key sectors of the black middle class was, in fact, the structural change which enabled the protest movements to succeed."[70]

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[64] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Haiti.

[65] A. James Arnold, Julio Rodriguez-Luis, and J. Michael Dash (Editors), *A History of Literature in the Caribbean, Volume I: Hispanic and Francophone Regions* (John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1992-1995), pp. 367-368

[66] Ibid., p. 368.

[67] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Haiti.

[68] Mats Lundahl, "History as an Obstacle to Change: The Case of Haiti", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 31 (1-2), 1989, p. 3.

[69] Alexander King, "Haiti, democratic uprising, 1980s-1981," *International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*, p. 1 (http://www.revolutionprotestencyclopedia.com/public/tocnode?query=haiti&widen=1&result_number=7&from=search&id=g9781405184649_yr2011_chunk_g9781405184649677&type=std&fuzzy=0&slop=1).

[70] David Nicholls, *From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence in Haiti* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. xiii.

Nonetheless, the increased influence of Mulattos in Baby Doc's regime compared to his father's does not imply that the Mulattos should be considered the state-controlling group. Baby Doc himself was black. Moreover, a key figure to whom Duvalier delegated much power (in a position of "super-minister") toward the end of his rule was Roger Lafontant (interior minister), ethnically black and embracing noiriste ideology. (The other most influential super-minster, Frantz Merceron, minister of finance, was a mulatto.[71]) Thus a coding of the government as dominated by Mulattos would seem incorrect; at most, one could say that Blacks and Mulattos shared power, with the Blacks holding key positions of president and interior minister. If the two groups were to be considered senior power-sharing partners, my coding rules would lead to a coding of Blacks as state-controlling, given that they constitute a majority (95%) of the country's population.

Moreover, there is some evidence that the opposition movement was broad-based, bridging the Black-Mulatto divide. In fact, towards the end of the regime all sectors of Haitian society, even some sections of the urban elite, united against Baby Doc, as part of a protest movement frustrated at Duvalier's reign. Accordingly, Galván writes that "in 1985, even the urban elite of Port-au-Prince withdrew their support for the Duvalier regime"[72] and Smarth notes that the uprising "slowly gained support among virtually all sectors of the population."[73]

In sum, regardless of whether we follow EPR's coding of ethnicity's "irrelevance" or consider the Blacks as the state-controlling group, a non-ethnic coding is warranted because the Blacks certainly played a dominant role in the opposition movement, although perhaps not an exclusive one, given that the movement may have bridged the country's ethnic divide.

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) also code the case as non-ethnic.

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[71] Elizabeth Abbott, *Haiti: An Insider's History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), pp. 268-269.

[72] Javier A. Galván, *Latin American Dictators of the 20th Century: The Lives and Regimes of 15 Rulers* (London: McFarland and Co., 2013), p. 103.

[73] Luc Smarth, "Popular Organizations and the Transition to Democracy in Haiti" in Michael Kaufmann and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso (eds.), *Community Power & Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life* (New York: Zed Books, 1997), p. 102

Peru, Anti-Fujimori, 2000
Non-ethnic.

I code this case as non-ethnic, as there is no evidence that the protest movement was exclusively dominated by groups other than the state-controlling whites/mestizos. Given the general absence of references to the ethnicity of movement participants and its broad-based nature, it likely bridged the country's ethnic divides.

Whites/mestizos (52% of the country's population) were the state-controlling group (coded as dominant in EPR) before and after the campaign.[74]

Several sources hint at the diversity of the movement, noting that various social groups from different regions of the country were involved, without explicitly mentioning ethnicity. For example, the Swarthmore Database states that the nonviolent protests that took place in the "March of the Four Directions" on July 27, 2000 drew protesters "from the four corners of Peru" and "Peasants and city-dwellers alike shouted '¡Abajo la dictadura!' ('Down with Dictatorship!')."[75] An additional source notes that "mobilizations were sparked first by students and women's groups… as protests expanded, they were joined by NGOs and then by political parties" and that "the campaign itself combined enormous marches… with a series of sustained regional mobilizations."[76] The fact that Fujimori obtained much of his electoral support in 2000 from rural Andean communities further suggests, albeit indirectly, that the movement was not primarily composed of Andean indigenous people.[77]

Several other reports on the opposition movement do not discuss its ethnic profile, which would seem highly unlikely if ethnic minorities exclusively dominated it.[78]

The opposition leader, Alejandro Toledo, was indigenous, but this fact in itself does not indicate that the group in power (whites/mestizos) did not have a dominant role in the movement.

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) also code the case as non-ethnic.

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[74] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Peru.
[75] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/peruvians-campaign-overthrow-dictator-alberto-fujimori-march-four-directions-2000.
[76] Scott Mainwaring, Ana Maria Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongomez (eds.), *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes* (Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 235.
[77] Lewis Taylor, "Alberto Fujimori's Peripeteia: From 'Re-Reeleccion' to Regime Collapse," *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe* 70, 2001: 3-24.
[78] Steven Levitsky and Maxwell A. Cameron, "Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori's Peru," *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, 2003: 1-33; Anthony Fajola, "Peru Inaugural Incites Protests Against Fujimori," *Washington Post*, 29 July, 2000; Sebastian Rotella and Natalia Tarnawiecki, "Fujimori Takes Oath Amid Violence and Protests in Peru," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 July, 2000; "Peru Erupts in Anti-fujimori Protests," *Chicago Tribune*, 29 July, 2000.

Maldives, Anti-Gayoom, 2003-06
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication of a dominant role in the movement of the small minority groups.

The country is not in EPR, so I base my coding on information of its ethnic demography from Helen Chapin Metz' analysis. She notes that

> "The contemporary homogeneous mixture of Sinhalese, Dravidian, Arab, Australasian, and African ethnicity in Maldives results from historical changes in regional hegemony over marine trade routes. …The only distinct ethnic minority is found in Male among the trading community of Indians, who settled there in the 1800s. Several hundred in number, they are also a religious minority, belonging to the Shia branch of Islam. In addition, a small number of Sri Lankans have come to Maldives in recent years to work in the tourist resorts because Maldivians, as devout Muslims, refuse to work in facilities serving alcoholic beverages.[79]…With the exception of Shia members of the Indian trading community, Maldivians are Sunni Muslims; adherence to Islam, the state religion since the twelfth century, is required for citizenship."[80]

Sunni Muslim, Dhivehi-speaking represent the overwhelming majority of the population and I assume that they were the state-controlling group, given that Gayoum belonged to the group and controlled the country's politics for over 30 years.

There is no indication that minorities dominated the opposition movement, in fact there is virtually no reference to ethnicity in available sources on the movement.[81]

The only reference to ethnicity in the protest movement I was able to find, confirming the non-ethnic coding, is the following: "The debates were very popular; anyone could share information *regardless of political, ethnic or religious background*." (emphasis added)[82]

The case is not reported in the Swarthmore database nor in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[79] Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), *Maldives: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994) (http://countrystudies.us/maldives/5.htm).
[80] Ibid. (http://countrystudies.us/maldives/7.htm).
[81] Hari Kunzru, "Welcome to Paradise," *The Guardian*, 16 December 2006; Matt Mulberry, "The Maldives – From Dictatorship to Democracy, and Back?" https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/maldives-dictatorship-democracy-back/; Ahmed Shaheed and Jonathan Upton, "Maldives: Reform Deferred? Challenges and Lost Opportunities for Democratic Transition," Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, 2008; Amnesty International, "Republic of Maldives: Repression of Peaceful Political Opposition," July 2003.
[82] Mulberry, "The Maldives – From Dictatorship to Democracy, and Back?"

Sudan, Anti-Jaafar, 1985
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because the movement bridged the country' ethnic lines and there is no indication that the state-controlling ethnic group played a marginal role in it.

EPR codes a subset of the country's Arab groups (namely, Shaygiyya, Ja'aliyyin and Danagla, corresponding to 15% of the population) as dominant, and therefore they are state-controlling for our purposes, before and after the campaign.[83]

The protest movement that brought down the government (with the army's support) was a cross-section of society: trade unions, lawyers, main opposition parties (some Sunni Islamic parties, like the Umma Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, some secular like the Sudanese Communist Party). As Kamal Osman Salih notes,

> "[T]he opposition groups organised a large-scale protest attended by a wide cross-section of workers in Khartoum, including trade unionists and professionals. Doctors, lawyers, airline employees, and electrical workers were among the many who joined a general strike, and with demonstrations showing no signs of ending, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dahab, took over control of the Sudan as head of the Transitional Military Council (T.M.C.)."[84]

Similarly, W. J. Berridge reports that

> "[T]he urban demonstrations witnessed during the Intifada embraced a far wider spectrum of Sudanese society. Although al-Hussein reports that the 27 March demonstrations were led by the students and workers, this does not do justice to the sheer breadth of their composition. Just as in 1964, newspaper reports on the social backgrounds of the dead and injured offer a useful index for analysis. The demonstrators who were killed by SSO bullets during the 27 March protest had both northern Arabic and southern Sudanese names. …Thus we can see that the demonstrations, from both a social and an ethnic perspective, incorporated a broad section of Sudanese society."[85]

Thus the protest movement seems to have spanned the country's ethnic lines; in the absence of any evidence suggesting that the involvement in the movement of the state-controlling ethnic groups was marginal, this warrants a non-ethnic coding.

Note that, contrary to my coding, the campaign is considered as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[83] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Sudan.
[84] Kamal Osman Salih, "The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 28 (2), 1990): 199-224, p. 200. For similar observations see also Peter Woodward, "Sudan after Numeiri," *Third World Quarterly* 7 (4), 1985: 958-972; and the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/sudanese-students-workers-bring-down-numeiri-dictatorship-1985).
[85] W. J. Berridge, *Civil Uprisings in Modern Sudan: The 'Khartoum Springs' of 1964 and 1985* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), p. 56.

Venezuela, Anti-Jimenez, 1958
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the movement bridged the country's ethnic divide (if ethnicity had any relevance in the country).

EPR codes ethnicity as "irrelevant" in Venezuela up to 1972. This in itself would warrant non-ethnic coding. Whites/mestizos account for 85% of the population, Afro-Venezuelans 12.5%, and indigenous peoples 3%.[86]

The non-ethnic coding stands even if we assume that whites/mestizos were the state-controlling ethnic group, based on the fact that the military dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez belonged to the group. There is in fact evidence that the opposition had broad-based social support rather than being exclusively dominated by groups other than the whites/mestizos: the movement that overthrew Jiménez brought together students (in particular from the Central University of Venezuela), multiple political parties, and middle-class and professional groups.[87] Sean Lee Welch states that

> "By January 1958 virtually every sector of Venezuelan society opposed Pérez Jiménez. Primarily located in Caracas, clashes between police and students were a daily occurrence, as were demonstrations and protests. Manifestoes and letters of opposition were published by a swath of professional groups and associations."[88]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[86] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Venezuela.

[87] Daniel H. Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 147-149; "General Marcos Pérez Jiménez," *The Guardian*, 21 September 2001.

[88] Sean Lee Welch, "Contentious Spaces: A Comparative Analysis of Latin American Resistance Campaigns, 1956-2006", MA Thesis, University of Louisville, 2015, p. 65.

Greece, Anti-Karamanlis, 1963
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the movement appears either to have been dominated by ethnic Greeks, the state-controlling ethnic group, or to have crossed the country's ethnic lines (it is hard to tell as "Greek" indicates both the ethnic group and the nationality).

Ethnic Greeks have held a monopoly of power throughout (hence the state-controlling coding) and constitute 96% of the population; the Roma, Macedonian, and Muslim ethnic minorities together make up 4% of Greece's population.[89]

Various sources indicate that the movement was dominated by the Greeks, in particular the Greek youth, without clarifying whether Greek here is used as an ethnic marker or a broader term indicating the country's citizens. In any case, the accounts make it clear that the movement was not exclusively dominated by ethnic minorities, which are not mentioned in the available sources. Roger Silverman describes "popular anger" peaking in May of 1963,[90] and Ioanis Gkegkes et al. detail the importance of "Greek youths" in the 1963 events[91] just as Kostis Kornetis emphasizes 1963 as "key for youth politics."[92]

The non-ethnic coding is confirmed by the symbolic role of Greek politician Grigoris Lambrakis, not only in 1963 but also in following years. Assassinated in May of 1963, Lambrakis's funeral itself "became a massive demonstration" of "more than 500,000 people" protesting "the right-wing government and the Royal Court."[93] Kornetis explains how Lambrakis "became the symbol of a pioneering movement that was created in early June 1963 and was named after him: the Democratic Youth Movement Grigoris Lambrakis, later renamed 'Lambrakis Youth,' or simply 'Lambrakides'."[94] Lambrakis Youth, formed by the aforementioned "Greek youths" with Greek composer Mikis Theodorakis at its helm, "played a decisive role in Greece's progressive movement of the 1960s"[95] and held the broad goal of "creat[ing] not just a political but a cultural mass movement."[96] Furthermore, as Gkegkes and co-authors detail, "Lambrakis remained in the hearts of the Greek people as a national symbol of democracy."[97] The 1963 campaign as well as future generations heavily drew inspiration from Lambrakis as a Greek national figure.[98]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[89] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Greece.
[90] Roger Silverman, *Defiance: Greece and Europe* (Zero Books, 2016) [unspecified page number].
[91] Ioannis D. Gkegkes et al., "Grigoris Lambrakis (1912-1963) – A Greek Obstetrician And World Renowned Activist," *Acta Med Hist Adriat*, 14(1), 2016: 177-184, p. 183.
[92] Kostis Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship: Student Resistance, Cultural Politics, and the "Long 1960s" in Greece"* (Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 19.
[93] Gkegkes et al., "Grigoris Lambrakis," p. 183.
[94] Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship*, p. 19.
[95] Gkegkes et al., "Grigoris Lambrakis," p. 183.
[96] Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship*, p. 22.
[97] Gkegkes et al., "Grigoris Lambrakis," p. 183.
[98] Evi Gkotzaridis, "'Who Will Help Me to Get Rid of this Man?' Grigoris Lambrakis and the Non-Aligned Peace Movement in Post–Civil War Greece: 1951–1964," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 30, 2012, p. 299.

<u>Greece, Anti-Military, 1973-74</u>
<u>Non-ethnic.</u>

I code the case as non-ethnic as the available sources suggest that either the movement was dominated by the Greek youth, i.e., coethnics of the state-controlling ethnic group, or the movement crossed the country's ethnic divides (the uncertainty between the two is due the fact that "Greek" may be both an ethnic and national label).

As in the 1963 movement, the 1973-74 opposition to Greece's military junta was heavily student-dominated. Kornetis describes how around 1973 "public spaces such as squares and avenues became the territory for open confrontation, and students began to favor collective action expressed in large demonstrations, gatherings, and clashes with the police."[99] This "student movement acquired a greater following, higher visibility, and occasionally, open support" that "helped to render the conflict public, to turn it toward more successful forms of struggle, and ultimately to fuse it into a movement."[100] Peter Bratsis writes that "Greeks have a propensity for and ingrained history of direct political action, especially among students, and that the 1973 student protest against the Junta was a sort of precursor or model for the current uprising" and describes "the student 'radicals' of 1973" as "very well integrated into the sinews of the Greek state," suggesting that the opposition students were not primarily members of ethnic groups other than the state-controlling Greeks.[101] Thus, for similar reasons to the previous Greek case, this campaign warrants a non-ethnic coding.

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[99] Kornetis, *Children of the Dictatorship*, pp. 225-226
[100] Ibid.
[101] Peter Bratsis "Legitimation Crisis and the Greek Explosion," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34 (1), 2010, pp. 190-196.

Pakistan, Anti-Khan, 1968-69
Non-ethnic.

The opposition represented a broad cross-section of society, with the state-controlling Punjabis playing a dominant if not exclusive role, which warrants a non-ethnic coding.

According to the EPR Dataset, the Punjabis (64% of the population) were senior partners throughout this period, including the years of Bhutto's rule (1971-1977), which I thus consider the state-controlling group.[102] (The core of the army consists of Punjabis too, accounting for 70-80% of the rank and file.)

As the Swarthmore Database reports, Bhutto's Pakistani People's Party, a key actor in the campaign, managed to obtain widespread support across the country during the campaign. Moreover, the student movement (including in Punjab, where for example the so-called "Decade of Sadness" protest took place) was highly involved in the protests; so were industrial workers, peasants, intellectuals and journalists.[103]

Rehman Sobhan reports the movement as including "all the characteristics of a popular uprising" that "involved a broad cross-section of society and spanned the two wings of Pakistan,"[104] and Talukder Maniruzzaman discusses how various political leaders and parties across Pakistan united against the corrupt Ayub regime:

> "But corruption was present in the Ayub government on such a scale and in so blatant a form that the conscience of the people was aroused and the legitimacy of the system was massively challenged. All major opposition parties decided to boycott the elections scheduled for early 1970 under the 1962 constitution and formed an alliance in January 1969. In a joint statement, the leaders of 8 political parties stated that 'the widespread corruption carried [out] by the ruling clique has become a consistent system and manner of government' and 'has given to people everywhere, particularly the people of East Pakistan, a sense of non-participation, powerlessness and alienation in the ordering of their affairs and destiny.' They vowed to launch 'a relentless, non-violent, organized and disciplined mass movement' against the Ayub regime."[105]

Lest the previous sentence is interpreted as indicating a predominantly East Pakistani participation in the movement, see the following quotation from the same author, which makes clear the country-wide, broad-based nature of the opposition:

> "In November 1968, the students in Punjab came out in the streets shouting for the 'restoration of democracy.' This sparked a mighty tide of students' demonstrations which swept all the cities and towns in East and West Pakistan. Soon the opposition politicians,

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[102] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Pakistan.

[103] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/pakistani-students-workers-and-peasants-bring-down-dictator-1968-1969.

[104] Rehman Sobhan, "East Pakistan's revolt against Ayub," *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 59 (235), 1969, p. 302.

[105] Talukder Maniruzzaman, "'Crises in Political Development' and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 5 (2), 1971, p. 228.

dissatisfied middle class groups – lawyers, doctors, technical services personnel, junior officers in government departments and autonomous bodies – and the labor force joined the students in the streets."[106]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[106] Ibid., p. 235.

Serbia, Anti-Milosevic, 1996-2000
Non-ethnic.

The state-controlling group – the Serbs – played a dominant role in the opposition movement, which warrants a non-ethnic coding. I cannot rule out the possibility that ethnic minorities played a significant role too, but I could not find any indication of that; in any case, if the movement were considered as bridging Serbia's ethnic divides, the non-ethnic coding would be unaltered.

Serbs (62% of the population) and Montenegrins (5%) were respectively senior and junior partners of a power-sharing system both during and after Milosevic's rule (until Montenegro's independence), so I code the Serbs as the state-controlling group.[107]

Referring to the "winter of discontent" from November 1996 to February 1997, Ivan Vejvoda describes "a massive, protracted three-month-long uprising of Serbia during which every single day citizens and students came out into the streets of all key Serbian cities and towns."[108] The student movement had an especially important role. The Swarthmore Database refers to the involvement of "Serb students" in organizing protests in the 1996-97 branch of the movement, and describes the 1998-2000 branch as stemming out of "student veterans of the 1996 protests."[109] These students "formed a new non-violent opposition group called Otpor," that played a central role in overthrowing Milošević. Though not explicitly referring to Otpor's ethnic composition as predominantly Serb, the Swarthmore Database remarks that at Otpor's founding congress in February of 2000 "eighty chapters from across the country participated," which would suggests that at the very least ethnic Serbs played a dominant role (even if not necessarily an exclusive one). Taras Kuzio stresses the importance of youth involvement in Otpor, writing that its strategy "targeted urban youth." Additionally, Kuzio writes that "Otpor was established by 15 Belgrade University students," and that "Otpor grew out of the Student Union of Serbia (SUS)."[110]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[107] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Serbia%20and%20Montenegro.
[108] Ivan Vejvoda, "Civil Society versus Slobodan Milosevic: Serbia, 1991-2000" in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford University Press, 2009).
[109] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/serbians-win-reinstatement-elected-opposition-members-1996-1997.
[110] Taras Kuzio, "Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39 (3), 2006: 365–386.

Panama, Anti-Noriega, 1987-89
Non-ethnic.

The lack of evidence pointing to a dominant role of ethnic minorities in the 1987-1989 anti-Noriega movement, known as the National Civic Crusade (CCN), as well as numerous references to the mobilization of "Panamanians" suggests that the movement bridged the country's ethnic divide, which warrants a non-ethnic coding.

According to EPR, whites/mestizos (80% of the population) held monopoly power, and are thus the state-controlling group, during and after Noriega's rule.[111]

A broad cross-section of civil society was mobilized against the military dictator. The Swarthmore Database reports protests broadly performed by the "Panamanian population," mentions rioting "throughout Panama," and cites the involvement of "more than 130 business, professional, civic, and labor groups."[112] Similarly, Roberto Eisenmann describes the Panamanian opposition as united under the National Civic Crusade (CCN), an organization that "comprise[d] some 125 nongovernmental organizations and institutions, ranging from workers', students', and women's groups to business and professional associations."[113] Eisenmann also refers to the opposition as the "Panamanian people" rather than any specific ethnic group or indigenous portion of the population.[114] He describes the opposition as "broadly based," and as a "nonpartisan civic movement."[115] Roger Powers and William Vogele describe the opposition movement from June 1987 to December 1989 as involving "various groups and numerous individuals… the CCN, political parties, other groups, and independent activists."[116] They refer to such non-CCN actors as giving the movement "a much broader base than the CCN per se could claim," additionally supporting the notion of a movement with a broad social base.[117]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[111] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Panama.
[112] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/panamanians-campaign-overthrow-dictator-civic-crusade-1987-1989.
If anything, there is the possibility that the movement was dominated by whites/mestizos, as the media reportedly emphasized its elite character, according to Nepstad (*Nonviolent Revolutions*, p. 72). Nepstad herself, however, notices that "people from all backgrounds participated in the NCC demonstrations and strikes" (p. 73).
[113] Roberto Eisenmann, "The Struggle Against Noriega," *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1), 1990, p. 42.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid., pp. 42-43.
[116] Roger S. Powers and William B. Vogele (eds.), *Protest, Power, and Change: An Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action from ACT-UP to Women's Suffrage* (Garland Publishing, 1997), p. 398.
[117] Ibid.

Mexico, Anti PRI, 1987-2000
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because the movement appears to have bridged the country's ethnic cleavages.

The mestizos (constituting about 80% of the population) were politically dominant, and thus the state-controlling group, during and after the campaign.[118]

There is no evidence that the opposition was exclusively dominated by ethnic minorities.[119]

Just as in the 2006 anti-Calderon protests, the campaign against the PRI from 1987 to 2000 was not exclusively dominated by the three groups identified by EPR as ethnic minorities. In fact, the opposition was widespread among the Mexican population, which had grown dissatisfied with the long-dominant PRI:

> "But toward the final third of the twentieth century, the post-revolutionary state saw a rapid loss of hegemony, as evidenced by a rising tide of increasingly organized and disruptive political contention. Middle-class students turned leftists, women, teachers, urban dwellers, informal sector merchants, peasants, workers, and even capitalists forcefully and effectively challenged the state."[120]

The history of minority relations of the PAN and the PRD – the "two major opposition parties" against the PRI – is of course the same history of indifference and even repression towards indigenous peoples previously described by R.A.H. Castillo in the 2006 anti-Calderon case.[121] By the same logic used for that case, this provides further indirect support of a non-ethnic coding.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[118] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Mexico.
[119] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexicans-chihuahua-protest-electoral-fraud-1985-1988.
[120] Dolores Trevizo, *Rural Protest and the Making of Democracy in Mexico, 1968-2000* (Penn State Press, 2011), p. 2.
[121] Andreas Schedler, "The Democratic Revelation," *Journal of Democracy* 11 (4), 2000, p. 7; Castillo, "The Indigenous Movement in Mexico."

Chile, Anti-Pinochet 1983-89
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the campaign against Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet appears to have crossed the country's ethnic lines.

Throughout the 1980s, according to EPR whites/mestizos (92% of the population) held monopoly of political power, and are therefore the state-controlling ethnic group, while indigenous groups were excluded.[122]

Descriptions of the anti-Pinochet protests do not mention participation of indigenous groups, but describe nationwide involvement in the movement. The Swarthmore Database quotes union leader Rodolfo Seguel as he describes the initial goal to "broaden" the anti-Pinochet campaign "to the whole country, to protest not just the economic hardship, but human rights abuses, the whole system."[123] The Swarthmore Database also mentions "increasingly widespread dissent," and describes protests of "students and poor Chileans from around the country." Furthermore, as Manuel Antonio Garretón contextualizes the build-up to the 1983-89 movement, he provides additional information on the movement's broad base among Chilean society; his description of "massive" protests and the deterioration of regime-support among the entire "civilian bloc" strongly suggests a coding of a campaign bridging Chile's ethnic cleavage:

> "Beginning in 1981 the military's economic and political programs ran into difficulty. …The living standards of the middle classes plunged, while the livelihood of the 'popular' sectors deteriorated even further. …The regime's civilian bloc of support began to wither, in turn, to the point where the military was increasingly isolated politically. Meanwhile, 'popular' expressions of protest and pre-coup political parties – which had never been inactive but were necessarily limited in their public action – reasserted themselves. In 1983 massive political and social protests began. The discontented middle classes supported the demonstrations and other forms of mobilization."[124]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[122] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Chile.
[123] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chileans-overthrow-pinochet-regime-1983-1988.
[124] Manuel Antonio Garretón, "Popular Mobilization and the Military Regime in Chile: The Complexities of the Invisible Transition," in Susan Eckstein (ed.), *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001) p. 265.

Indonesia, Anti-Suharto, 1997-99
Non-ethnic.

The opposition movement represented a broad cross-section of civil society, with a prominent role of students, which warrants a non-ethnic coding.

The Javanese (45% of the population) are coded as dominant in EPR before and after the campaign and therefore are the state-controlling ethnic group.[125] No piece of evidence suggests that Javanese did not play a dominant (even if not necessarily exclusive) role in the movement.

Brian Martin and his co-authors' description of the movement clearly indicates its broad base:

> "The overt opposition was drawn primarily from the middle classes, including students, academics, university graduates, journalists, lawyers, artists and NGO staff. This middle-class group, having grown up in a time of prosperity, was particularly affected by the sharp changes in lifestyle brought about by the crisis. Of those involved, students were by far the most vocal."[126]

Consistently, The Swarthmore Database attributes Suharto's fall to the "unwavering demands of the students and citizens of Indonesia," and states that the opposition comprised "several different fronts including influential NGOs; political leaders such as Megawati Sukarnoputri, the [Javanese] head of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI); and Amien Rais, [Javanese] leader of Muhammadiyah, one of the two biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia." It was the "students" who "propelled the country into mass mobilization," and at one point during the campaign "student protest within universities grew to tens of thousands of participants spanning from the most elite to State-run universities."[127]

Likewise, R. William Liddle alludes to the movement's broad base:

> "President Suharto resigned on 21 May 1998 after several months of economic crisis which precipitated student demonstrations at dozens of universities across the country, mass rioting in many cities…and finally the refusal on 20 May of fourteen key ministers to be appointed to a reshuffled cabinet."[128]

Edward Aspinall's observations about the violence against ethnic Chinese Indonesians that occurred hand in hand with calls for governmental reform confirm the breadth of the opposition movement:

> "The urban crowds which took to the streets of Jakarta on May 13-14, attacking shops, security forces, symbols of authority, and (in many cases) the property and persons of the ethnic Chinese were the antithesis of an organized and disciplined opposition movement.

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[125] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Indonesia.
[126] Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian Vickers, "Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression: Studying Lower Profile Nonviolent Resistance," *Pacifica Review* 13 (2), 2001: 143-156.
[127] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/indonesians-overthrow-president-suharto-1998.
[128] R. William Liddle, "Indonesia's Democratic Opening," *Government and Opposition* 34 (1), 1999, p. 98.

This apparent paradox – the organizational weakness of opposition contrasted with the ubiquity of the oppositional mood during the late Suharto years and its eventual capacity to force through political change – is a major focus of this study."[129]

Aspinall refers to those being attacked specifically as "ethnic Chinese" while withholding any specific ethnic classification of the "urban crowds" of attackers and protestors. Further, he refers to the "ubiquity of the oppositional mood." If the opposition had been exclusively dominated by non-Javanese, it seems that very likely that Aspinall would have discussed the fact here.

Finally, in describing the same severe "organizational weakness" emphasized by Aspinall, Michael R.J. Vatkiotis provides more direct evidence of the case's non-ethnic nature by describing the opposition's inclusion of various actors in Indonesian society (again without ethnic qualifiers):

"Even as external pressure mounted on Suharto to resign to save the economy from total collapse, there was no united domestic front of opposition to him. The military was non-committal, led by former presidential adjutants who were loyal to the very end; the civilian political elite was too busy arguing over who should lead post-Suharto Indonesia; and the Islamic clergy was engaged in turf-fighting between urban and rural power bases. Meanwhile, the students were so scared that they would become tools of the elite that they hid their organization and appeared leaderless."[130]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[129] Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

[130] Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. xvii.

Thailand, Anti-Thaksin, 2005-06
No ethnic conflict.

I code the case as non-ethnic, as either the protest movement was dominated by Thais – the state-controlling group – or it bridged the country's ethnic cleavages. The Thais (74% of the population) have been the state-controlling group throughout, but according to the EPR country report "ethnicity does not play a significant role in national Thai politics."[131]

Descriptions of the movement, and in particular the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the main opposition umbrella organization, indicate a broad social base, without a straightforward class division and even less so an ethnic one.[132] The following descriptions by Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar illustrate the broad social base of the movement:

> "The PAD was an alliance between a wide range of sections of Thai society and between diverse political organisations. One wing was made up groups who could be described as an urban elite or as conservatives, such as disgruntled royalist civil servants who were being marginalised by the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, or sections of business who were not part of Thaksin's patronage system (see Ukrist, 2008). Another wing (and this is what we will focus on in our argument) was made up of social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a grassroots base, such as workers, farmers, teachers and students. The PAD thus brought together elite and grassroots opposition to Thaksin."[133]

> "School students developed initiatives, university campus demonstrations were held, women's marches were organised, and rallies, marches and protests in towns and cities up and down the country were held."[134]

> "The mass movement against Thaksin was not simply made up of royalist followers of Sondhi and nor was it comprised of an urban, free-market elite as suggested by Kasian (2005: 132). At least part of the movement was made up of self-organised groups of workers, students, farmers and teachers, and of political activists from social movements and NGOs.[135]

Naruemon Thabchumpon echoes this description:

> "The composition of the PAD network is drawn from different sectors and is cross-class in affiliation and issue based in orientation rather than being an ideological standpoint or territorial grouping."[136]

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[131] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Thailand.

[132] For a short overview, see the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/urban-thais-overthrow-prime-minister-thaksin-thailand-2005-2006).

[133] Oliver Pye and Wolfram Schaffar, "The 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: An Analysis," *Journal of Contemporary* Asia 38 (1), 2008, p 40.

[134] Ibid., p. 42.

[135] Ibid., p. 44.

[136] Naruemon Thabchumpon, "Contending Political Networks: A Study of the 'Yellow Shirts' and the 'Red Shirts' in Thailand's Politics," *Southeast Asian Studies* 5 (1), 2016, p. 101.

"The PAD consists of a political network with a wide variety of professional organizations (such as teachers, medical doctors, lawyers, and government officers), state enterprise unions, fundamental religious organizations (meaning the Santi-Asoke Buddhism and its Dharma Army group), communitarian NGOs, networks of small-scale farmer organizations, and urban middleclass individuals."[137]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[137] Ibid., p. 98.

Argentina, Pro-democracy movement, 1977-83
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic given the absence of any ethnic reference in the sources, which suggests that the group dominating the movement were also the state-controlling whites/mestizos or at the very least that the tiny indigenous minority did not exclusively dominate it.

At the time of the pro-democracy movement, whites/mestizos (97% of the population) held a monopoly of political power and thus the state-controlling ethnic group; Indigenous peoples, a very small minority, comprised the rest of the population.[138]

What began in Argentina as weekly demonstrations by "mothers" seeking explanations for the disappearance of their children grew into a larger pro-democracy movement by the Argentinian people.[139] The "mothers" had no specific geographical, religious, or class affiliation:

> "Gradually, the number of women grew. They belonged to different social classes, though the majority were working class. They represented different religious groups and came from different parts of Argentina. In July [1977] there were *150 Madres*."[140]

As the movement expanded, it gradually attracted broader sectors of Argentinian society. Seeing the example of the "*Madres*," the movement "extended to other groups of Argentines… such as lawyers and teachers," until 1983 saw "a boom of mass mobilization."[141] The loss of the 1982 Malvinas War, a humiliating military debacle, also played a role in escalating public aggravation and propelling "mass mobilization."[142]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[138] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Argentina.
[139] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mothers-plaza-de-mayo-campaign-democracy-and-return-their-disappeared-family-members-1977-19.
[140] Diana Taylor, "Making a Spectacle: The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo," *Journal of the Association for Research on Mothering* 3 (2), 2001, p. 100.
[141] Olga Onuch, *Mapping Mass Mobilization* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 92-93.
[142] Ibid., p. 94.

<u>Argentina, Coup plot, 1987</u>
<u>Non-ethnic.</u>

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication of the movement being dominated by the indigenous minority. The fact that the main political parties were involved in the protest movement indicates a dominant role in it for the state-controlling whites/mestizos.

The April 1987 failed coup attempted by a "group of lieutenant colonels," was one in a string of military uprisings between 1987 and 1990.[143] The Argentinian people reacted angrily to the coup, bridging previous divides to come out and defend the new democratic government:

> "Despite military statements that this was not an attempted coup d'état, civilian leaders rallied to defend the regime against the challenge to civilian authority. Putting aside decades of antagonism, Peronists and Radicals joined other parties in a pact to defend democracy. Multiparty commissions organized nationwide demonstrations against the military uprising."[144]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[143] Deborah L. Norden, "The Rise of the Lieutenant Colonels: Rebellion in Argentina and Venezuela," *Latin American Perspectives* 23 (3), 1996: 74-86, pp. 74-77.
[144] John Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. xii.

Bangladesh, Anti-Ershad, 1987-90
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because the movement bridged the country's ethnic divide; it is also possible that Bengali Muslims – the state-controlling ethnic – exclusively dominated the opposition movement, which would not alter the non-ethnic coding.

Bengali Muslims comprise approximately 89.5% of Bangladesh's population and are coded by EPR as politically dominant and are therefore the state-controlling group.[145]

The movement against Bangladeshi President Hussain Muhammed Ershad mobilized a huge portion of Bangladeshi society. The Swarthmore Database describes large-scale protests throughout the 1987-1990 period, which by 1990 consisted of "diverse segments of the Bangladeshi population including not only workers but also doctors, lawyers, and intellectuals."[146] All the way from the "mass demonstrations" that started in 1987 to the "weeks of strikes and public demonstrations that paralyzed Dhaka and other major urban areas of Bangladesh" in 1990, the movement was so widespread that, in late 1990, Ershad lost even the support of his own police force as they "began to refuse to comply with Ershad's order to fire on demonstrators."[147]

The two leading organizations in the opposition movement were the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which alternated in power subsequently.[148] The AL's political orientation emphasized "ethnicity based Bengali nationalism and secularism" and thus the party had the support of Bengali Hindus (10% of the population), besides its vast following among Bengali Muslims.[149]

The BNP embraced "Bangladeshi nationalism thus appealing to the country's entire population (Bengalis, though, represent 99.5% of the population). Thus, Bengali Muslims had a crucial role in both parties. The fact that the AL managed to obtain the votes of Bengali Hindus and the fact that the BNP appealed to the entire Bangladeshi population suggest that it is possible that the movement crossed the country's ethnic divide, but in any case Muslim Bengalis played a dominant role in it.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[145] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Bangladesh.
[146] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bangladeshis-bring-down-ershad-regime-1987-1990.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.
[149] Akhtar Hossain, "Anatomy of Hartal Politics in Bangladesh," *Asian Survey* 40 (3), 2000, p. 511.

<u>Belarus, Anti-Communist, 1988-1991</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

The protest movement was dominated by Belarussians, while the Russians were the state-controlling group in the Soviet Union.[150]

By contrast, Svensson and Lindgren (2010) do not code the case as ethnic.

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[150] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Russia; Adrian Karatnycky, Peter Ackerman, and Mark Y. Rosenberg, "How Freedom is Won," Freedom House, 2005, p. 27.

Belarus, Regime Opposition, 2006
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the movement was either dominated by the state-controlling Belarussians or crossed the country's ethnic divides.

Byelorussians (78% of the population) have been senior partners in a power-sharing system – and thus the state-controlling group – since the country's independence; Russians and Poles constitute 13% and 4% of the population, respectively.[151]

According to the Swarthmore Database, the movement succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of Belarussian citizens; for example, in the March 25 protest "tens of thousands took to the streets."[152] Animosity toward President Alexander Lukashenka served as the uniting factor of theses protests, as Vitali Silitski indicates: "Keeping the opposition together proved to be a complicated task. Containing as it did everything from communists to right-wing nationalists, its members shared little more than a common dislike of Lukashenka."[153]

Silitski's and the Swarthmore Database's descriptions of the mass protests of Belarussian citizens do not make any references to ethnicity, besides noting the wide social spectrum that the opposition brought together (including nationalists). Thus the movement was either exclusively dominated by ethnic Byelorussians or it bridged the country's ethnic cleavage(s).

The fact that opposition might have even have had an anti-Russian bias, further confirms the coding as non-ethnic, as it suggests that ethnic Russians probably did not play a dominant role in it:

> "To some degree, however, certain oppositional ideas have also been accepted as important Belarusian symbols (like Kastus' Kalinouski, a leader of the anti-Russian Uprising of 1863–1864, who became the symbolic patron of a major protest in Minsk after the 2006 presidential elections)."[154]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[151] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Belarus.
[152] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/belarusian-citizens-protest-presidential-election-2006.
[153] Vitali Silitski, "Belarus: Learning from Defeat," *Journal of Democracy* 17 (4), 2006, p. 141.
[154] Nelly Bekus, "Ethnic identity in post-Soviety Belarus: Ethnolinguistic Survival as an Argument in the Political Struggle," *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 35 (1), 2014, p. 53.

Benin, Anti-Communist, 1989-90
Non-ethnic.

Benin had an authoritarian power-sharing system, with northerners (15% of the population) as senior partners (and thus state-controlling for our purposes) and other groups (including the Fon) as junior partners in 1989. After regime change, roles were reversed, with the Fon (33% of the population) becoming senior partners and all other groups junior partners.[155]

The description of the movement in the Swarthmore Database clearly suggests that the protestors against President Mathieu Kérékou's government were a broad cross-section of society, including, in particular, teachers, students, and civil servants. The national conference created by the government in response to the movement launched a sort of civilian coup d'etat declaring its constitutional autonomy and eventually the government acquiesced.[156]

All other consulted sources confirm the "heterogeneous social basis" of the opposition movement, without explicitly discussing ethnicity.[157] Importantly, as Thomas Bierschenk notes, the civil servants engaged in protests – a major player in the movement – were integrated in the government clientelistic networks (hence their positions).[158] In the absence of any hint to the fact that only civil servants from groups other than the state-controlling northerners protested and given that most plausibly northerners had a significant presence in the civil service, this would constitute a more direct piece of evidence of the non-ethnic nature of the challenge.

Moreover, the national conference created as a result of the protest movement appears to have crossed the country's ethnic divides, as suggested by Rachel Gisselquist:

> "A further characteristic of the key groups in the Beninese negotiations was that they did not tend to represent narrow ethnic interests in the sense of guarding benefits exclusively for 'their' group. Instead, they were more clearly 'Beninese' groups, representing the interests of students, businesses, trade unions, and so forth."[159]

One could consider the formation and activities of the national conference as distinct from the phase of mass protests. However, the fact that the social groups involved in the movement were represented in the national conference too (as the above quote makes clear) indicates that to an important extent the non-ethnic character of the national conference organizations must apply to the organizations engaged in the non-violent resistance movement.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[155] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Benin.
[156] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/beninese-campaign-economic-justice-and-democracy-1989-90.
[157] Thomas Bierschenk, "Democratization without Development: Benin 1989-2009," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 22 (3), 2009, p. 341. See also Rachel M. Gisselquist, "Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin," *Democratization* 15 (4), 2008: 789-814; Karatnycky, Ackerman, and Rosenberg, "How Freedom is Won," p. 27; Eleanor Marchant and Arch Puddington, Enabling Environments for Civic Movements and the Dynamics of Democratic Transition," Freedom House, 2008.
[158] Bierschenk, "Democratization without Development," p. 343.
[159] Gisselquist, "Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival in Benin," p.807.

Bolivian, Anti-Junta, 1977-82

Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the movement was either exclusively dominated by the state-controlling ethnic group or bridged the country's ethnic divide.

Bolivia hosts a large indigenous population, especially compared to its southern neighbors – the Quechua, Aymara, the Guaraní, and other eastern indigenous groups together comprise 59% of the country's population. According to EPR, in the 1978-82 period, these groups were either "powerless" or "irrelevant" in the face of the politically dominant – and therefore state-controlling – whites/mestizos (41% of the population), which remained the case after the fall of the junta, until 1993.[160]

Unsurprisingly, Bolivia has not lacked turmoil related to this ethnic cleavage; campaigns such as the Indianista and Katarista indigenous movements partially overlapped in time with the democratic transition,[161] and the "1970s saw a rise in indigenous movements that included a revalorization of indigenous identities."[162]

However, mobilization for democracy does not seem to have been limited to ethnic minorities. The Swarthmore Database describes the opposition as inclusive of "different segments of Bolivian society" and mentions specific actions by "workers," "miners," and "students." In September of 1982, protests were held in the three largest Bolivian cities, attracting thousands of people.[163] Similarly, Miguel Centellas writes that the political turmoil beginning circa fall 1978 encompassed "a vast array of political parties, splinter groups, student factions, workers' organizations, and civic committees [which] emerged and reemerged to challenge the authoritarian regime and each other."[164] Enrique Ibanez Rojo discusses the leading role played by the union (COB) in the opposition to the regime, but again does not report any information suggesting a dominance by indigenous ethnic groups.[165] The facts that most important element within the COB were miners, that miners are explicitly distinguished by indigenous campesinos in the literature and the COB was reluctant to accept the use of indigenous languages in national literacy program suggest that white-mestizos must have played a dominant role in the movement.[166]

Even in her work exploring "the changing relations between the state and left-indigenous movements in Bolivia and Latin America," Laing does not indicate that any particular ethnic or

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[160] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Bolivia.
[161] Waskar Ari, *Earth Politics: Religion, Decolonization, and Bolivia's Indigenous Intellectuals* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), p.11.
[162] Carolyn Anne Stilwell, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Bolivia," MA Thesis, Washington State University, 2007, p. 19.
[163] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-successfully-oust-military-regime-1982.
[164] Miguel Centellas, "Decentralization and Democratization in Bolivia," paper presented at the International Congress of the Latin American Studies, 2000, p. 3.
[165] Enrique Ibanez Rojo, "The UDP Government and the Crisis of the Bolivian Left (1982-1985)," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (1), 2000: 175-205.
[166] John Crabtree, *Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 2008), p. 23; Centellas, "Decentralization and Democratization in Bolivia."

indigenous group dominated the anti-junta movement.[167] The Kataristas, Aymara nationalists, who "postulated a number of ethnic demands" for such things as "equal treatment of peasants" and "the recognition of indigenous peoples," had a significant political impact in the late 1970s, including influencing the establishment of the Trade-Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB).[168] However, Laing singles out neither the Kataristas nor the CSUTCB, nor any another group, as the main forces behind the regime's demise. Instead, she broadly attributes it to "popular pressure through a series of nonviolent actions."[169]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[167] Anna Frances Laing, "Territory, Resistance and Struggles for the Plurinational State: The Spatial Politics of the TIPNIS Conflict," PhD Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015, p. iii.
[168] Ibid., pp. 37-38.
[169] Ibid., p. 39.

Bulgaria, Anti-Communist, 1989
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because ethnic Bulgarians clearly played a dominant role in it, but probably not an exclusive one given the important involvement of ethnic Turks too (i.e., the movement may have crossed the country's Bulgarian-Turkish cleavage).

According to EPR, Bulgarians represented 83% of the population and held a monopoly of power – and thus are considered the state-controlling ethnic group – before and after the transition; Turks represented 10% of the population, with Roma, Pomaks, and Macedonians accounting for the rest.[170]

The Swarthmore Database describes "a rally attended by 50,000 people in Sofia" organized by "independent opposition groups," in which "nearly 1,000 ethnic Turks at the protest also shouted for the end of the assimilation program." The numerical figures here imply that most protesters were ethnic Bulgarians and they were disproportionally represented compared to their share of the population, suggesting that they dominated the movement.[171] (The size of subsequent protests varied, with 100,000 participants on January 14, 1990.) However, other sources (see below) suggest an important Turkish role (even though no precise breakdown of movement participants is available), which would warrant considering the case as bridging the ethnic divide between Turks and Bulgarians.

The Swarthmore Database also explains how environmental protests by the group "Ecoglasnost" in October of 1989 served as a catalyst for the broader movement, noting that "following these actions by Ecoglasnost, further opposition groups began to form." As opposition activity continued, in December the Union for Democratic Forces (UDF) formed, an "umbrella organization" that included such diverse entities as student and agrarian groups, trade unions, and other pro-democracy opposition groups.[172] This description of the pro-democracy movement does not contain additional references to the ethnicity of participants, which, together with the fact that protesters are reported to have sung the Bulgarian national anthem and displayed the Bulgarian flag, suggests that the movement was not dominated by ethnic minorities.

Several other sources also describe the movement in terms consistent with a non-ethnic coding. A *New York Times* article from December 1989 calls out the actions of Bulgarians rather than Bulgarian Turks, writing that, on the eve of the article publication, "more than 10,000 Bulgarians showed their support for further democratic change at a candlelight vigil."[173] Freedom House describes Turkish involvement in the protests:

> "In 1989, environmental, civic, political, and trade union organizations joined the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a loose, broad-based movement that pressed for democratic

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[170] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Bulgaria.
[171] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bulgarians-campaign-democratic-reforms-and-multi-party-rule-1989-90.
[172] See also Emil Giatzidis, *An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, Economic, and Social Transformations*, (Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 47.
[173] Clyde Haberman, "Upheaval in the East; Bulgaria's Communist Chief Plans To Relax Grip and Hold Elections," *The New York Times*, 12 December, 1989.

reform. Protests, strikes, and mass rallies forced Bulgaria's Socialist Party (the former Communist Party) to agree to June 1990 multiparty parliamentary elections, which the party won by a narrow margin. Civic activism also spread to the large Turkish minority, which in 1990 won significant minority rights. Amid a political scandal and rising nonviolent civic ferment, the country's Socialist president resigned and UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev was elected president by Parliament with support from Communist and pro-Communist legislators who responded to pressure from the growing mass protest movement."[174]

As Jenny Engström reports, an initially Turkish-dominated movement eventually grew into one by greater Bulgarian society:

"Resistance against the forcible assimilation process emerged in the spring of 1985 as Bulgarian Turks organized themselves underground with the aim of regaining their cultural rights (Tafradkiski et al. 1992, 215). Four years later, in May 1989, a wave of protest spread throughout Turk-inhabited areas, primarily in the south-east. Bulgarian Turks resorted to hunger strikes, demonstrations and sit-down strikes, leading to clashes with the Bulgarian authorities. Increasingly, during this time period, the Turkish minority received support from a group of Bulgarian pro-democratic intellectuals and, alongside the call for the restoration of minority rights, there eventually emerged a general public protest against the government… In the absence of popular opposition to the communist regime in Bulgaria until the late 1980s, one of the first challenges to the Communist Party came from the Turkish minority's protests – primarily in the spring and summer of 1989 – against the Bulgarian state's violation of their human rights. Whereas it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria was a direct result of the crisis that followed from the forced assimilation campaign, it can nonetheless be argued that the emergence of an inter-ethnic crisis at the end of the 1980s forced the political elite to address the ethnic, or national, issue as a component of the transition, and helped pave the way for political pluralism."[175]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[174] Freedom House, "Bulgaria, Period of democratic transition: 1989-1990, Pro-democracy civic movement: present," undated (https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Bulgaria.pdf).

[175] Jenny Engström, *Democratisation and the Prevention of Violent Conflict: Lessons Learned from Bulgaria and Macedonia* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 83 and 85.

Burma, Pro-democracy Movement 1988-90

I code the case as non-ethnic, as the movement seems to have bridged the country's ethnic lines and very plausibly saw significant involvement of the Barman (68% of the population), which are coded dominant in EPR and thus are the state-controlling ethnic group.[176]

The Swarthmore Database reports that "massive" demonstrations took place in the capital Rangoon "and other major cities throughout the country," which would be inconsistent with an exclusive domination of the movement by peripheral ethnic groups.[177]

Chenoweth and Stephan specifically note the ethnic heterogeneity and inclusivity of the movement:

> "Spontaneous student-led protests against police violence in Rangoon quickly grew into a nationwide campaign to dismantle the junta involving large numbers of Burma's ethnically and linguistically diverse population. …The protests culminated on 8-8-88, when interviews broadcast over the BBC and VOA called on the Burmese people to converge on Rangoon… Hundreds of thousands of students, monks, workers, civil servants, unemployed people, professionals, and members of various ethnic groups marched carrying signs and banners demanding democracy."[178]

Similarly, Maureen Aung-Thwin reports the participation of large numbers of Buddhist monks, young children, university students, housewives, doctors, and even some civil servants and police.[179]

Zoltan Barany's account of the protest movement is consistent with a non-ethnic coding, but suggests an exclusively dominant role for the majority state-controlling ethnic group:

> "The protesters included different segments of the Burmese society, but the student-led opposition was unable to draw into the uprising two potentially significant participants: critical masses from Burma's large agricultural population and the country's ethnic minorities, some with well-organized and battle-hardened guerrilla forces."[180]

Barany also provides an indirect piece of evidence in reporting that the state propaganda against the protestors was that they were traitors and communists, not affiliates of the various ethnic rebel groups engaged in armed rebellion in the periphery.[181] It seems plausible that the

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[176] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Myanmar.
[177] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/burmese-citizens-campaign-democracy-1988.
[178] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, pp. 172 and 180.
[179] Maureen Aung-Thwin, "Burmese Days," *Foreign Affairs* 68, 1989: 143-161. See also a contemporary newspaper account, noting: "The protests, which have spread to every major city since they began on Monday, have been led by students and joined by large numbers of workers and Buddhist monks, as well as by a cross-section of citizens, including Government employees." Seth Mydans, "Uprising in Burma: The Old Regime Under Siege", *New York Times*, August 12, 1988.
[180] Zoltan Barany, *How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 86.
[181] Ibid., p. 85.

government would have played the "ethnic card" had there been a substantial ethnic minority presence in the protest movement.

Note that the campaign is coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 1973-74
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic due to the ethnic homogeneity of Portugal's population and the broad-based character of the movement.

EPR codes the Portuguese ethnicity as the country's only, and deems ethnicity politically "irrelevant" from 1946 to 2013.[182] The Swarthmore Database refers to the Carnation Revolution as a "national demonstration of popular power," and references the participation of "virtually all shantytowns in the major cities" as well as "a strike wave that swept many parts of the country."[183]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[182] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Portugal.
[183]http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/portuguese-workers-campaign-societal-change-ongoing-revolutionary-process-1974-1976. See also Kenneth Maxwell, "Portugal: 'The Revolution of the Carnatians,' 1974-75," in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Lebanon, Cedar Revolution, 2005
<u>Ethnic</u>.

This is an ethnic case as the protests are against the Syrian occupation.[184]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[184] See, for example, Rudy Jaafar and Maria J. Stepan, "Lebanon's Independence Intifada," in Maria Stepan, ed., *Civilian Jihad* (New York: Palgrave, 2009).

<u>Russia, Chechen, 1997</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

This is a Chechen movement against the Russian-controlled state.[185] According to NAVCO 2.0 1997 is a nonviolent year of an otherwise violent campaign, which, based on the ACD2EPR dataset was conducted by Chechen insurgents.

References to a Chechen nonviolent movement in 1997 are rare and lack details. Elena Pokalova reports protests in Grozny.[186] The protestors opposed the terms of the negotiated settlement with Russia and favored de jure independence from Russia. Consistent reports are put forth by Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy[187] and Ekaterina Sokirianskaya.[188] It is nonetheless clear that large protests did occur in Chechnya in 1997 and the protestors were ethnic Chechens.

The campaign is not included in Svensson and Lindgren's (2010) database.

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[185] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Russia.
[186] Elena Pokalova, *Chechnya's Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia's North Caucasus* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015), p. 77.
[187] Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy, *The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost* (New York: Palgrave, 2010).
[188] Ekaterina Sokirianskaya, "State and Violence in Chechnya (1997-99)" in Anne Le Huérou, Aude Merlin, Amandine Regamey, and Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowsk (eds.), *Chechnya at War and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

Ghana, Ghanaian Convention People's Party, 1949-1957
Ethnic.

This is an ethnic resistance case as it is an anti-colonial struggle.[189]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[189] See the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ghanaians-campaign-independence-british-rule-1949-1951).

Croatia, Croatian Institutional Reform, 1999-2000
Non-ethnic.

A non-ethnic coding is warranted as descriptions of the movement are devoid of ethnic references, suggesting that it was either exclusively dominated by the state-controlling Croatians or it bridged the country's ethnic divides.

EPR codes Croats (90.4% of the population) as dominant, and thus they are state-controlling. The rest of the population consists of Serbs (4.3%), Bosniaks (0.73%), Italians (0.42%), Roma (0.4%), and Hungarians (0.33%).[190]

Descriptions of the opposition movement in Croatia at the time are completely devoid of references to the ethnicity of participants. Given the centrality of ethnic conflict in the country's politics in the 1990s, this absence is particularly suggestive of a non-ethnic coding, as a dominant role for Serbs, in particular, likely would not have gone unmentioned. Various authors refer to the movement using terms such as mass civic mobilization, opposition coalition, NGO campaign, and "youths." All neglect to mention ethnicity when describing the opposition, supporting a non-ethnic coding.[191]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[190] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Croatia.
[191] Taras Kuzio, "Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal Post-Soviet Democratization* 16 (1), 2008: 97-109, in particular pp. 104-106 and 109; Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Paul Stubbs, "Networks, Organizations, Movements: Narratives and Shapes of Three Waves of Activism in Croatia," *Polemos* 15 (2), 2012: 11-32.

<u>Croatia, Croatian nationalists, 1970-71</u>
<u>Ethnic.</u>

I code the case as ethnic as the protestors were Croatians[192] and the Serbs were the state-controlling group as the largest demographically senior power-sharing partner, according to EPR.[193]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[192] Paul Lendvai and Lis Parcell, "Yugoslavia without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis," *International Affairs*, 67 (2), 1991: 251-261; Ante Batović, "The Balkans in Turmoil – Croatian Spring and the Yugoslav position Between the Cold War Blocs 1965-1971," LSE Working Paper, 2009; Jill Irving, "The Croatian Spring and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia," in Lenard J Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso (ed.), *State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia's Disintegration* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2008).
[193] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Serbia%20and%20Montenegro.

Czechoslovakia, Czech Anti-Soviet Occupation, 1968
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the movement was local (and crossed the Czech-Slovak cleavage) and its target were Soviet occupying forces.[194]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[194] Peter Deli, "'Esprit' and the Soviet Invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia." *Contemporary European History* 9 (2000): 39-58; Cox, Richard Henry and Erich G. Frankland. "The Federal State and the Breakup of Czechoslovakia: An Institutional Analysis," *Publius* 25 (1995): 71-88.

Brazil Diretas J*á*, 1984-1985

Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic in light of the fact that available sources describe the mass opposition movement in non-ethnic terms, suggesting that it may have crossed the country's ethnic divide or that it was exclusively dominated by the state-controlling whites.

Both during and after Diretas J*á*, a campaign that united much of the population in opposition to the military government, whites (54% of the population) held dominant political status (and thus are the state-controlling ethnic group) vis-à-vis Afro-Brazilians (45%) and Indigenous peoples (0.4%).[195]

The Swarthmore Database describes a large-scale, broad based movement, without any reference to ethnicity.[196] The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party had a leading role in the movement and its leaders (including the two candidates for the 1985 presidential elections) were white (Ulysses Guimarães, Tancredo Neves, André Franco Montoro, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Mário Covas, Teotônio Vilela, José Serra, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Eduardo Suplicy, and Leonel Brizola).

Timothy Power refers to the case as an "unprecedented mobilization on the part of the Brazilian people" and mentions "opinion polls that showed the population nearly unanimous in its support for *diretas*."[197] By describing the "two political directions of the movement" as the "elite opposition groups" and the "working-class sectors organized in trade unions, civil associations, and neighborhood organizations," Maria Helena Moreira Alves suggests the broad scope of the movement across different sectors of Brazilian society.[198] Salvador Sandoval writes that Diretas J*á* "consisted of mass demonstrations held in the major urban centers coordinated by the coalition of opposition parties, labor unions, and social movement organizations",[199] and Ann Schneider explains the movement's support as coming "first from leaders in the Catholic Church, then from the national directorates of opposition political parties, key political figures, the Brazilian Bar Association and the central media, as well as a wellspring of cultural figures."[200] Scott Mainwaring consistently describes a broad-based, large-scale movement active across the country, without any reference to ethnicity.[201]

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[195] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Brazil.

[196] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/brazilians-act-end-military-rule-diretas-j-1983-84.

[197] Timothy J. Power, "The Masses and the Critical Mass: A Strategic Choice Model of the Transition to Democracy in Brazil," *Texas Papers on Latin America: Pre-publication working papers of the Institute of Latin American Studies,* University of Texas at Austin, 1987, p. 6.

[198] Maria Helena Moreira Alves, "Dilemmas of the Consolidation of Democracy from the Top in Brazil: A Political Analysis," *Latin American Perspectives* 15 (3), 1988, p. 48.

[199] Salvador A. M. Sandoval, "Social Movements and Democratization: The Case of Brazil and the Latin Countries," in Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds.), *From Contention to Democracy* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), p. 182.

[200] Ann M. Schneider, "The Unsettling and Unsettled Monument against Torture in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil," *Peace & Change* 37 (4), 2012, p. 497.

[201] Scott Mainwaring, "The Transition to Democracy in Brazil," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 28 (1), 1986: 149-179.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

East Germany, Worker Uprising, 1953

Ethnic.

As the main repressive role in the uprising was played by Soviet occupying forces, this case is coded as ethnic.[202]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[202] Victor Gobarev, "Soviet Military Planning and Activities During the East German Uprising of June 1953," *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 10 (4), 1997: 1-29.

<u>Cyprus, Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston, 1954</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

This is by definition an ethnic challenge, as it was an anti-colonial struggle against British rule and for union ("enosis") with Greece.

On the large-scale protests by Greek-Cypriots that preceded the violent phase of the struggle, see, for example, the book chapter by Andreas Karyos.[203]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[203] Andreas Karyos, "The Acceleration of History and Decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean: The case of Cyprus, 1945-1959," in Alexios Alecou (ed.), *Acceleration of History: War, Conflict, and Politics* (London: Lexington Books, 2016), pp. 126-127.

East Timor, Freitilin, 1974
Ethnic.

This is an ethnic case, as it was a struggle by the local East Timorese population against the Javanese-controlled Indonesian government.[204]

The campaign is coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[204] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Indonesia. See, for example, the Online Methodological Appendix for Chenoweth and Stepan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; Martin, Varney, and Vickers, "Political Jiu-Jitsu against Indonesian Repression."

East Germany, Pro-democracy Movement, 1989

<u>Non-ethnic</u>.

I code the case as non-ethnic given the homogeneity of the East German population, the political irrelevance of ethnicity according to EPR, and the fact that all sources refer to the protesters simply as Germans.[205]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[205] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Germany%20Democratic%20Republic. See, e.g., Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," *World Politics* 47 (1), 1994: pp. 42-101.

<u>Mozambique, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, 1963</u>
<u>Ethnic.</u>

This is an anti-colonial struggle and thus by definition an ethnic challenge, pitting people from Mozambique against the Portuguese colonizers.[206]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[206] Matt Meyer notes that the government violent repression of peaceful protests in Mueda in 1960 represented a key turning point, as it convinced the opposition of the need to resort to violent resistance. However, nonviolent activities continued until early 1964, when they gave way to FRELIMO's violent campaign. Matt Meyer, "Mozambique: Liberation Myths and Resistance Strategies, 1920s–1970s," in Maciej J. Bartkowski (ed.), *Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), pp. 93-96.

China, Democracy Movement, 1976-1979
Non-ethnic.

References to the Tiananmen protests of 1976 and the Peking Spring of 1978 and 1979 make no mention of the ethnicity of the protestors, which would indicate that the movement was dominated by the state-controlling ethnic group – the Han Chinese – and thus a non-ethnic coding.

According to EPR, the Han Chinese constituted 94% of the population and held monopoly of power (and are thus the state-controlling ethnic group).[207]

In discussing the episode, Peter Moody notes the "absence of intellectuals from the famous 'Peking Spring' democracy movement of 1978-1979, in which workers seemed to be the most outspoken proponents of radical change."[208] Arlette Laduguie's discussion of the protest movements and political atmosphere from 1976 to 1979 is equally devoid of ethnic references.[209]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[207] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/China.
[208] Peter R. Moody, "The Political Culture of Chinese Students and Intellectuals: A Historical Examination," *Asian Survey* 28 (11), 1998, p. 1156.
[209] Arlette Ladugie, "The Human Rights Movement," *Index on Censorship* 9 (1), 1980.

China, Hundred Flowers Movement, 1956-57
Non-ethnic.

The Hundred Flowers Campaign represented an outcropping of Party criticism by Chinese intellectuals, originally prompted to do so by Mao but later persecuted for taking the opposition too far.

Though no source explicitly states that the Chinese intellectuals comprising the movement were majority Han Chinese (the state-controlling ethnic group), no source links the dissenting intellectuals to any of China's 55 ethnic minorities either. Eddy U refers to the "professors, engineers, and others [who] spoke out during the Hundred Flowers campaign,"[210] and Peter Moody refers to the dissenters as "intellectuals."[211] Rodrick MacFarquhar and John King Fairbank write that the criticisms of the Hundred Flowers Campaign were "wide-ranging" and "mainly produced by an important but narrow segment of urban society – intellectuals, students, members of 'democratic parties,' and professional people."[212] Non-Han Chinese may have participated in the movement, but it seems exceedingly unlikely they exclusively dominated it given the absence of any ethnic references. [213]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

[210] Eddy U, "The Making of Chinese Intellectuals: Representations and Organization in the Thought Reform Campaign," *The China Quarterly* 192, 2007: 971-989, p. 976.
[211] Peter R. Moody, "The Political Culture of Chinese Students and Intellectuals: A Historical Examination," *Asian Survey* 28 (11), 1988, p. 1152.
[212] Rodrick MacFarquhar and John King Fairbank (eds.), *The Cambridge History of China*, Volume 15, The People's Republic, Part 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 704.
[213] Another source that makes no mention of ethnicity but says movement was dominated by intellectuals is Janos Radvanyi, "The Hungarian Revolution and the Hundred Flowers Campaign," *The China Quarterly* 43, 1970: 121-139.

Hungary, Pro-democracy Movement, 1989
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic due to the absence of any references to ethnicity in the historical accounts, which suggests that either the movement was dominated by ethnic Hungarians or it crossed the country's ethnic divide.

According to EPR, the majority of Hungary's population is ethnically Hungarian, accounting for 90% of the total; the group held a monopoly of power and is thus state-controlling.[214] The only other ethnicity that is mentioned by EPR is the much smaller Roma population (~5%).

The movement participants are described as "independent civic groups and labor unions,"[215] or more generically as "protestors"[216] and "marchers."[217]

An indirect piece of evidence of the dominant role of Hungarians in the opposition movement is provided by James Brown, who reports that the issue of the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania became an important focal point for the opposition to the regime.[218] Also he notes the importance of the rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, the Hungarian leader during the Soviet invasion in 1956, which was widely seen a Hungarian nationalist symbol (in this specific context, as in other cases above, there is some ambiguity as to whether "Hungarian" is an ethnic or national label).[219]

The case is sometimes not included in studies of nonviolent resistance, as to an important extent the transition appears to have be driven from above by the ruling party, rather than resulting from popular pressure from below. However, as noted above, there were well-documented mass demonstrations, so it seems appropriate to keep the case.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[214] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Hungary.
[215] Karatnycky, Ackerman, and Rosenberg, *How Freedom is Won*, p. 32.
[216] Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 428.
[217] "The Curtain Rises: Eastern Europe, 1989 12 Months that Shook the East Bloc," *Los Angeles Times*, December 17, 1989.
[218] James F. Brown, *Surge to Freedom: The End of Communist Rule in Eastern Europe* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 107.
[219] Ibid. p. 114.

United Kingdom, IRA, 1968
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the movement was clearly dominated by Catholics, while the English (81.5% of the population), as senior partners in a power-sharing system, were the state-controlling ethnic group.[220]

Richard English reports the year 1972 as marking the unambiguous prevalence of violent contention (497 people killed in the conflict that year).[221] However, I stick with NAVCO 2.0's coding of 1969 as the beginning of violent resistance as that is the first year of armed conflict in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset; English does note that violence occurred even before 1972, for example the clashes in Derry in October 1968 (the Provisional IRA was created in late 1969).

Besides the fact that the ACD2EPR dataset reports the violent phase of the conflict as involving an armed group recruiting among Catholics in Northern Ireland, there is no doubt about the ethnic nature of the conflict. The challengers' aimed at redressing the mistreatment of Catholics in Northern Ireland, obtaining a larger share of power for Catholics in Northern Ireland or unification with Ireland[222] and there is no indication of any significant presence of Protestants in the movement. Richard English reports, in passing, that the marchers were concerned about their community's (Catholic) treatment and that probably most wanted unification with Ireland.[223] English also notes:

> "Put crisply, and despite the genuinely and impressive cross-communal instincts of some of those activists involved, the Northern Irish civil rights movement quickly became a movement expressing dissatisfaction on the part of one community, concerning their treatment at the hands of the other; it overlapped with national identification (Catholic-nationalist civil rights agitation versus Protestant-unionist skepticism)."[224]

Gregory Maney is even more explicit: "the movement consisted overwhelmingly of members of the mostly Catholic, Nationalist minority."[225]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[220] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/United%20Kingdom.

[221] Richard English, "The Interplay of Non-violent and Violent Action in Northern Ireland, 1967-1972," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*. For a brief description of the first nonviolent phase of the campaign and bibliography, see April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action* (London: Housmans Bookshop: 2006), pp. 114-116.

[222] Ibid., pp. 76-77.

[223] Ibid., p. 88.

[224] Ibid., p. 87. See also Robert W. White, "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (6), 1989): 1277-1302.

[225] Gregory M. Maney, "The Paradox of Reform," in Lester R. Kurtz and Sharon Erickson Nepstead (eds.), *Nonviolent Resistance* (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012), p. 11.

Iran, Iranian Revolution, 1977-78
Non-ethnic.

I code the challenge as non-ethnic as there is no indication that the movement was dominated by ethnic minorities; it seems likely that mass movement crossed the country's ethnic lines but it is also possible that it was exclusively dominated by the state-controlling Persian majority.

According to EPR, the Persian majority (51% of the population) has been politically dominant (and therefore the state-controlling ethnic group) throughout.[226] There is no indication that the opposition movement was dominated by Azeris, Kurds or Arabs, the main minorities.

The Swarthmore Database, Zoltan Barany and newspaper accounts describe a broad-based opposition consisting of students, Shia theologians, oil field workers, and middle-class citizens.[227]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[226] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Iran.
[227] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/iranians-overthrow-shah-1977-79; Barany, *How Armies Respond to Revolutions*; Robert Keatley, "Iranian Oilfield Strife Adds to Doubts About Shah's Ability to Hang On as Ruler," *Wall Street Journal*, 1 November, 1978.

Egypt, Kifaya, 2000-05
Non-ethnic.

I code this campaign as non-ethnic as there is no indication that the movement was dominated by the Coopt minority excluded from power. Existing accounts indicate a broad social support for the movement spanning across various social cleavages. It is not clear, however, whether the movement spanned the country's *ethnic* cleavage or it was exclusively dominated by the state-controlling ethnic group (Muslim Arabs). Either way a non-ethnic coding is warranted.

According to EPR, Arab Muslims constitute 91% of the population and hold a monopoly of political power, with Christian Coopts accounting for the remaining 9%.[228]

The movement drew upon large sections of Egyptian society under Kifaya's message of "Enough."[229] It "unite[d] diverse groups in its pursuit of broadly acceptable democratic reforms" and "appealed to reform-minded individuals and parties of all social backgrounds and political persuasions" including communists, nationalists, and Islamists.[230] The movement eventually weakened, due to the "withdrawal of Islamist actors" and failure to "penetrate grassroots Egyptian society, operating instead in circles of intellectuals and political activists,"[231] as well as "intimidation by the state" and various "internal conflicts."[232] That the ideological constituency of Kifaya evolved, specifically regarding the Islamists, explains the seemingly contradictory claims regarding the organization's composition. A Carnegie report points to Kifaya's "key obstacle" in "its inability to forge a broad, cross-ideological coalition," while Manar Shorbagy specifically highlights Kifaya as a "cross-ideological force."[233] Shorbagy also writes that Kifaya "differs from the Islamic movement" in that "while [the Islamic movement] has a concrete ideology shaping its project, Kefaya goes beyond any single ideology to be the only movement in contemporary Egypt that emerged out of serious political interactions across ideological lines."[234] In any case, such domestic divides are ideological, with no hint of an ethnic backdrop.

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[228] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Egypt.
[229] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kefaya-protests-mubaraks-referendum-and-re-election-egypt-2005.
[230] Nadia Oweidat, Cheryl Benard, Dale Stahl, Walid Kildani, Edward O'Connell, and Audra K. Grant, *The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), p. ix. See also Sherif Mansour, "Enough is Enough: Achievements and Shortcomings of Kefaya, the Egyptian Movement for Change," in Stephan (ed.), *Civilian Jihad*, pp. 205-208.
[231] Kefaya "Resource Page," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010 http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/22/kifaya-pub-54922.
[232] Oweidat et al., *The Kefaya Movement*, pp. ix-x.
[233] Manar Shorbagy, "Understanding Kefaya: The New Politics in Egypt," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 29 (1), 2007: 39-60, p. 39.
[234] Manar Shorbagy, "The Egyptian Movement for Change – Kefaya: Redefining Politics in Egypt," *Public Culture* 19 (1), 2007: 175-196, p. 178.See also Jeannie Sowers and Chris Toensing, *The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt* (New York: Verso Books, 2012), p. 82, for a description of the movement's social base.

Yugoslavia/Serbia, Kosovo Albanian, 1989-1996
Ethnic.

The movement was dominated by Kosovar Albanians and challenged the Serb-controlled state.[235]

The campaign is coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[235] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Serbia%20and%20Montenegro. See, for example, Howard Clark, "The Limits of Prudence: Civil Resistance in Kosovo, 1990-98," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*.

<u>Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanian nationalist movement, 1981</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

The movement was dominated by Kosovar Albanians and challenged the Serb-controlled state.[236]

The campaign is coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[236] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Serbia%20and%20Montenegro.

Sri Lanka, LTTE, 1972-75
Ethnic.

This refers to the first few years of the Tamil campaign in Sri Lanka, which later turned violent and was dominated by the Tamil Tigers, coded as affiliated with the Tamil ethnic group by the ACD2EPR dataset.[237]

According to EPR, the Sinhalese (constituting 70% of the population) were politically dominant and thus are the state-controlling ethnic group.[238]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[237] The accounts of the nonviolent phase of the Tamil self-determination movement are extremely patchy. See K. T. Rajasingham, "Sri Lanka: The Untold Story Chapter 24: Tamil militancy - a manifestation," Asia Times, January 26, 2002 (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DA26Df04.html); Amnesty International, Report of Amnesty International Mission to Sri Lanka, January 1975; University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), "The Broken Palmyra. Sri Lanka: 1990," chapter 2 (http://www.uthr.org/Book/CHA02.htm#_Toc527947381); http://www.lankalibrary.com/pol/militancy_history.htm; http://www.pbs.org/pov/nomoretears/timeline/.
[238] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Sri%20Lanka.

USSR, Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement, 1990-91
Ethnic.

The movement is dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz, while the Soviet Union was Russian-controlled, so an ethnic coding is warranted.[239]

However, this is an ambiguous case as sources discussing the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement generally do not report large-scale protests or other relevant forms of collective action.[240] The two mentions of collective action I could find refer the May 1 1990 demonstration against Communist rule and the October anti-Communist hunger strike.[241]

The case is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

[239] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Russia. On the Kirgiz national movement, see Eugene Huskey, "Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[240] E.g., Huskey, "Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration;" Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to Independence," *Foreign Affairs* (summer), 1992. In his landmark book on nationalist mobilization and the Soviet collapse, Mark Beissinger does not discuss mobilization in Kyrgyzstan. Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[241] "RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service Director Recalls May Day Protest," Radio Free Europe, May 10, 2010 (https://pressroom.rferl.org/a/off_mic_kyrgyz_may_day_protest/2035589.html).

USSR, Latvia Pro-democracy Movement, 1989-91
Ethnic.

The movement is dominated by ethnic Latvians in the Russian-controlled Soviet Union.[242]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[242] On the dominant role of ethnic Latvians see the Swarthmore database
(http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/latvians-campaign-national-independence-1989-1991). On ethnic power relations in the Soviet Union, see the EPR dataset (https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Russia).

<u>Colombia, Liberals of 1949, 1946-47</u>
<u>Non-ethnic.</u>

This case seems to correspond to the labor-led campaign in the early phase of La Violencia.[243] I code the case as non-ethnic as the ACD2EPR dataset does not identify the rebels as affiliated with a specific ethnic group. Moreover, the descriptions of the movement do not contain ethnic references, suggesting that either it was dominated by the state-controlling majority group or it crossed the country's ethnic divide to include Afrocolombians and indigenous people.

According to EPR, whites/mestizos (73% of the population) held monopoly power and are thus the state-controlling ethnic group. Afrocolombians and indigenous people represented 23% and 0.3% of the population respectively.[244]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[243] Norman A. Bailey, "La Violencia in Colombia," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 9 (4), 1967: 561-575; Richard E. Sharpless, *Gaitán of Colombia: A Political Biography* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1978), pp. 160-164; Antonio Rafael de la Cova "La Violencia in Colombia" undated (http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/colombia/la-violencia.htm).
[244] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Colombia.

Mali, Anti-Military, 1990-91
Non-ethnic.

I code the campaign as non-ethnic as there is no indication of a dominant role played by ethnic minorities out of power. It is not clear whether the movement was exclusively dominated by the state-controlling ethnic majority or bridged the country's ethnic divides.

According to EPR, Mali's population includes three main ethnic groups, the Blacks (Mande, Peul, Voltaic etc., constituting 90% of the population), the Tuaregs (7%), and the Arabs/Moors (3%). The Blacks were the state controlling ethnic group as they held a monopoly of power until 1990 and were senior partners in a power-sharing system in 1991-1993.[245]

Protesters are identified as "students" and "mothers"[246], "anti-regime protesters"[247], or "pro-democracy protesters"[248] without ethnic references. These protests were largely led by pro-democracy organizations such as the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (ADEMA), the National Committee for Democratic Initiative (CNID), and the Mali Pupils and Students Association (AEEM), which do not appear to have specific ethnic affiliations.[249]

Katherine Nesbitt and Stephen Zunes suggest that the main opposition organization – ADEMA – had a broad social base:

> "Through the unification of many organizations (whose histories go back as far as 1968), ADEMA broadened its geographical influence. Also, because of ADEMA's-aged teachers and health professionals, whose skills and experience in the public sphere helped to bring ADEMA's message to rural communities throughout the country, as well as recruit members and raise funds for the democratic movement."[250]

The leader of ADEMA and winner of the 1992 presidential elections was an ethnic Mante (i.e., Black), as the previous Presidents.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[245] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Mali.
[246] Robert M. Press, "Pro-Democracy Activists Recall Motives for Move Against Dictator," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 13, 1992.
[247] "Soldiers in Mali Kill 22 Anti-Regime Protesters," *Los Angeles Times*, March 23, 1991.
[248] "Soldiers in Mali Kill 7 in 3rd Day of Anti-Regime Protests," *Los Angeles Times*, March 25, 1991.
[249] See the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/malians-defeat-dictator-gain-free-election-march-revolution-1991).
[250] Katherine Nesbitt and Stephen Zunes, "Mali's March Revolution (1991)," April 2009 (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/malis-march-revolution-1991/). See also Allison Boyer, "An Exemplary Transition," *Africa Report* 37, July 4, 1992.

Mongolia, Anti-communist, 1989-90
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication that the movement was dominated by the out-of-power minority. The available evidence does not permit a clear assessment of whether the state-controlling majority exclusively dominated the movement or the campaign bridged the country's ethnic divide.

According to EPR, Mongols (90% of the population) were politically dominant and thus are the state-controlling ethnic group; Kazakhs (5%) were excluded from power.[251]

Accounts of the protest movement do not make ethnic references, describing participants as "protestors"[252], "students", or members of the Mongolian Democratic Union.[253] Some descriptions of the movement reported by the Swarthmore Database suggest the possibility that the movement was exclusively dominated by ethnic Mongolians: some protestors "were dressed in outlawed traditional [Mongolian] clothing;" some "sang traditional Mongolian folk songs honoring the Mongolian conqueror, Genghis Khan;" and "Buddhist monks came to show their support for the hunger strikers" (ethnic Mongols tend to be Buddhist, while ethnic Kazakhs tend to be Muslim).[254]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

[251] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Mongolia.
[252] Simon Long, "Protestors Spur on Mongolia Reforms," *The Guardian*, January 16, 1990.
[253] Nicholas D. Kristof, "Reform Movement Grows in Mongolia: President Says Communists Will Convene to Consider Changes in Politburo," *New York Times*, March 11, 1990.
[254] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mongolians-win-multi-party-democndracy-1989-1990.

Nepal, Anti-government, 2006
Non-ethnic.

I code the campaign as a non-ethnic as existing reports do not provide any indication that the movement was dominated by groups other than the state-controlling Caste Hill Hindu Elite. The fact that broad social groups like trade unions, students, professionals and all major opposition parties participated, strongly suggest that the opposition movement bridged Nepal's ethnic divides.

According to EPR, the CHHE (Caste Hill Hindu Elite) were senior partners in a power-sharing agreement and thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[255]

The protests against the government were led by outlawed political parties like the SPA (Seven Party Alliance). Pro-democracy protesters were identified as, "students,"[256] "Nepali youth,"[257] or by the political parties that led them,[258] without specific ethnic identifiers.

The Swarthmore Database reports that the opposition was broad-based, which suggests that it likely crossed the country's ethnic lines:

> "The political opposition to King Gyanendra, and to the autocratic system of governance more largely, formed the Seven Party Alliance (SPA). …Additional support came from the various trade union organizations in Nepal, including the two largest trade union confederations, the General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT), and the Nepal Trade Union Congress-Independent (NTUC-I). Various professional groups were vocal supporters of the strike and the democracy movement. All around Nepal, but especially in the capital city of Kathmandu, economic life was brought to a standstill. Numerous press reports released during that time mention the halt to all types of enterprises and workplace activity; transport, professional/intellectual, informal, civic service, hotels and tourism, agricultural, and construction industries were among the economic sectors that participated. Labor support networks and world and international trade unions supported the strike efforts."[259]

The campaign is coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[255] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Nepal.

[256] "This Nepalese generation is something new. A young crowd cries, 'Burn the crown!'" *International Herald Tribune*, 15 April, 2006.

[257] Somini Sengupta, "Young Nepalese Lead Their Nation's Push for Democracy," *New York Times*, April 14, 2006.

[258] "Tens of thousands attend Nepal protest rally," *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, 13 January, 2006.

[259] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/nepalese-general-strike-protest-monarchic-rule-2006.

Niger, Anti-Military, 1991-92
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because existing accounts depict participants as students and union members, without specifying ethnic affiliation, which suggest that the movement may have bridged the country's ethnic divisions.

The three main ethnic groups in Niger are the Djerma-Songhai (22% of the population), the Hausa (56%), and the Tuaregs (8%). EPR codes the Djerma-Songhai as dominant until 1991, while the Hausa are senior partners in a power-sharing system in 1992.[260] The public protests and strikes that pushed the government to accept the principle of multiparty democracy and start the process of democratic transition, led by the National Conference, occurred in October 1990. The process terminated on 26 December 1992, when a referendum approved the new constitution. I consider the Djerma-Songhai as the state-controlling ethnic group as they were politically dominant in the phase in which the key concessions of creating a national government and a transitional government in 1990-91 were made.

The movement was initiated by student groups (without any indication of specific ethnic background) and the main labor organization, the Union des Syndicats des Travailleurs du Niger (USTN), played a major role.[261] In the absence of any indication of an exclusive dominant role played by ethnic groups other than the state controlling Djerma-Songhai, I conclude that the movement bridged the country's ethnic divides.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[260] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Niger.
[261] Jibrin Ibrahim, "Political Exclusion, Democratisation and Dynamics of Ethnicity in Niger," *Africa Today*, 41 (3), 1994: 15-39. See also John Uniack Davis and Aboubacar B. Kossomi "Niger Gets Back On Track," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (3), 2001: 80-87.

Nigeria, Independence Movement, 1945-50

Ethnic.

This is an anticolonial struggle and thus by definition ethnic.[262]

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[262] Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945*, p. 28.

Nigeria, Anti-Military, 1993-98
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the main civil society organizations challenging the government, in particular the CD and NADECO, appear to have been exclusively dominated by ethnic groups (in particular Yoruba) other than the state-controlling group. As discussed below, this is a highly ambiguous case, as important evidence points to the possibility of coding the opposition movement as crossing the country's ethnic divides. However, I code the case as ethnic so as to avoid stacking the evidence in favor of my argument (as this is would be a case of successful ethnic campaign).

According to EPR the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt (29% of the population) were "dominant" in this period, and are therefore the state controlling ethnic group. The Yoruba (21% of the population) were "powerless."[263]

The turmoil in Nigeria in the 1990s grew out of the annulment of the June 12 1993 election by General Babangida, followed by an Interim National Government, and then the seizure of power by General Abacha in late 1993, who hailed from Northern Nigeria. The winner of the election, Chief Moshood Abiola, was a Christian from the South of the country.

As Eghosa Osaghae reports, the so-called June 12 Movement was "Yoruba-based,"[264] noting "that the Yorubas formed the core of the movement, [and] that the uprisings subsequent to the annulment were concentrated in Lagos, Ibadan, Abeokuta and other Western towns…"[265] Protests in the immediate aftermath of annulment were "more serious in Lagos and other Southern capitals than elsewhere,"[266] while pro-Babangida rallies took place in Northern cities.[267] Even the victorious party of the annulled elections – the SDP – split along ethno-regional lines, with only the Yoruba-Western factions continuing to demand the restoration of the electoral results.[268] The Interim National Government that took over Babangida had to face major strikes in the fall of 1993, but most Northern workers did not participate.[269] Opposition against the successor Abacha military regime was also "mostly from the South-West of the country,"[270] the "[c]ampaigns lacked countrywide support"[271], and workers in the North and East did not join in large numbers the major strike in the Summer of 1994.[272]

The support given by Northerners to the ruling party is described in a *New York Times* article from the time, which states that, during the 1994 uprising, "Many among the country's northern

[263] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Nigeria.
[264] Eghosa E. Osaghae, *Crippled Giant: Nigeria since* Independence (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 262.
[265] Ibid., p. 255.
[266] Ibid., p. 256.
[267] Ibid., p. 257.
[268] Ibid., p. 258.
[269] Ibid., p. 265.
[270] Ibid., p. 294.
[271] Ibid., p. 296.
[272] Ibid., p. 297.

elite … responded to the strikes by pressing General Abacha, himself a northerner, for tougher action to end the demonstrations."[273]

Osagha further elaborates on the dominant role played by Yorubas in the movement and the fact that the state-controlling ethnic group had limited involvement in it:

> "the greatest impediments to the efficacy of civil society and democracy in Nigeria remained the deep ethnic and regional divisions within the country. This was one of the major reasons for the failure to 'actualise' 12 June in 1993. As we saw, the sectional character of the demands for the actualization led to the resurgence and strengthening of the irreconcilable 1965/6-type ethno-regional positions. These positions remained unchanged in 1994 as the protests, strikes and riots were concentrated and most effective in Lagos and the South-West of the country – it was the oil workers' strike that gave the uprising its national impact. *While almost every segment of the Yoruba-West, including the conservative traditional rulers, rose to demand the restoration of 12 June and, later, the release of Abiola from detention (in fact there were calls on Yoruba ministers in the Abacha regime and delegates in the confab to resign), most civil society elements in the North and East of the country were resolutely opposed to its restoration.* There were isolated pro-democracy activities in some minority states like Rivers, Edo and Delta whose citizens seized the opportunity to press their own demands for a more equitable federation, but that was all. *Attempts by various Yoruba groups to reach out to these other groups were not very successful; NADECO, which increasingly became the main opposition movement both at home and abroad, was one of the products of such attempts, but although it had some notable non-Yoruba members, its leadership and membership profile was mainly Yoruba*, and it functioned as the handmade of Afenifere, the club of Yoruba 'progressives' led by Pa Adekunle Ajasin, who also chaired NADECO. Occupational and class-based organisations did function to some extent to counteract some of the centrifugal forces, as could be seen in the frontline roles played by labour unions, professional associations, student organisations and other groups with more national orientation, but these were constrained by ethno-regional loyalties."[274] (emphasis added)

As noted above, some sources suggest that the Nigerian pro-democracy movement may have bridged the country's ethnic divides. Carl LeVan describes the 1990s movement as "a nation-wide campaign of civil disobedience,"[275] and even states that pro-democracy "groups articulated demands in universal rather than particularistic terms, transcending regional, ethnic, or religious cleavages."[276]

Consistently, Rita Kiki Edozie quotes Ebenezer Babatope, a leading pro-democracy activist, as saying that "Dissatisfaction with the annulment was widespread among all classes of

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[273] Howard W. French, "Nigerians Fear New Strife Could Blow the Country Apart," *New York Times*, 14 August, 1994.
[274] Osagha, *Crippled Giant*, p. 300.
[275] A. Carl LeVan, "Confronting Tocqueville in Africa: Continuity and change in civil society during Nigeria's Democratization," *Democratization* 18 (1), 2011: 135-159, p. 142.
[276] Ibid., p. 148.

Nigerians… all working class organizations in Nigeria including market women and peasant farmers were unanimous in their demand for democratic justice."[277] Edozie also describes "a broad social movement" in favour of democracy,[278] with organizations such as Northern Elements Coalition, Northern Elders Forum, Northern Consultative Forum, and Turaki Committee in the North participating.[279]

Moreover, Edozie reports that CD "had a membership base and organizational network representative of the Nigerian left … in addition, CD's roots in such Nigeria cosmopolitan cities as Lagos also facilitated a broad based ethnic membership, a factor which spearheaded strong cross-ethnic and regional mobilization… The CD's membership is representative of a wide range of progressive activists and intellectuals."[280] The author also notes "expanded involvement [in the pro-democracy movement] by communities in the east and the north," which made protests in August 1993 more successful than previous ones.[281] Moreover, when describing protests in June 1994, she reports that for the "first time in Nigeria's post-independence history, the Nigerian military regime was openly challenged by millions who took a stand for democracy in urban and rural settings, across ethnic, regional, religious, class and gender lines."[282]

Edozie describes NADECO, the organization that took CD's mantle as the leader of the pro-democracy movement in 1994, as a "coalition of various pro-democracy organizations, human rights organizations and progressives "from all over Nigeria and abroad."[283] She also notes that despite the fact "the Abacha military regime systematically ethnicized the June 12 question, turning into a south-west/Yoruba affair … the organization [NADECO]… constitutes an ethnically diverse membership of prominent personalities from all over Nigeria as well as being affiliated with organizations representing all Nigerian regions."[284] She also notes that

> "despite the organization's close affiliation with the Southwest, NADECO's membership equally reflective of its cross-cutting membership, with membership fairly dispersed among charismatic personalities native of the Southwest, northern, and eastern regions of the country… out of the twenty-three NADECO founders at least ten members are non-Yoruba…NADECO was also able to successfully employ its ethnically broad-based and politically high-profile membership base as a mobilization technique…"[285]

In addition, Edozie reports that "NADECO had forged alliances with the National Unity Club, an association of leading progressives in the Middle Belt, the far North and the East," that it "draws broad organizational membership and coalition membership from pro-democracy organizations in non-Yoruba regions,"[286] and that in 1997 "[k]ey leaders from the north … followed NADECO

[277] Rita Kiki Edozie, *People Power Democracy: The Movement against Despotism in Nigeria, 1989-1991* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2002), pp. 45-46.
[278] Ibid., p. 45.
[279] Ibid., p. 51.
[280] Ibid., p. 60.
[281] Ibid., p. 67.
[282] Ibid., p. 70.
[283] Ibid., p. 74.
[284] Ibid., pp. 77-78.
[285] Ibid., p. 120.
[286] Ibid., p. 122.

in denouncing Abacha's transition program as a 'sham' and calling for the general's immediate stepping-down from power."[287]

However, the author also reports aspects of the opposition movement suggesting an ethnic coding:

> "[NADECO's] mobilization had the greatest impact in the south-west, among the Yoruba where several Yoruba traditional leaders endorsed NADECO's boycott call [against the constitutional commission elections]… even though NADECO was able to gain support for its boycott campaign from non-Yoruba pro-democracy organizations, *because of minimal mobilization efforts*, the non Yoruba high-profile members of the organization …were unable to stop the elections… Declarations from non Yoruba pro-democracy organizations *were a far cry from grass root mobilization that NADECO*, through Afenifere, *had conducted in the Yoruba states*."[288] (emphasis added)

Moreover she observes that,

> "With a membership base from the Middle-belt, North, East, West and Southern parts of Nigeria, NADECO appeared to have a national character; however, NADECO failed woefully in transferring its national character into a solid, observable presence all over the country. The political clout and following of most of *NADECO supporters came from the Southwest and Lagos, Having taken root in Lagos, NADECO did not spread to other parts of the country*…"[289] (emphasis added)

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[287] Ibid., 109.
[288] Ibid., pp. 81-82.
[289] Ibid., p. 136

Nigeria, Ogoni Movement, 1990-95
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the Ogoni group dominated the homonymous movement.

The Ogoni constitute 0.05% of the population; the Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt represent 29% and are politically dominant (and thus are the state-controlling ethnic group).[290]

Clifford Bob clearly indicates that the base of the movement is the Ogoni population.[291]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[290] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Nigeria.
[291] Clifford Bob, "Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of Protest among Nigeria's Ogoni Minority," *Social Problems* 49 (3), 2002: 395-415.

<u>Malawi, Nyasaland African Congress, 1958-59</u>
<u>Ethnic.</u>

This is an anti-colonial struggle and thus ethnic by definition.[292]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[292] Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945*, p. 25.

Ukraine, Orange Revolution, 2001-04
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because the movement was dominated by ethnic Ukrainians, the state-controlling ethnic group.

According to EPR, ethnic Ukrainians (77.8% of the population) are senior power-sharing members (and thus state-controlling); Russians are the largest minority (17.3%) (https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Ukraine).

The protest movement was not dominated by ethnic Russians.[293] As Mark Beissinger documents, protesters tended to be Ukrainian speakers and to come from the west and the center of the country, which are strongholds of Ukrainian nationalism.[294] In light of the EPR coding of ethnic Ukrainians as the state-controlling group, a non-ethnic coding follows.

A possible rationale for coding the campaign as ethnic is suggested by Keith Darden, who notes that in the east and south of Ukraine many people perceive Russian and Ukrainian identity as compatible with each other, as many individuals there are ethnic Ukrainians based on their ID card but are also Russian speakers and strongly pro-Russia.[295] Movement participants were overwhelmingly from the west, while opponents were from the east and south.[296] If we take this regional divide as an ethnic one, then we could code the case as ethnic, given that the most powerful Ukrainian political leaders since the 1990s hailed from the east and the south.[297]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[293] For background info, see the Swarthmore Database's report (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ukrainians-overthrow-dictatorship-orange-revolution-2004) and Adrian Karactnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 84, 2005: 35-52.

[294] Mark R. Beissinger, "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *American Political Science Review* 107 (3), 2013: 574-592.

[295] Keith Darden, "How to Save Ukraine: Why Russia Is Not the Real Problem," *Foreign Affairs*, April 14, 2014.

[296] Beissinger, "The Semblance of Democratic Revolution." See also Taras Kuzio, "Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine: Understanding the Orange Revolution," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies,* 2010 43 (3): 285-296; Viktor Stepanenko, "How Ukrainians View Their Orange Revolution: Public Opinion and the National Peculiarities of Citizenry Political Activities," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 13 (4), 2006: 595-616.

[297] Darden, "How to Save Ukraine."

Pakistan, Pro-democracy Movement, 1983
Ethnic.

I code this case as ethnic as multiple sources indicate that the movement was dominated by a politically excluded minority, the Sindhi.

According to EPR, the Punjabi (56% of the population) are senior partners in a power-sharing system. Pro-democracy protests in Pakistan were triggered by outrage over President Bhutto's execution two years after he was overthrown by President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party had given some political influence to the Sindhi people, which became "powerless" following the rise of Zia in 1977.[298]

The Swarthmore Database reports that "much of the resentment against the Zia regime was rooted in the Sindhi region, and this was the center of organizing throughout the [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy-MRD] campaign." The database also mentions that "Zia sent 45,000 troops into Sindh where they brutally attacked protesters," which confirms Sindh as the epicenter of the protest movement. Efforts to get the state-controlling Punjabi involved appear to have been unsuccessful: "Sindhi activists attempted to reach out to Punjab for support. However, their efforts failed to spark protests similar to the ones seen in Sindh. …The campaign's failure to expand outside of Sindh proved to be a critical one."[299]

Stephen Zunes confirms the evidence above about the dominant role of the Sindhi:

> "Though it launched one of the most massive nonviolent movements in South Asia since the time of Gandhi, *failure to expand beyond its southern stronghold* combined with effective repression from the military led to its demise a year and half later…it became *difficult for the movement to expand beyond its base in that southern province*. Zia's interior secretary, Roedad Khan, later wrote that the regime was able to manipulate this perception to their advantage and prevent the MRD from gaining greater appeal on a nationwide level… *By November, it became apparent that the movement was not gaining momentum nationally and Zia was not prepared to concede*."[300] (emphasis added)

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[298] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Pakistan.

[299] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/pakistanis-sindhi-struggle-democracy-1981-1984.

[300] Stphen Zunes, "Pakistan's Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (1981-1984)" (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/pakistans-movement-for-the-restoration-of-democracy-1981-1984/). See also "Pakistan Warns of Stiff Penalties for Protests," *New York Times*, 22 August, 1983; Mary Anne Weaver, "Pakistan's protests stir up ethnic divisions," *Christian Science Monitor*, 2 September, 1983. Other sources that confirm the ethnic coding include: Online Methodological Appendix of Chenoweth and Stepan's book *Why Civil Resistance Work* and C.G.P. Rakisits, "Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government'ss and the Opposition's Approaches." *Pacific Affairs* 61 (1), 1988: 78-97. The latter source compares this movement to other ones in Pakistan: "Therefore, as a consequence of the MRD's failure to muster the support of the other provinces, especially the Punjab's, for the overthrow of the government, the MRD-led movement was bound to collapse; for, historically, it has been demonstrated that unless Lahore, the largest city of the Punjab, joins an anti-government uprising, as it did when Ayub and Bhutto were toppled, all opposition movements will falter and fail to achieve their objective."

Israel, Palestinian Liberation, 1987-93
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the movement is dominated by Palestinians,[301] while Ashkenazim Jewish, accounting for 29% of the population and senior partners according to EPR from 1976 to 1991, are the state-controlling group. Mizrahim Jewsih (31% of the population) are junior partners.[302]

(The ACD dataset includes the years 1987-1993 in a broader armed conflict. I include the case as the First Intifada is one of the most commonly studied episodes of nonviolent resistance, but in robustness checks I drop it.)

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[301] See, for example, Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, pp. 119-146.
[302] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Israel.

Philippines, People Power, 1983-86
Non-ethnic.

There is no evidence that the movement was dominated exclusively by ethnic groups other than the state-controlling Christian lowlanders. The movement either crossed the country's ethnic divides or, more plausibly, was dominated by Christian lowlanders, both of which warrant a non-ethnic coding.

Christian lowlanders (85.9% of the population) are coded as a politically dominant by EPR and are thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[303]

All accounts indicate a broad-based movement. Newspapers identify the protestors as "students", "union workers", and "church groups" without ethnic qualifiers.[304] The Catholic Church, trade unions, students and leftists played a major role from early on, later joined by businesses, middle-class groups, women groups, urban poor and rural associations, according to Chenoweth and Stephan.[305] The key role of the Catholic Church would suggests the possibility that the movement may have been exclusively dominated by the state-controlling ethnic group.

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[303] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Philippines.
[304] See, for example, Steve Lohrs, "Protests Increase in the Philippines: Big Demonstration Expected to Mark the Anniversary of Aquino Assassination," *New York Times*, 14 August, 1984.
[305] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, pp. 147-171. See also Amado Mendoza Jr, "'People Power' in the Philippines,1983-86" in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*; Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

Philippines, Second People Power Movement, 2001
Non-ethnic.

As in the first People Power in the Philippines, there is no evidence that the movement was dominated by ethnic groups other than the state-controlling Christian lowlanders. The movement either crossed the country's ethnic divides or, more plausibly, was dominated by Christian lowlanders, as its leader was Catholic Archbishop Cardinal Sin.[306]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[306] Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/philippine-citizens-overthrow-president-joseph-estrada-people-power-ii-2001); "Philippines Leader Resigns, Beset by Scandal: Philippines President Quits, Beset by Scandal and Protest Once again, 'people power' seems to win the," *New York Times*, 20 January, 2001; Seth Mydans, "'People power II' Doesn't Give Filipinos the Same Glow," *New York Times*, 5 February, 2001.

<u>Poland, Anti-Communist I, 1968</u>
<u>Non-ethnic</u>.

I code the case as non-ethnic as protesters do not appear to have been primarily from excluded minority ethnic groups.

According to EPR, the Poles (98% of the population) are politically dominant, and thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[307]

Protestors were mostly university students. The fact that the movement was triggered by government censorship of a theater play with strong traditional Polish symbolism suggests that it was dominated by Poles (despite government propaganda that the protests were led by Jewish agitators).[308]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[307] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Poland.
[308] See the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/polish-students-reject-censorship-and-repression-1968).

Poland, Anti-Communist II, 1970

Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the protestors were Polish workers (without any indication of a significant role played by ethnic minorities) and the movement was suppressed by local security forces, in particular the Polish army.[309]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by the Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[309] Luba Fajfer, "The Polish military and the crisis of 1970," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26 (2), 1993: 205-225. It should be noted that Warsaw pact forces were closely integrated under Soviet leadership, so in some sense one could say the case is ethnic as the Polish forces were under Soviet command; however, I stick to a non-ethnic coding in order to avoid favoring my own argument.

Poland, Poznan Protests, 1956
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication that protests were dominated by minorities and they were suppressed by the Polish military.[310]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[310] Johanna Granville, "Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives *Journal of Contemporary History* 38 (2), 2003: 261-290, in particular p. 265. As the 1970 Polish case, this is potentially ambiguous as the Soviet Union exercised substantial control over the Polish military through Soviet officers serving in the Polish army and Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, a Polish-born Soviet officer whom the Soviet Union had imposed as Defense Minister on Poland (Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland.") Nonetheless, I code this failed instance of nonviolent resistance as non-ethnic to avoid favoring my own argument.

Czechoslovakia, Public Against Violence, 1989-1992
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic given that the movement is dominated by Slovaks and the Czechs are senior partners in a power-sharing system according to EPR, and thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[311]

Newspapers at the time clearly identified the protesters as Slovaks.[312]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[311] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Czechoslovakia.

[312] See, for example, John Tagliabue, "Slovakia's Separatist Premier Facing Political Counterattack," *Philadelphia Tribune*, 17 March, 1991; Darina Malova, "The Slovak National Movement: A Case of Successful Contention," in Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, *Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

Georgia, Rose Revolution, 2003
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication of a dominant role in the movement played by ethnic minorities.

Ethnic Georgians (80.5% of the population) are politically dominant according to EPR, and thus are the state-controlling ethnic group.[313]

There is no indication that the movement was dominated by ethnic minorities.[314] Accounts of the movement identify protestors as students, activists, members of civil society organizations and of opposition parties, without ethnic qualifications.[315] The prevalence of Georgian flags among protesters, which can be seen as an ethno-nationalist symbol, suggests a dominant role for ethnic Georgians.[316]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[313] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Georgia.

[314] For an overview, see the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/georgians-overthrow-dictator-rose-revolution-2003).

[315] Leonard Doyle, "Georgian opposition copied Serbs' bloodless revolution," *The Independent*, November 26, 2003; Scott Peterson, "Peaceful protest topples Georgia's president," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 24, 2003; Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries*, pp. 148-176.

[316] Stephen Jones, "Georgia's 'Rose Revolution' of 2003," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*.

Russia, Pro-democracy Movement, 1990-91
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the protesters are ethnic Russians, which are also the state-controlling group in the Soviet Union, as the EPR codes them as senior members in a power-sharing system.[317]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[317] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Russia. On the protest movement, see, e.g., Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*; and the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/defense-soviet-state-against-coup-1991).

<u>Rwanda, Independence, 1956-58</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

This is a case of anti-colonial struggle and thus by definition ethnic. NAVCO 2.0 identifies the first three years of the Rwandan independence movement as nonviolent, followed by a violent phase ending in 1961.

Sources on the nonviolent phase of the campaign are patchy and there is the concrete possibility that a nonviolent campaign did not actually take place.[318]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[318] Mahmood Mamdani reports protests in 1959 just before the onset of violence. Ian Linden and Jane Linden report protests in 1958. J. J. Carney describes a climate of significant political tension in the relevant years, with Tutsis voicing their anti-colonial nationalism and the politically subordinate Hutus expressing anti-Tutsi sentiments; however, he does not report actions classifiable as a nonviolent campaign. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 120; Ian Linden and Jane Linden, *Church and Revolution in Rwanda* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p. 258; J. J. Carney, *Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 79-.105.

Lithuania, Sajudis/ Lithuanian pro-democracy movement
Ethnic.

I code this case as ethnic as it was dominated by ethnic Lithuanians in the Russian-controlled Soviet Union.[319]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[319] For a summary account, see the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/lithuanians-campaign-national-independence-1988-1991).

El Salvador, Salvadoran Civil Conflict, 1977-1979
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication of the protest movement being dominated by the politically excluded indigenous minority.

According to EPR, 90% of El Salvador's population consists of white/mestizos, which held a monopoly of power (and are thus state-controlling for our purposes).[320]

This is the early, non-violent phase of the civil war. The ACD2EPR dataset codes the group as unaffiliated with an ethnic group. The accounts of the protest movement do not contain ethnic references; protestors are identified as students, peasants, union members, and leftists.[321]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[320] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/El%20Salvador.
[321] Alan Riding, "Salvadoran Vote Unrest Raises Fear of Polarization," *New York Times*, 20 March, 1977; Karen deYoung, "Peasant-Based Activists Gain Spotlight in El Salvador," *Washington Post*, 9 May, 1979; Hugh Byrne*, El Salvador's Civil War: A Study of Revolution* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), pp. 39-69.

<u>Estonia, Singing Revolution, 1987-91</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

I code this case as ethnic as the movement was dominated by ethnic Estonians and took place in the Russian-controlled Soviet Union.[322]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[322] See the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/estonians-campaign-independence-singing-revolution-1987-1991).

Slovenia, Anti-communist, 1989-90
Ethnic.

I code this case as ethnic because the protest movement was dominated by ethnic Slovenians and took place in the Serb-controlled Yugoslavia.[323]

There is some ambiguity as to whether this case should be treated as distinct from the subsequent secessionist struggle. Nonetheless I treat this successful case of ethnic challenge as distinct so as not to favor my argument.[324]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[323]Adolf Bibič, "The emergence of pluralism in Slovenia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 26 (4), 1993: 367-386. For a brief overview, see Stefano Lusa, "Slovenia: 1989 or 1992?" (https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Slovenia/Slovenia-1989-or-1992-47872)
[324]NAVCO 1.1 only includes one case.

Slovenia, Independence, 1990
Ethnic.

This case is a continuation of the previous campaign. After the achievement of political pluralism, the next target became Slovenian independence. The second year of the campaign turned violent, with the outbreak of the so-called "Weekend War." The ACD2EPR codes the Slovenian insurgents as affiliated with the Slovenian ethnic group.

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

Poland, Solidarity, 1980-89
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic, because the movement was dominated by Poles, the state-controlling ethnic group.

Accounts of the movement do not contain specific ethnic references. Participants are referred to as Polish dissidents, unionists, miners, activists, workers, students, and farmers.[325] Repression was conducted by Polish security forces, under Soviet pressure and supervision.[326]

[325] Frederick Kempe, "Polish Dissidents Pass the Torch To Solidarity," *Wall Street Journal*, 29 September, 1981; George Brodzki, "Poland's Solidarity union demands free elections," *Boston Globe*, 11 September, 1981; Gerald F. Seib and Jonathan Spivak, "Poland's Solidarity Union Calls Off Nationwide Strike, Easing Tensions," *Wall Street Journal*, 31 March, 1981; John Tagliabue, "Solidarity Calls For Talks Again: As Tension Rises, Solidarity Again Seeks Talks," *New York Times*, 24 August, 1988; John Kifner, "Solidarity Group in Gdansk Upsets May Day Parade, *New York Times*, 2 May, 1984; Michael T. Kaufman, "Workers Hear Praise From Polish Clerics For Solidarity's Aims: Polish Clerics, Praising Solidarity, Greet Workers," *New York Times*, 16 September, 1985; John Tagliabue, "Leader of Choice for Polish Radicals: The official's goal is complete independence from Moscow," *New York Times*, 24 March, 1989; John Tagliabue, "Slogans Ready, Solidarity Takes Stab at the Hustings," *New York Times*, 10 May, 1989.

[326] Mark Kramer, "The Dialectics of Empire: Soviet Leaders and the Challenge of Civil Resistance in East-Central Europe, 1968-1991," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance & Power Politics*, pp. 96-100; Alksander Smolar, "Towards 'Self-limiting Revolution': Poland, 1970-89," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance & Power Politics*.

South Africa, First Defiance Campaign, 1952-59

I code the case as ethnic, due to the exclusive dominant role in the movement of politically excluded non-whites.

According to EPR, Afrikaners (8% of the population) were politically dominant according to EPR, and are thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[327]

Various sources describe the nonviolent movement as a "Black," "African" or "non-white" movement. For example, Kurt Schock refers to the first Defiance Campaign as "black protest" and notices that the "movement mobilized a substantial portion of the non-white population."[328] The Swarthmore database reports the large-scale involvement of South African Indians, besides Blacks.[329] Ackerman and Duvall report of "limited support from whites" for the campaign.[330]

Joshua Lazerson reports that the "group of 'white' democrats" that joined the "African nationalist movement" against Apartheid in this period did not number "more than 200 or 300."[331] Subsequently Lazerzon notes that "whites' actions [in the First Defiance campaign], given the [tiny] numbers involved, appeared symbolic,"[332] that the Congress of Democrats, a white ally of the African National Congress, had an estimated membership of 500,[333] and that "[i]t was only a few white South Africans who were highly conscious of the oppressive nature of South African society and sought to integrate themselves in the struggle of blacks for justice."[334]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[327] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/South%20Africa.

[328] Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, p. 57. Consistently, Russell describes the Defiance campaign as dominated by non-whites. D.E.H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Forces* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 38-39.

[329] https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/south-africans-disobey-apartheid-laws-defiance-unjust-laws-campaign-1952-1953; https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/south-africans-successfully-boycott-buses-johannesburg-1957.

[330] Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, p. 339. White drivers did help African bus boycotters in Alexandria in 1957 by giving them rides. Stephen Zunes, "The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37 (1), 1999: 137-169, p. 163.

[331] Lazerson, *Against the Tide*, p. 3.

[332] Ibid., p. 67.

[333] Ibid., p. 72.

[334] Ibid., p. 75. Lazerzon (p. 117) also reports that the White population of South African was "overwhelmingly hostile" to the anti-Apartheid campaign and that the Congress of Democrats' mobilizing efforts "had little effect on South Africa's urban white population."

South Africa, Second Defiance Campaign, 1990-94

Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic due to the dominant role in the movement of politically excluded non-whites.

Afrikaners (8% of the population) were politically dominant according to EPR, and are thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[335]

Tom Lodge notes that membership of the United Democratic Front (one of the main opposition organizations) in the 1980s, as the ANC-mobilized movement in 1950s, was mostly African (even if it was a "non-racial" umbrella of hundreds of different organizations).[336] Ackerman and Duvall describe the Second Defiance campaign as dominated by Blacks. In particular, they note that the bulk of contentious activities occurred in Black "townships," the white presence in the UDF's ranks was "limited," and another dominant actor from 1986 was the Black labor movement.[337]

There certainly was more white participation in the movement than in the First Defiance campaign.[338] However, there is no indication that that white involvement ever reached a level warranting considering whites as one of the dominant participants groups. For example, Zunes describes sympathetic whites as "enlightened sectors of South Africa's white minority," implying that involvement in the movement was not the norm among whites.[339] Consistently, Rupert Taylor's discussion of white middle-class organizations participating in the movement suggests that they played an ancillary role, rather than a dominant one.[340]

It should be noted that an ethnic coding the case as ethnic avoids stacking in the evidence in favor of my argument, as the anti-Apartheid campaign was ultimately successful.[341]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[335] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/South%20Africa.

[336] Tom Lodge, "The Interplay of Non-violent and Violent Action in the Movement Against Apartheid in South Africa, 1983-94," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*, p. 216.

[337] Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp. 349 and 364. See also Lester Kurtz, "The Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa (1912-1992)," 2010 (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/the-anti-apartheid-struggle-in-south-africa-1912-1992/).

[338] See in particular, Lazerson, *Against the Tide*, chapter 11.

[339] Zunes "The Role of Non-Violent Action in the Downfall of Apartheid," p. 165.

[340] Rupert Taylor "South Africa: The Role of Peace and Conflict-Resolution Organizations in the Struggle Against Apartheid" in Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld, *Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 71-72.

[341] Consistent with my coding protocol, I include in the analysis only the last four years of the Second Defiance Campaign (1991-1994), as the previous years are coded involving a civil war in the PRIO/UCDP dataset.

South Korea Anti-Junta, 1979-80
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the population is ethnically homogenous.
According to EPR, Koreans constitute 100% of the population and ethnicity is politically irrelevant.[342]

The opposition movement to President Chung Hee Park's military regime (sometimes referred to as the "Seoul Spring") was largely composed of Korean students, activists, and workers.[343]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[342] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/South%20Korea.
[343] See, for example, "Curfew imposed Students continue rioting in S. Korea," *The Globe and Mail*, 20 October, 1979; Tim Shorrock, "The Struggle for Democracy in South Korea in the 1980s and the Rise of AntiAmericanism," *Third World Quarterly* 8 (4), 1986: 1195-1218.

<u>South Korea, Anti-Military, 1987</u>
<u>Non-ethnic</u>.

For the same reasons given above, I code the case as non-ethnic.

A "loose coalition of students, Protestant and Catholic religious activists, journalists, trade unionists, cultural workers and farmers" was the initial core of the movement; the middle class eventually joined too.[344]

The campaign is coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[344] Tim Shorrock, "South Korea: Chun, the Kims and the Constitutional Struggle," *Third World Quarterly* 10 (1), 1988: 95-110, pp. 98 and 101. See also the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/south-koreans-win-mass-campaign-democracy-1986-87); Damon Darlin, "Radicals Keep Up Pressure Against Seoul Government," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 February, 1987; Clyde Haberman, "Student Protests Gain in Intensity in Center of Seoul," *New York Times*, 19 June, 1987.

South Korea, Student Revolution, 1960
Non-ethnic.

As with the other South Korean cases, I code this campaign as non-ethnic. The protesters were referred to largely as students or demonstrators more generally.[345]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

[345] "Mr. Rhee Resigns," *New York Times*, April 27, 1960; "Rhee Steps Down: Foreign Minister to Head Caretaker Regime in Korea," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 April, 1960; "Korean Premier Acts on Students' Demand," *New York Times*, 12 October, 1960.

Taiwan, Pro-democracy Movement, 1979-85
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the movement was dominated by the politically excluded ethnic Taiwanese.

According to EPR, the Taiwanese (84% of the population) were powerless until 1987, when they became junior partners in a power-sharing system to Mainland Chinese (14%), who had been dominant previously, and are thus the state-controlling ethnic group throughout. "'Taiwanese' is often used to refer to a composite of Hoklo and Hakka groups that were present in Taiwan prior to the influx of Mainland Chinese in 1949 at the end of the Chinese Civil War."[346]

There is some important evidence that the opposition was dominated by Taiwanese. In particular, Tun-Jen Cheng reports that its core of early movers was constituted "predominantly of Taiwanese."[347] Moreover, the author very explicitly identifies the opposition as Taiwanese dominated in observing:

> "Democratization could be and had been interpreted as a redistribution of political power between the mainlanders and the Taiwanese. Although many liberal, intellectual mainlanders had supported the opposition for the purpose of creating a counterforce to balance the KMT, at most only a dozen were found in the leadership stratum of the opposition, and none in the rank and file. Thus, although the supporters of democracy were not exclusively Taiwanese, the opposition presented itself as a Taiwanese political force and it was so perceived."[348]

There is nonetheless some ambiguity to this case. While the ruling party – the KMT – was historically the party of the mainlanders, it had undergone a process of "indigenization" from the 1970s, culminating in 1984 with the nomination of Lee Teng-hui – a Taiwanese – as vice-president and designed successor of the son of Chiang Kai-shek.[349] As Cheng notes, "By the mid-1980s, 45 percent of the Central Standing Committee's members and 75 percent of the cadres in the KMT were native Taiwanese," which suggests that at least for the final years of the movement a case could be made for considering Taiwanese as state-controlling and thus the campaign as non-ethnic.[350] A distinct rationale for a non-ethnic coding would be that Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese are often referred to as sub-ethnic groups of the same "Han" ethnic group.

Despite these ambiguities, I stick to an ethnic coding of this successful campaign to avoid skewing the findings in favor of my argument (as this campaign was ultimately successful).

[346] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Taiwan.
[347] Tun-Jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 41 (4), 1989: 471-499, pp. 482-3.
[348] Ibid., p. 498.
[349] Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity," *The China Quarterly* 165, 2001: 102-129; Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, *China's Search for Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), p. 215; Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," p. 494.
[350] Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," p. 494.

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

Thailand, Thai student Protests, 1973
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication that the student movement was dominated exclusively by groups other than the state-controlling Thais.

According to EPR, Thais (74% of the population) were senior-partners both before and after the campaign, while Chinese (14%) were junior partners; however, "[e]thnicity does not play a significant role in national Thai politics. …While important leaders have emerged from ethnic minority or mixed backgrounds [e.g. Thanom Kittikachorn], ethnic identity is largely irrelevant in national Thai politics where the major cleavage is urban/rural."[351]

The movement is described as formed mostly of students.[352]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[351] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Thailand.
[352] Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/thai-students-overthrow-military-thanom-regime-1973); "New Thai premier named as students battle troops," *New York Times*, 15 October, 1973; Malcolm W. Browne, "Students gain control in thai uprising," *New York Times*, 16 October, 1973; "Students revolt," *New York Times*, 24 November, 1973.

Thailand, Thai pro-democracy movement, 1992
Non-ethnic.

As the previous case, I code this case as non-ethnic as there is no indication that the student movement was dominated exclusively by groups other than the state-controlling Thais.

The Swarthmore Database describes a mass movement without ethnic qualifiers, in which student groups played a major role.[353] Newspaper accounts do not report any information suggesting a dominant role of ethnic minorities.[354] According to the *New York Times*, protesters were mostly students, academics, poor workers and members of the middle class.[355]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[353] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/thai-people-successfully-defend-democracy-against-military-coup-1992.

[354] "Thailand awaits its turn," *The Globe and Mail*, 26 March, 1992; "After Suchinda," *Wall Street Journal*, 26 May, 1992.

[355] Philip Shenon, "Thai Troops Fire on Demonstrators in Capital Streets," *New York Times*, 18 May, 1993.

Nepal, The Stir, 1990
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication that the movement was dominated exclusively by ethnic groups other than the state-controlling one; the movement may have bridged the country's ethnic cleavage but in any case it is seems extremely likely that the state controlling group played a dominant role.

EPR codes the CHHE (Caste Hill Hindu Elite, 31% of the population) as holding a monopoly of power in 1990 (senior partner from 1991) and this is thus the state-controlling ethnic group.[356]

The protest movement, led by the Nepali Congress (the largest illegal political party) and the United Left Front (a coalition of communist and leftist parties), aimed at the establishment of multiparty democracy.[357] The CHHE held the leadership of both parties[358] and a large number of movement participants were from the urban, educated middle class (in particular students).[359] Newspaper accounts do not refer to the ethnicity of participants, speaking generally of students or Nepali protestors, typically following the lead of the main outlawed parties.[360] Therefore, it seems likely that the state-controlling ethnic group played a dominant role, with the possibility that it crossed the country's ethnic divide.

The campaign is coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010). However, the description of the campaign in the dataset ("Lead by coalition of banned political parties, trade union professional and student organizations") suggests that this may be a coding error.

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[356] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Nepal.
[357] Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/nepalese-force-king-accept-democratic-reform-jana-andolan-peoples-movement-1990).
[358] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Nepal; Sumit Ganguly and Brian Shoup, "Nepal: Between dictatorship and anarchy," *Journal of Democracy*, 16(4), 2005: 129-143, p. 134.
[359] Narayan Khadka, "Democracy and Development in Nepal: Prospects and Challenges," *Pacific Affairs* 66 (1) 1993: 44-71, p. 46.
[360] Steve Coll, "Police Fire On Activists In Nepal; Protesters Demand Democratic Reform," *Washington Post*, 20 February, 1990; Steve Coll, "Democracy Is Promised In Nepal," *Washington Post*, 9 April, 1990; Sanjoy Hazarica, "Army in Nepal Opens Fire, Killing Demonstrators," *New York Times*, 7 April, 1990. Kurth Schock does not discuss ethnicity in his analysis of the Nepalese campaign. Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, pp. 121-125.

China, Tiananmen, 1989
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as there is no indication of a dominant role played by non-Han minorities.

According to EPR, the Han Chinese (93.3% of the population) held monopoly power, and are thus the state-controlling group.[361]

Accounts of the movement refer to participants as students, "ordinary citizens" and a broad-based section of society, without any hint of a dominant role of minorities.[362]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[361] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/China.

[362] Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-students-campaign-democratic-reform-tiananmen-square-1989); Barany, *How Armies Respond to Revolutions*, pp. 107-108; Merle Goldman, "The 1989 Demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and Beyond: Echoes of Gandhi," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance & Power Politics*.

China, Tibetan Uprising, 1987-89.
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as the movement was exclusively dominated by ethnic Tibetans pitted against a Han Chinese-controlled state.[363]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[363] Tenzin Dorjee, *The Tibetan Nonviolent Struggle: Strategic and Historical Analysis* (Washington, DC: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2015).

Indonesia, Timorese Resistance, 1989-99
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as it was a struggle by the local East Timorese population against the Javanese-controlled Indonesian government.[364]

There are several possible rationales for dropping this case or considering it non-ethnic, but I keep it as an instance of successful ethnic nonviolent challenge so as to avoid stacking the deck in favor of my argument.

First, this episode is included in all civil war datasets. Awet Tewelde Weldemichael reports guerrilla operations throughout this period.[365] The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes the end of the conflict in 1998; however, given that the movement that led to the fall of Suharto in 1998 probably removed the single biggest obstacle to East Timor's independence (the Habibie regime that followed was probably less committed to holding on East Timor in the first place and was eventually persuaded to give in) one could code campaign success as taking place before the end of the armed conflict even according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

Relatedly, the literature is not very clear as to the degree to which actual nonviolent resistance took place in the aftermath of the fall of Suharto, and in 1999 in particular. I found references to some nonviolent resistance in the second half of 1998; in particular, on 23 June 1998 a third of the population of Dili, the capital of East Timor, took to the streets demonstrating in favor of a referendum (Suharto fell in May).[366] I did not find direct reports of resistance in 1999, but it seems plausible that it did take place.

Second, in the years leading up to the fall of Suharto's New Order regime, the East Timorese cause was integrated into the broader pro-democracy movement. The movement that eventually brought down Suharto was non-ethnic, as it was largely composed by Javanese, the state-controlling ethnic group throughout. As the East Timor movement was part of this broader movement, the case could be considered non-ethnic.

Moreover, one could object to the fact that the referendum really amounted to a serious concession given the amount of state-supported violence that took place leading up to it and in particular in its aftermath.[367] As without the subsequent international intervention independence could not have been achieved, one could code the case as failure (presumably following the same logic, NAVCO 2.0 codes the campaign in Panama as a failure, given that US military intervention was necessary to remove Noriega from power). However, one could also make the case that the nonviolent resistance movement created the conditions for the referendum which in

[364] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Indonesia.
[365] Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, *Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East Timor Compared* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). For example, p. 260 reports intense fighting in 1998.
[366] David Bourchier, "The Habibie Interregnum," in Chris Manning and Peter Van Diemen, eds., *Indonesia in Transition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
[367] See Weldemichael, *Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation*, ch. 7; Paul Hainsworth, "Conclusion: East Timor After Suharto – A New Horizion," in Stephen McCloskey, Jose Ramos, Horta, Paul Hainsworth, eds., *East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia* (I.B. Tauris, 2000)

turn triggered external intervention when violence erupted, i.e., intervention was endogenous to nonviolent resistance.

Despite of all these considerations, in order to avoid favoring my argument, I keep the case as instance of a successful ethnic campaign. Moreover, I keep all campaign-years included in NAVCO 2.0 (1989-1999) despite the fact that most of these are coded as armed conflict years in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, given that the campaign is frequently studied in the civil resistance literature as taking place over a decade.

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

Kyrgyzstan, Tulip Revolution, 2005
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic because there is no evidence that the movement was exclusively dominated by ethnic minorities other than the state-controlling ethnic Kyrgyz (65% of the population according to EPR).[368] The evidence suggests that the movement was either exclusively dominated by Kyrgyz or bridged the country's ethnic cleavages.

The Swarthmore Database indicates a widespread participation of the population, including students, without specific ethnic qualifiers, while Bunce and Wolchik note that participants tended to be poor villagers from the south of the country.[369]

Several sources suggest that the revolution had a regional dimension, with opposition to the northern president mostly focused in the south. If anything this would indicate a dominant role for ethnic Kyrgyz, who are concentrated in the south.[370] However, there are also indications that the north-south divide does not closely overlap with the Kyrgyz vs. non-Kyrgyz cleavage.[371]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[368] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Kyrgyzstan.
[369] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kyrgyz-citizens-overthrow-president-ayakev-tulip-revolution-2005;
Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*, p. 174.
[370] Shairbek Juraev, "Kyrgyz democracy? The Tulip Revolution and beyond," *Central Asian Survey* 27 (3–4), 2008: 253–264; David Lewis, "The dynamics of regime change: domestic and international factors in the 'Tulip Revolution'," *Central Asian Survey* 27 (3-4), 2008: 265-277;
[371] Maxim Ryabkov, "The north–south cleavage and political support in Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asian Survey* 27 (3–4), 2008: 301–316.

<u>Tunisia, Independence Movement, 1952</u>
<u>Ethnic</u>.

This is a case of ethnic challenge, as a colonial case, where challengers were Tunisians struggling for independence from France.[372]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[372] On the initially nonviolent phase of the campaign, see Anthony Clayton, *The Wars of French Decolonization* (New York: Routledge, 2013); Robert C. Doty, "3 Die, 30 Wounded In Riots in Tunisia," *New York Times*, 22 January, 1952; Robert C. Doty, "Paris Offers Tunis Bid on Home Rule," *New York Times*, 26 March, 1952.

Czechoslovakia, 1989, Velvet Revolution
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as both Czechs and Slovaks dominated the movement (with protests taking place in both ethnic regions), which thus crossed the country's main ethnic divide. The Civic Union and Public Against Violence were the main Czech and Slovak organizations, respectively.[373]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[373] Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/czechoslovakians-campaign-democracy-velvet-revolution-1989); Lester Kurtz, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution (1989)," International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2008 (https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/czechoslovakias-velvet-revolution-1989/).

Uruguay, Anti-Military, 1984-85
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as ethnicity is coded as politically "irrelevant" in the period by EPR. Moreover, accounts of the movement do not suggest a dominant role of the country's ethnic minority.

White-mestizos constitute 91% of the population, while Afro-Uruguayans account for the remaining part. According to EPR, ethnicity was irrelevant until 1988. From 1989 on whites/mestizos held monopoly power, hence they would be state-controlling for our purposes.[374]

Accounts of the movement do not suggest a dominant role of the ethnic minority. The movement was led by unions, which had massive support among the country's workforce, and saw the involvement of the main parties and student groups.[375]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[374] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Uruguay.
[375] Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/uruguayans-general-strike-against-military-government-1984); Henry Finch, "Democratisation in Uruguay," *Third World Quarterly* 7 (3), 1985: 594-609.

Indonesia, West Papua Anti-Occupation, 2000-06
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic, as the campaign is dominated by West Papuans in Javanese-controlled Indonesia.[376] NAVCO 2.0 identifies 2000 as the first year of the nonviolent campaign, following a violent phase.[377]

The campaign is also coded as ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

[376] David Webster, "'Already Sovereign as a People': A Foundational Moment in West Papuan Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs* 74 (4), 2001-2002: 507-528; Esther Heidbüchel, *The West Papua Conflict in Indonesia: Actors, Issues and Approaches* (Wettenberg: Johannes Herrmann Verlag, 2007).

[377] Other sources identify an earlier end for the violent phase: 1981 (according to the ACD2EPR dataset) and 1998 with the fall of Suharto's regime (according to Heidbüchel, *The West Papua Conflict in Indonesia,* p. 1; and Jason MacLeod, "Nonviolent Struggle in West Papua: 'We Have Hope'," in Ralph V. Summy, *Nonviolent Alternatives for Social Change* (Oxford: EOLSS Publications, 2009) pp. 80-81).

Yugoslavia, student protests, 1968

Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as it seems to have bridged the country's ethnic divides.

As the largest senior partner in a power-sharing system, the Serbs are the state-controlling ethnic group.[378]

Descriptions of movement participants refer to students without ethnic qualifications. Given that the center of the movement was in Serbia's capital Belgrade, it is seems extremely likely that Serb students played a major role. Protests in solidarity to the movement occurred across Yugoslavia, in Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia.[379]

The campaign is not included in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset.

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[378] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/SerbiaandMontenegro.
[379] Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/yugoslav-students-occupy-university-belgrade-democracy-and-human-rights-1968).

Zambia, Anti-Single Party, 1990-91
Non-ethnic.

I code the case as non-ethnic as the movement appears to have bridged the country's ethnic divide and the state-controlling ethnic group – Bemba speakers – played a dominant (if probably not exclusive) role in it.

According to EPR, Bemba speakers (43% of the population) are the largest of three senior members in a power-sharing system in the entire period, and so they are the state-controlling group.[380]

Michael Bratton notes that the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), the main opposition organization and then challenger political party in the aftermath of the democratic opening, had the support of a broad-section of Zambian society, including the labor movement, students, and professional and business groups.[381] The MMD presidential candidate and winner of the 1991 elections – Frederick Chiluba – who had previously led the Zambia Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU), representing 80% of the workers in the formal sector – was a Bemba speaker and received 76% of the vote.[382] The large electoral support and broad social base of the MMD suggest that it was not exclusively dominated by any ethnic minority. The fact that Chiluba was a Bemba speaker and the MMD maintained strong support among Bemba speakers even in subsequent years, when its strength in other ethnic communities dwindled, suggests that Bemba speakers played a dominant role in the movement (even if the broad-based nature of the MMD suggests that this was not an instance of exclusive dominance).[383]

The campaign is also coded as non-ethnic by Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

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[380] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Zambia.
[381] Michael Bratton, "Zambia Starts Over," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (2), 1992: 81-94.
[382] Carolyn Baylies and Morris Szeftel, "The Fall and Rise of Multi-Party Politics in Zambia," *Review of African Political Economy* 54, 1992.
[383] Gero Erdmann, "Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and an African Case: Zambia," GIGA Working Papers 45, 2007. Erdmann (p. 86) notes that the MMD had support "among the 'common people' of both urban and rural areas" and "garnered broad-based support out of broad-based discontent." Elischer consistently codes the MMD as a "catch-all" party bridging the country's ethnic divides, even if it was widely perceived as a Bemba party. Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa*, p. 211. Erdmann (p. 90) also reports accusations of pro-Bemba bias in the MMD's allocation of government positions.

Zambia, Anti-occupation, 1961-63
Ethnic.

I code this case as ethnic as it is anti-colonial struggle of Zambians against British rule.[384]

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) also code the case as ethnic.

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[384] Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945*, pp. 25-26.

Soviet Union/Georgia, Gamsakhurdia & Abkhazia, 1989-91
Ethnic.

I code the case as ethnic as it seems to refer to protests movement dominated by ethnic Abkhaz first in Russian-controlled Soviet Union (1989-91), before it turned to violent resistance against the newly independent Georgian-dominated government of Georgia (NAVCO 2.2 includes two violent years too, 1992-1993.[385]

Mark Beissinger reports large-scale protests by ethnic Abkhaz during the last years of Soviet rule calling for annexation of the region to the Russian Republic (apparently with support of the Soviet leadership) in response to Georgian moves towards independence from the Soviet Union.[386]

Svensson and Lindgren (2010) do not include the case.

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[385] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Russia; https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Georgia. Based on the name of the campaign, it seems that the violent phase may include another disputes too. One may be the 1991-92 protest movement against Georgian President Gamsakhurdia, which turned violent by late 1991 and culminated with his removal from power in January 1992. Another one could be the violent resistance movement by Gamsakhurdia's loyalists (the "Zviadists"), launched after his ousting. http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/812.

[386] Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 182, 225, 301-303 and 348. I was unable to unearth evidence of Abkhaz protests in 1991 after Georgia's April declaration of independence before the outbreak of armed conflict in 1992. The Abkhaz and Gamsakhurdia reached a power-sharing agreement in August 1991 (after Georgia's declaration of independence), which held until January 1992. Christoph Zurcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 125-130.

3. Coding the dependent variable – campaign outcome

I created a trichotomous variable – OUTCOME3 – measuring the outcome of nonviolent campaign-years based on NAVCO 2.0's variable progress (0=status quo; 1=visible gains short of concessions; 2=limited concession achieved; 3=significant concessions achieved; 4=complete success).

OUTCOME3 takes on 1 (i.e., failure) if NAVCO 2.0's progress is equal to 0, 1, or 2 for the concluding year of a campaign, indicating that the campaign ended with no departure at all from the status quo or at most limited concessions. OUTCOME3 takes on 2 (i.e., ongoing) for years other than the last year of the campaign. OUTCOME3 takes on 3 (i.e., success) if NAVCO 2.0's progress is equal to 3 or 4 in the last year of the campaign, indicating that the campaign achieved significant concessions or complete success.

I follow NAVCO 2.0's coding of the variable progress, but I add a more nuanced coding criterion for instances in which the campaign goal is the establishment of multi-party democracy. If multi-party elections are held as a result of the campaign and a party/individual other than the one previously in power wins (i.e., they is a change at the helm of the state as a result of the elections) I code the campaign as successful. However, if the winner of the election is the incumbent party/political leader, then I examine whether elections were minimally free and fair. If that was the case, the campaign would be coded as a success, the incumbent's victory notwithstanding. By contrast, if multi-party elections won by the incumbent are widely recognized as a sham, then they can be at best considered as a minor concession and the campaign is coded as a failure. Applying this criterion to all of NAVCO 2.0's non-violent campaign yielded one coding change – Kenya 1991.

Kenya, Anti-Arap Moi, 1990-91: NAVCO 2.0 codes the campaign outcome as success, as Arap Moi acquiesced to multi-party elections. However, I recode the outcome as a failure given that the conditions under which elections took place were deeply flawed and favored the incumbent party KANU, which achieved victory. Stephen Brown reports widespread fraudulent electoral practices during the campaign, such as massive irregularities in voter registration favoring the incumbent, opposition candidates being physically prevented from presenting registration papers, which enabled KANU candidates to run unopposed, government restrictions on opposition assemblies, and appointment of KANU sympathizers to the electoral commission.[387] David Throup and Charles Hornsby argue that KANU would not have accepted an unfavorable electoral outcome had its manipulation of the electoral process not sufficed.[388] Brown concurs:

> "Indeed, there were no provisions for a run-off, had no presidential candidate met the 25%-in-five-provinces requirement. And there would have been no handover to an opposition victor. Had KANU been defeated, there might even have been a military coup or a 'self-coup' of the Latin American variety."[389]

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[387] Brown, "Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa," pp. 726-729.
[388] David W. Throup and Charles Hornsby, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: The Kenyatta and Moi States and the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Elections* (Oxford: James Currey, 1998).
[389] Brown, "Authoritarian leaders and multiparty elections in Africa," pp. 730.

Nepstad depicts a consistent account of a "rigged" election process.[390]

4. Additional changes to NAVCO 2.0 data

4.1 Dropped campaigns due to absence of evidence of a nonviolent campaign taking place at all

- *Tanzania, Pro-democracy Movement, 1992-95*: I drop the case as there is no evidence that a nonviolent resistance campaign occurred. All sources describe the case as an instance of democratization from above, the result of government initiatives (in turn spurned by international donors), rather than the pressure of a nonviolent movement from below. As Andrea Brown put it, "The reform has been initiated, directed, and carefully controlled by the state."[391] No dataset on nonviolent resistance other than NAVCO includes the case.[392] According to EPR, Tanzania is largely homogenous with mainland Africans constituting over 96% and politically dominant (i.e., state-controlling) before and after transition.[393] If the case were to be included, it would have to be coded as non-ethnic given the absence of indications that the opposition was dominated by the excluded ethnic minority and the fact that the campaign is coded as non-ethnic in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset. Thus, in a robustness check I include the case as non-ethnic.

- *Ghana, Anti-Rawlings, 2000*: Multi-party democracy had been established in 1993; the incumbent, Rawlings, did not run for the third time in 2000, which would have been prohibited by the constitution, and the opposition candidate won in a relatively free and fair election. None of the multiple sources consulted suggests the occurrence of a nonviolent campaign, either before the election or in its aftermath. Rawlings did not try to run for a third term and did not oppose the election results. The case is in fact hailed in the literature as the first democratic handover of power in the country and thus the consolidation of the democratic transition of 1992.[394] So I drop

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[390] Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions*, pp. 103-109.
[391] Andrea M. Brown, "Democratization and the Tanzanian State: Emerging Opportunities for Achieving Women's Empowerment," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 35 (1), 2001: 67-98, p. 68. See also Jessica I. Vener, "Prompting democratic transitions from abroad: International donors and multi-partyism in Tanzania" *Democratization*, 7 (4), 2000: 133-162; Elischer, *Political Parties in Africa*; Göran Hydén, "Top-Down Democratization in Tanzania," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (4), 1999; Mohabe Nyrabu, "The Multiparty Reform Process in Tanzania: The Dominance of the Ruling Party," *African Journal of Political Science* 7 (2), 2002: 99-112; Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 24 (4) 1992: 419-442; Karatnycky, Ackerman, and Rosenberg, "How Freedom is Won," p. 42.
[392] International Center on Nonviolent Conflict's Resource Library (no entry for the campaign); Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945* (no entry for the campaign); Swarthmore Database (no entry for the campaign).
[393] https://growup.ethz.ch/atlas/Tanzania.
[394] Joseph RA Ayee, "The Evolution and Development of the New Patriotic Party in Ghana," Political Party Systems in Africa Project, Occasional Paper 19, 2009; Alexander K. D. Frempong, "Political Conflict and Elite Consensus in the Liberal State," in Kwame Boafo-Arthur, ed. *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State* (London: Zed Books, 2007); Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, "A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana", *Journal of Democracy* 12 (2), 2001: 103-117; Rachel Naylor, *Ghana* (Oxford: Oxfam, 2000); Paul Nugent, "Living in the Past: Urban, Rural and Ethnic Themes in the 1992 and 1996 Elections in Ghana," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37 (2), 1999: 287-319; Daniel A. Smith, "Consolidating Democracy? The Structural Underpinnings of Ghana's 2000 Elections," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40 (4), 2002: 621-650; Lindsay Whitfield, "Civil Society as Idea and Civil Society as

the case as not meeting the basic requirements of a campaign of nonviolent resistance. In a robustness check, I include the campaign, coded as non-ethnic following the only available source on it – the Svensson and Lindgren (2010).

- *Papua New Guinea, Bougainville Revolt, 1998*: NAVCO 2.0 codes the last year (1998) of the campaign as nonviolent. I drop the observation because I could not find references to the occurrence of the nonviolent campaign in 1998 in any source (all sources discuss the case as a civil war ending in 1997/1998).[395] As NAVCO 2.0 codes the outcome as campaign failure and the challenge has an ethnic character,[396] dropping the observation avoids skewing the findings in favor of my argument about the ineffectiveness of nonviolent ethnic challenges. I include the case in a robustness check.

- *United Kingdom, IRA, 1999-2006*: NAVCO 2.0 includes the years after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement as a period of nonviolent resistance, but I could not find any reference to this campaign in any other source. Even Chenoweth and Stephan note that the campaign ended in 1999.[397] Moreover, one of the coders of NAVCO 2.0 noted that the evidence of a nonviolent campaign after 1998 is thin and thus the case will not be included in subsequent updates.[398] Thus I dropped the post-1998 observations. However, I include them a in a robustness check.

- *United Kingdom, IRA, 1994-95*: NAVCO 2.0 codes two years of nonviolent resistance in the previously violent IRA campaign, which turned violent again in 1998. The years 1994-95 witnessed a ceasefire, which the IRA broke in 1996.[399] However, no consulted source reports the occurrence of nonviolence resistance, besides protests by Catholics against Protestant parades

Process: The Case of Ghana," QEH Working Paper 92; Karatnycky, Ackerman, and Rosenberg, "How Freedom is Won," p. 31; Swarthmore Database (no entry for the campaign); International Center on Nonviolent Conflict's Resource Library (no entry for the campaign); Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945* (no entry for the campaign); ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (keywords: "Ghana" and "protests/demonstrations/rallies;" timeframe: year 2000); ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Wall Street Journal (keywords: "Ghana" and "protests/demonstrations/rallies;" timeframe: year 2000).

[395] Anthony J. Regan, "Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict," *Journal of Pacific History* 33 (3), 1998: 269-285. The literature does discuss some nonviolent activities in the aftermath of armed conflict, which, however, do not appear to meet NAVCO 2.0's inclusion criteria. In particular, Anne Henning reports nonviolent resistance by local communities against land grabs (in particular by foreign firms) after 1998, which do not amount to a "maximalist" challenge. Anne Henning, "Resistance against Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: Bougainville's peace process under threat?", working paper, 2015 (https://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Research_and_projects/Research_networks/MOSAIC/CMCP_49-Hennings.pdf). Other sources consulted are International Center on Nonviolent Conflict's Resource Library (no entry for the campaign); Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945* (no entry for the campaign, just one reference on p. 172 to nonviolent resistance against mining companies); Swarthmore Database (no entry for the campaign).

[396] Regan, "Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict."

[397] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, p. 14.

[398] Personal email communication with Jonathan Pinckney, September 12, 2016.

[399] Martina Purdy, "Peace in the Troubles," BBC, February 2013 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_peace).

going through Catholic areas (which clearly do not meet NAVCO 2.0's inclusion criteria).[400] Thus I drop the case for the main analysis but I include it in a robustness check.

- *Indonesia, Indonesian leftists / Anti Sukarno, 1956-60*: I drop the case as there is no indication that a nonviolent resistance movement actually took place during this time period. Descriptions of the opposition labeled it as "anti-red", or "anti-regime," without ethnic qualifications.[401] However, these sources do not explicitly mention the occurrence of protests or demonstrations.[402] The case is not reported in the Svensson and Lindgren (2010) dataset. In a robustness check, I include the case as non-ethnic (given the lack of references to the ethnicity of the opposition movement).

- *Cameroon, Anti-colonialist Movement against French occupation, 1955-60*: NAVCO 2.0 codes the first year of the campaign as violent and the rest as nonviolent. However, there is evidence of a large-scale armed conflict taking place throughout the period, which warrants dropping the campaign. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset reports an armed conflict in the years 1957-1959 (Cameroon achieved independence on January 1, 1960). Elizabeth Rechniewski documents an intense guerrilla campaign launched by UPC (Union des Populations du Cameroun) in 1955, which continued after the country's independence.[403] `

4.2. Dropped campaign-years due to absence of evidence of active campaign in the relevant year

- *Czechoslovakia, Velvet Revolution, 1990*: The campaign is reported in all sources as ending in 1989.[404] Moreover, NAVCO 2.0 itself codes the campaign as achieving full success in 1989, which suggests that the inclusion of 1990 in the dataset was a coding error. Thus I drop the campaign-year.

- *Madagascar, Pro-democracy movement, 2003*: All information for this observation is missing in NAVCO 2.0. Moreover, NAVCO 2.0 codes the previous campaign-year (2002) as achieving success.[405] I could not find other references to the movement in 2003. These facts suggest that the inclusion of this campaign-year in NAVCO 2.0 is the result of a coding error, so I drop this observation.

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[400] Tim Pat Coogan, *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966–1995 and the Search for Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Paul Dixon, "Paths to peace in Northern Ireland (II): The peace processes 1973–74 and 1994–96," *Democratization* 4 (3), 1997: 1-25; Neil Jarman, "From War to Peace? Changing Patterns of Violence in Northern Ireland, 1990–2003," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (3), 2004: 420-438.

[401] Bernard Kalb, "Sukarno Battles for 'Unity'," *New York Times*, 26 September, 1960; "Indonesia Ant-Reds Decry Sukarno Plan," *New York Times*, 25 March, 1960; Bernard Kalb, "Sukarno Decree Closes 8 Papers: Indonesia Seizes Printing Plants of Anti-Red and Anti-Regime Press," *New York Times*, 26 September, 1960.

[402] NAVCO 1.1 situates the case in different years – 1960-65.

[403] Elizabeth Rechniewski, "A Small War in Cameroon," *Small Wars Journal*, 24 October, 2014 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-small-war-in-cameroon).

[404] See, e.g., Lester Kurtz, "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution (1989);" Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/czechoslovakians-campaign-democracy-velvet-revolution-1989).

[405] This is consistent with the account of the campaign provided by the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/madagascar-general-strike-support-marc-ravolomanana-2002) and by Randrianja, "'Be Not Afraid, Only Believe'."

- *Mali, Anti-military, 1992*: NAVCO 2.0 identifies both of the last two years of the campaign (1991 and 1992) as campaign success, which suggests a coding error. As various campaign accounts identify 1991 as the last year of the campaign, I drop the 1992 observation.[406]

4.3 Dropped campaign-years due to the occurrence of large-scale violence in the same dispute

I dropped campaign-years if an armed conflict related to the same political dispute was occurring at the same time according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.

I exempt from this rule two cases – the East Timor liberation movement and the First Palestinian Intifada. The rationale is that these are two of the most studied instances of nonviolent campaigns and scholars, while noting the occurrence of violence too, stress that nonviolent struggle played a more important role. Therefore rigidly following my own coding criteria here would lead to the exclusion of two cases that are often referred to by civil resistance scholars as paradigmatic instances of the phenomenon I am interested in studying. In robustness checks reported above I drop the relevant campaigns-years.

- *Morocco, Independence War, 1956*: This is the last year of the Moroccan independence war. I drop the case as the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes 1956 as a year of armed conflict.

- *Guatemala, Marxist rebels (URNG), 1963-64*: NAVCO 2.0 codes two early years (1963-1964) of the long-lasting Marxist rebellion in Guatemala (1961-1996) as nonviolent. However, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes 1963 as a year of armed conflict, so I drop the observation. I also drop 1964 because, while the UCDP/PRIO dataset does not code an armed conflict, the corresponding account seems to suggest that the violent conflict may have continued in 1964[407] and I could not find any reference to a non-violent campaign in Guatemala in 1964.[408] In robustness check, I re-run the analysis without dropping the year 1964, which is coded as non-ethnic as the ACD2EPR dataset reports that in this period the rebels recruited among the state-controlling Ladinos.

- *Nepal, CPN-M/UPF, 2006*: This is the last year of the Maoist campaign in Nepal, which NAVCO 2.0 codes as violent up to then. However, 2006 is considered a year of armed conflict by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (a peace agreement is eventually signed in the same year).[409] As several sources suggest that in this case the shift from violence to non-violence may have made a decisive difference for the successful outcome for the challengers (rather than being a mere reflection of the fact that the dispute had essentially been settled), one could make the case that the observation should not be dropped.[410] However, I drop it because NAVCO 2.0

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[406] See the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/malians-defeat-dictator-gain-free-election-march-revolution-1991) and Nesbitt and Zunes, "Mali's March Revolution (1991)."

[407] http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/465.

[408] There are, however, reports of a protest movement in 1962. Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 193; Deborah Levenson-Estrada, *Trade Unionists Against Terror: Guatemala City, 1954-1985* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 43.

[409] http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/562.

[410] See, in particular, Kiyoko Ogura, "Seeking state power. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)," Berghof Transition Series 3 (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2008).

already contains an observation corresponding to nonviolent resistance in Nepal in 2006 – a campaign in which both Maoists and civil society groups were taking part – so including it would amount to double-counting, which would favor my argument, given that this is a case of success of a non-ethnic challenge.[411]

- *Cyprus, Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston, 1957 and 1959*: I drop the campaign years as the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset reports an ongoing armed conflict. NAVCO 2.0 codes the Greek Cypriot struggle against British rule as starting with a nonviolent approach in 1954 and shifting to violence in 1955 (the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset consistently codes 1955 as the first year of large-scale violence).[412] NAVCO 2.0 also codes 1957 and 1959 as characterized by primarily nonviolent resistance, but this appears inaccurate, given that the armed conflict is typically coded as ending with a treaty between the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey in spring of 1959 and there is no indication in case study accounts of a decline in violence in 1957 or 1959 (before the treaty).[413]

- *Algeria, Islamic Salvation Front, 1992*: NAVCO 2.0 codes the first year of the Islamist insurgency (1992) as nonviolent, but according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset the armed conflict had already started in 1992. So I drop this observation.

- *Philippines, Moro National Liberation Front, 1976:* NAVCO 2.0 codes 1976 as a nonviolent year of an otherwise violent campaign (1970-80). As the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes 1976 as a year of ongoing armed conflict, I drop this observation.

- *India, Naga Rebellion, 1958-59*: NAVCO 2.0 codes these two years as nonviolent in the context of a longer violent campaign (1955-75). I drop the observations as the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes these two years as ongoing armed conflict.

- *Morocco, Western Sahara Freedom Movement (POLISARIO), 1982-83*: NAVCO 2.2 codes these two years of an otherwise violent campaign as nonviolent. I drop these two observations as according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset the campaign amounted to an armed conflict in those years.

- *Yugoslavia/Serbia, Slovenian Independence, 1991*: I drop this observation as the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset reports an armed conflict in 1991.[414]

- *Hungary, Anti-Communist, 1956*: I drop the case as there is evidence of large-scale organized violence. Granville reports of "a wave of lynchings by insurgents" of Hungarian security forces; moreover, the fact that the Hungarian government declared a ceasefire in October 28 suggests

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[411] The non-ethnic coding is suggested by the fact that the ACD2EPR codes the Maoists as recruiting from the state-controlling ethnic group, among others.

[412] On the large-scale protests by Greek-Cypriots that preceded the violent phase of the struggle, see, for example, Karyos, "The Acceleration of History and Decolonization in the Eastern Mediterranean."

[413] See, e.g., Christopher Paul et al., *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), pp. 94-103.

[414] On this civil war, see Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (London: Penguin, 1995), pp. 154-168

that what was taking place amounted to two-sided violence.[415] A 1957 UN report also unambiguously describes an armed conflict in the section titled "The armed uprising," speaking of "a five-day battle" in which the police and part of the army sided with insurgents, which were given weapons by Hungarian security forces.[416] Similarly, Carter, Clark, and Randle describe a situation characterized by "heavy fighting."[417] The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset identifies the occurrence of an armed conflict.

- *Hungary, Anti-Soviet Occupation, 1956*: I drop the case as there is evidence of large-scale organized violence. A UN report discusses pitched battles between Soviet forces and Hungarian forces.[418] The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset identifies the occurrence of an armed conflict.

4.4 Recodings of campaign-years in which there are shifts in resistance method
I examined all cases in which there is a switch from nonviolence to violence or vice versa in NAVCO 2.0 to ensure an accurate coding. First of all, I assess whether there was in fact a shift to violence, by looking at the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and case specific sources. I found one instance – Guyana 1992 (see below) – where the shift to violence does not appear to have actually taken place. In cases with a one-year violent hiatus in a nonviolent campaign, I examine case-specific evidence to assess whether the shift to violence corresponds to a suspension of nonviolent activities or to a temporary intensification of violence in a context of continued nonviolent resistance. If the former, I code the nonviolent campaign as ending and then resuming after the one-year violent hiatus. If instead there is evidence of an ongoing nonviolent campaign during the one-year violent hiatus, it would not seem sensible to code the campaign as ending and then resuming; rather I recode the campaign as continuing in its nonviolent form throughout the one-year violent episode. As it turns out, there is only one case that this rule applies to – Chile 1984 (see below). Finally, I dropped nonviolent campaign-years at the very end of a campaign that had previously been waged violently, if negotiations on the final settlement between the warring parties had been ongoing before the switch to nonviolence, so as to assuage concerns about reverse causality, as the turn to nonviolence in this context would likely be a result of the impending settlement rather than its cause. This coding rule in practice applies only to one case – Guatemala 1996 (see below).

- *Guyana, Anti-Burnham/Hoyte, 1992*: NAVCO 2.0 codes the last year of this campaign (1990-92) as violent. However, none of the sources consulted reports the occurrence of violence by the challengers in 1992, so I recode the campaign-year as nonviolent. However, in a robustness test I keep the original coding.

- *Guatemala, Marxist rebels (URNG), 1996*: NAVCO 2.0 codes the last year of this otherwise violent campaign as nonviolent. The UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset codes 1995 as the last year of armed conflict; a ceasefire agreement is signed in March 1996 and a peace agreement later in

[415] Johanna Granville, "Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from the Budapest and Warsaw Archives," *Journal of Contemporary History* 38 (2), 2003: 261-290, p. 271.
[416] UN General Assembly, "Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary," 1957, p. 21 (http://mek.oszk.hu/01200/01274/01274.pdf).
[417] Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945*, p. 37.
[418] UN General Assembly, "Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary," p. 26. See also Carter, Clark, and Randle, *People Power and Protest Since 1945*, p. 37.

the year.[419] Negotiations had been well under way when violence ended in 1995 (the peace process had started in 1990 and preliminary agreements had already been reached in 1994)[420] and there is no indication in the literature (unlike, say, Nepal in 2006) that nonviolent resistance in 1996 had a decisive effect on the outcome.

- *Chile, Anti-Pinochet Movement, 1984*: NAVCO 2.0 codes 1984 as a violent campaign-year in a broader, primarily non-violent campaign (1983-89). However, I do count the nonviolent campaign as ending in 1984 and restarting in 1985 as it continued in 1984; the year was peculiar because the violent campaign that had occurred in parallel in previous years was especially intense.[421]

4.5 Dropping campaigns that do not meet the maximalist goal criteria of NAVCO 2.0
In the process of coding the ETHNIC CONFLICT variable for each campaign, I assessed whether NAVCO's "maximalist goal" criterion was met, i.e., only campaigns with the maximalist goal of overthrowing the existing regime/leader, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination/secession at some point during the campaign should be included.[422] The Israel 1982 case (see below) does not meet the criterion and is thus dropped from the main analysis.

- *Israel, Druze Resistance, 1982*: If included, this case would be an ethnic challenge, as the movement was constituted by Druzes challenging the Jewish-controlled Israeli government. However, I drop the case from the main analysis as it does not meet the inclusion criteria of NAVCO 2.0's dataset of campaigns with maximalist goals only. In fact, the goal of the campaign was limited to opposing the imposition of Israeli ID cards to the Druze population of Israel-occupied Golan Heights, not to end the occupation itself. As Scott Kennedy notes

> "The Golanis were not demanding liberation from Israeli occupation. They simply asked for return to the status quo ante [before new ID card policy]…The strike was not an open-ended general strike demanding self-determination or an end to Israeli rule. It candidly assessed the political context in which it was raised and avoided ill-defined or hopelessly unrealistic objectives. Such piecemeal or incremental an approach may not satisfy the maximalist goals of revolutionary rhetoric or ideological dogmatism."[423]

Moreover, as the same author makes clear, the case should not be considered a success, as Israel reneged on a compromise deal. The Swarthmore Database confirms that the movement did not achieve even its less than maximalist goal of convincing Israel to abandon its ID card policy:

> "The [Israeli] siege eventually ended, and so did the [Druze] strike, with little action. Again Israel negotiated and promised identity cards which addressed some concerns of

[419] http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/469.
[420] http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/469; http://www.usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-guatemala.
[421] Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp. 279-302; Huneus, "Political Mass Mobilization against Authoritarian Rule," in Roberts and Garton Ash (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*.
[422] Chenoweth and Lewis, "Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (3), 2013: 415–423, p. 416.
[423]Scott R. Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, 1984: 48-64, p 59.

the Druze, including that they be recognized as Arabs (not Druze). They also promised to leave civil rights with the Druze communities, including the right to water. Furthermore, Israel agreed not to impose mandatory conscription on the Druze. The Israelis have gone back on these promises since. Many Druze have accepted the identity cards, though many still refuse, and the community pressure to resist remains."[424]

So keeping the case but accurately recoding it as a failure would be more favorable to my argument than dropping it. In any case, in a robustness check I include the campaign as ethnic.

4.6 The year 2006
The last year included in NAVCO 2.0 is 2006. The variable CYEAR in NAVCO 2.0 indicates whether a given campaign-year is the onset year (CYEAR=0), an ongoing year (CYEAR=1), or the final year (CYEAR=2). For four campaigns active in 2006, CYEAR takes on 0 or 1, but I recode them as 2, i.e., I consider them the final year of the campaign as discussed below.

- *Mexico, Anti-Calderon*: I could not find reports of continuation of protests after 2006. The Swarthmore Database reports that protests died out at the end of the year.[425]

- *Maldives, Anti-Gayoom*: There may have been protests in 2007 too but it makes sense to consider 2006 the last year of the campaign as that is when Gayoom issued the "Roadmap to Democracy," with a clear timetable for the political reform process, including revision of the constitution, more commitments to human rights, and proposals for government investment in civic institutions. The constitutional changes were made in March 2007 and free and fair elections took place in 2008.

- *Belarus, Regime Opposition*: Several sources suggest that the challenge ended in 2006.[426]

- *Nepal, Anti-government, 2006*: The campaign ended in 2006 with the opening to multi-party competition.[427]

4.7 Venezuela, 2002, anti-coup
I added this case to the dataset as the NAVCO 2.0's codebook explicitly notes that it was accidentally dropped out of the dataset (the case is included in NAVCO 1.1 as a nonviolent campaign).[428] I therefore had to code the variables of interest (see above for the ETHNIC CONFLICT variable coding).

I coded the campaign as a success (OUTCOME=3) given that Chavez returned to power, consistent with NAVCO 1.1's coding.

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[424] https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/golan-druze-resistance-israeli-forced-citizenship-1981-1982.
[425] http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mexican-citizens-massively-protest-presidential-election-results-2006.
[426] See, for example, the Swarthmore Database (http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/belarusian-citizens-protest-presidential-election-2006); Vitali Silitski, "Belarus: Learning From Defeat," *Journal of Democracy* 17 (4), 2006: 138-152; Elena Korosteleva, "Was There a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006 Presidential Election," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25 (2-3), 2009: 324-346.
[427] See, e.g., the Swarthmore Database (https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/nepalese-general-strike-protest-monarchic-rule-2006).
[428] Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, Codebook NAVCO 2.0, 2013 (http://www.navcodata.org).

I coded the occurrence of military defections (SECURITY DEFECTIONS=1) based on the NAVCO 1.1's codebook, which notes that "Many high-ranking officers refused to support the coup"[429] and the account provided by the Swarthmore database:

> "On the morning of April 13th, General of the Parachute Brigade, Raul Baduel, announced his position against the interim government. He gathered active and retired officers in Maracay to rally around the military base there. In Maracay, they organized the sabotage of the country's fleet of helicopter gunships by removing the batteries and placing them in a safe and a team undertook the job of disabling the undercarriage of the presidential plane."[430]

I coded the occurrence of civilian defections (CIVILIAN DEFECTIONS=1) as
Carlos Ortega, president of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV), which had played a key role in the ousting of Chavez, withdrew support from the Carmona's government after being sidelined, indicating the break-up of the alliances of social forces behind the coup.[431]

I coded SELF-DETERMINATION=0 as the campaign goal was to reverse the coup and reinstate Hugo Chavez (consistently, NAVCO 1.1 codes the campaign as aiming at regime change).

I coded CAMPAIGN SIZE as 1 (i.e., with over 100,000 participants) because NAVCO 1.1's codebook reports that "Hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets in opposition to the Carmona government."[432]

4.8 Maldives
Maldives is not included in the EPR dataset, so I code the corresponding variables based on Metz' *Maldives: A Country Study*. I code the Dhivehi-speakers as state-controlling. There is no specific percent information about the Indian minority, but it is estimated in the hundreds, so I code the state-controlling group as constituting 99% of the population. There is no indication that the tiny minority is discriminated against or that one political organization claimed to represent it national politics, so I code the group as politically irrelevant and ETHNIC EXCLUSION=0.

4.9 Corrections of Self-Determination variable
In generating the dummy flagging campaigns aiming at self-determination (SELF-DETERMINATION) based on NAVCO 2.0's CAMP_GOALS, I identified and corrected the following apparent coding errors in NAVCO 2.0:

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[429] Erica Chenoweth and Orion A. Lewis, Online Methodological Appendix Accompanying *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 2011(http://www.navcodata.org). NAVCO 1.1 codes the occurrence of military defections (i.e., the variable DEFECT in the dataset takes on 1).

[430] https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/venezuelans-defend-against-coup-attempt-2002. See also Randall Parish, Mark Peceny, and Justin Delacour, "Venezuela and the Collective Defence of Democracy Regime in the Americas," *Democratisation* 14 (2), 2007: 207-231, p. 220.

[431] Parish, Peceny, and Delacour, "Venezuela and the Collective Defence of Democracy," p. 220.

[432] Chenoweth and Lewis, Online Methodological Appendix, p. 48.

- *Cedar Revolution, Lebanon, 2005*: NAVCO 2.0 codes CAMP_GOALS=0 (i.e., regime change). I recoded CAMPAIGN_GOALS=5 as the campaign aimed at the end of Syria's occupation of Lebanon (NAVCO 2.0's codes the variable TARGET=Syrian forces).

- *LTTE, Sri Lanka, 1972*: NAVCO 2.0 codes CAMP_GOALS=2 (policy change) for the first year of this campaign, while the following years are coded as aiming at greater autonomy or secession. I recoded the campaign in 1972 as aiming at self-determination.

4.10 Corrections of violent campaign outcomes

For one of the robustness checks, I recode the following campaign outcomes as success, given that the rebels obtained de facto control for the ethnic region they claimed: "Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh," "Dniestr," "Kosovo Albanian," and "Kurdish Secession against Saddam." (In the Kosovo case NATO intervention was necessary for the rebels to achieve control of the region, but the intervention was endogenous to the rebellion and the government repression that met it.) I recode ""Liberals of 1949" as failure, rather than success, because by the final year in the dataset the rebels had not achieved their objectives and violence significantly declined following an amnesty that saw thousands of guerrillas surrender to government forces.[433]

5. Variables descriptions

OUTCOME (outcome3 in STATA files): trichotomous variable measuring campaign outcome, indicating campaign failure (1), success (3) or an ongoing campaign (2), based on the variable PROGRESS from NAVCO 2.0. A campaign is coded as ending in failure if it ends without any departure from the status quo (PROGRESS=0), with some gains short of government concessions (PROGRESS=1) or only minor concessions (PROGRESS=2); a campaign is coded as ending in success if it ends with significant government concessions (PROGRESS=3) or achieves its ends in full (PROGRESS=4). For years in which a campaign is ongoing, OUTCOME takes on 2 (regardless of the value of PROGRESS).

OUTCOME DUMMY (outcome_dummy in STATA files): dichotomous variable for campaign outcome, with 0 indicating failure and 1 success.

ETHNIC CONFLICT (ethnic_conflict in STATA files): dummy variable indicating the ethnic character of a nonviolent campaign, based on the author's own research.

For consistency, I code instances of ethnic conflict in violent campaigns (analyzed in the robustness checks reported in Tables A24-25) based on the identity of rebel groups' members, using the recruitment variable in the ACD2EPR dataset (i.e., ethnic_conflict=1 if according to the dataset the rebel organization recruits from an ethnic group other than the state-controlling group *and* does not recruit from the state-controlling ethnic group). I also code as ethnic conflict cases of violent resistance against foreign occupation (in which the bulk of the counter-rebellion activities are conducted by foreign forces) and against colonial rule.

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[433] Norman A. Bailey, "La Violencia in Colombia," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 9 (1967): 561-575.

LATE USSR (soviet in STATA files); dummy variable flagging campaigns taking place in the Soviet Union in the years 1987-1991.

POLITY2 (lag_polity2 in STATA files): measure of regime type, ranging from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic), lagged one year, from the Polity IV dataset.[434]

TIME TO STATE (timetostate in STATA files): log of the time duration of the campaign up to a given campaign year.

POLITY2 SQUARE (lag_polity_square in STATA files): POLITY2 raised to the square.

ETHNIC EXCLUSION (exclusion in STATA files): dummy variable indicating whether any politically relevant group in the country is coded as excluded from executive power by the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset.[435]

GDP PER CAPITA (log_lag_percapita_pwt in STATA files): GDP per capita, in log form, lagged one year, PPP converted, Chain Series, at 2005 constant prices.[436]

URBAN POPULATION (urban_pop_perc in STATA files): Percent of the country's population that lives in cities.[437]

YOUTH (perc_youth in STATA files): Percent of the country's population in the age 15-24 age range.[438]

HUMAN RIGHTS (lag_cirphysint in STATA files): Cingranelli–Richards indicator of state practices regarding physical integrity rights, as a proxy of state repressiveness, with a one-year lag.[439] This index is the sum of four distinct indicators from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset – Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance – and it ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights).

HUMAN RIGHTS SQUARE (lag_cirphysint_square in STATA files): HUMAN RIGHTS raised to the square.

LATENT HUMAN RIGHTS (lag_latentmean in STATA files): latent measure of respect for human rights developed by Christopher Fariss.[440]

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[434] Monty Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Regime Transitions and Characteristics, 1800-2010 (Detroit: Center for Systemic Peace, 2013).
[435] Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min, "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis," *World Politics* 62 (1), 2010: 87–119.
[436] Data is from the World Penn Tables 7.0.
[437] World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI).
[438] Author's calculation based on WDI data.
[439] David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and K. Chad Clay, The CIRI Human Rights Dataset, 2014 (http://www.humanrightsdata.com).
[440] Christopher J. Fariss, "Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability," *American Political Science Review* 108 (2), 2014: 297-218.

REGIONAL CAMPAIGNS (laggedother_campaign_region in STATA files): Count variable of the active nonviolent campaigns in countries in the same world region in the previous year (author's own calculations).

WESTERN AID (lag_west_aid_percent in STATA files): measure indicating the amount of aid received from western donor as percent of the country's GDP in the previous year.[441]

REGIME DURABILITY (lag_poldurable in STATA files): Number of years (in log form and with one-year lag) since the most recent regime change (i.e., a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score).[442]

ETHNIC POLARIZATION (ETHPOL): A measure of demographic ethnic polarization.[443]

MANUFACTURing (lag_manufacturing in STATA files): the manufacturing share of GDP, lagged one year.[444]

SECURITY DEFECTIONS (sec_def in STATA files): NAVCO 2.0's dummy variable indicating major defections or loyalty shifts in the country's security forces.

COLD WAR (cw in STATA files): a dummy variable flagging cold war years, i.e., 1945-1990.

#ETHNIC GROUPS (number_groups in STATA files): the number of politically relevant ethnic groups according to EPR.

#ETHNIC GROUPSxETHNIC CONFLICT (interaction_number in STATA files): interaction between ethnic conflict dummy and number of politically relevant ethnic group.

POPULATION SIZE (log_pop in STATA files): log of the country's population.[445]

CIVILIAN DEFECTIONS (state_def in STATA files): NAVCO 2.0's dummy variable indicating major defections or loyalty shifts among civilian bureaucrats and/or civilian public officials.

SELF-DETERMINATION (self_det in STATA files): dummy variable indicating whether the campaign aimed at self-determination. I coded this variable based NAVCO 2.0's variable CAMP_GOALS indicating the goals of campaigns. SELF-DETERMINATION=1 if CAMP_GOALS equals 3 (territorial secession), 4 (greater autonomy) or 5 (anti-occupation).

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[441] The aid data (in constant 2011 US$) is from the AidData dataset. Michael J. Tierney et al., "More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData," *World Development* 39 (11), 2011: 1891–1906. The GDP data (in constant 2010 US$) is from WDI.

[442] Data from Erica Chenoweth and Jay Ulfelder, "Can Structural Conditions Explain the Onset of Nonviolent Uprisings?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (2), 2017:298-324.

[443] José G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars," *American Economic Review* 95 (3), 2005: 796-816.

[444] WDI.

[445] WDI.

ARMED FORCES (log_forces in STATA files): the size of the target country's armed forces, in log form.[446]

#COUPS (moving_a in STATA files): the number of successful coups in the previous five years (logged).[447]

ETHNIC DIVERSITY (cdivers_ethnicity in STATA files): a dummy variable from NAVCO 2.0, indicating whether more than one ethnic group participated in the nonviolent movement.

MASS MEDIA ACCESS (mdi in STATA files): a measure of media accessibility, calculated as the sum of number of television receivers in use for broadcasts to the general public, the number of radio receivers in use for broadcasts to the general public, and the circulation of daily newspapers, divided by the population size, and multiplied by 100.[448]

SANCTIONS (sdirect in STATA files): a dummy variable from NAVCO 2.0 indicating whether international sanctions were imposed on the regime for cracking down on the nonviolent campaign.

PARALLEL MEDIA (alternative_media in STATA files): ordinal variable indicating the presence of campaigns' media institutions beyond government control. It is based on NAVCO 2.0's dummy variables pi_newmedia and pi_tradmedia, indicating, respectively, an alternative new media system (such as websites and social media) and a traditional media system running parallel to official state institutions. PARALLEL MEDIA takes on 0 if neither dummy variable equals 1; it takes on 1 if one of the two dummies equals 1 and 2 if both equal 1.

PARALLEL MEDIA DUMMY (alternative_media_dummy in STATA files): a dummy variable flagging campaigns with their own media institutions beyond government control. The variable takes on 1 if at least one of the two alternative media dummies in NAVCO 2.0 (pi_newmedia and pi_tradmedia) is equal to 1.

PERSONALIST (personalistic in STATA files): dummy variable (lagged one year) flagging regimes coded as "personalist" in the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (ARD).[449]

PERSONALIST2 (personalistic2 in STATA): alternative dummy for personalist regimes, taking on 1 if regime is coded in the ARD as "personal," "party-personal-military," or "party-personal" regimes in the previous year.

MILTARY (military in STATA files): dummy variable (lagged one year) flagging regimes coded as "military" in the ARD.

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[446] WDI.

[447] Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr, Polity IV Project.

[448] Camber Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty," *International Organization* 68 (1), 2014: 111–41.

[449] Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set," *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2), 2014: 313-331.

MILITARY2 (military2 in STATA files): alternative dummy for military regimes, taking 1 if the regime is coded in the ARD as "military," "military-personal," "indirect military," "party-military," "party-personal-military" regimes

DEMOCRATIC (democratic in STATA files): dummy variable (lagged one year) flagging regimes coded as "democratic" in the ARD.

ANTICOLONIAL (anticolonial in STATA files): dummy variable indicating cases of anticolonial campaigns, based on author's own coding.

CAMPAIGN SIZE (bivar_size in STATA files): dummy variable flagging campaigns with over 100,000 participants, based on information from NAVCO 2.'s CAMP_SIZE_EST, a 5-point ordinal variable (0=small, i.e., hundreds to thousands participants; 1=medium, i.e., tens of thousands; 2=large, i.e., above 100,000; 3=extremely large, i.e., above 1 million).

LATIN AMETICA (LA in STATA files): Dummy for Latin American countries in the dataset (i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela).

EASTERN EUROPE (EE in STATA files): Dummy for Eastern European countries in the dataset (i.e., Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Poland, Russia, Romania, Soviet Union, Ukraine, Yugoslavia/Serbia).

SOUTH ASIA (SA in STATA files): Dummy for South Asian countries in the dataset (i.e., Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka).

SOUTH-EAST ASIA (SEA in STATA files): Dummy for South-east Asian countries in the dataset (i.e., Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand).

MENA: Dummy for Middle East and Northern African countries in the dataset (i.e., Egypt, Iran, Israel, Syria).

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA in STATA files): Dummy for Sub-Saharan African countries in the dataset (i.e., Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, | Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia).

EAST ASIA (EA in STATA files): Dummy for East Asian countries in the dataset (i.e., China, South Korea, Taiwan).

WESTERN EUROPE (WE in STATA files): Dummy for Western European countries in the dataset (i.e., Greece, Portugal, United Kingdom).