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Book Reviews

science, hence the creation of the Office of Strategic Research and Development (OSRD) in June 1941. While Sullivan does discuss the creation of the OSRD, he does not sufficiently explain its creation in the context of the Roosevelt administration's larger strategic thinking about the future role of science and technology in national security policymaking. Nevertheless, *The Prometheus Bomb* ought to be read by anyone interested in the Manhattan Project.

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Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win by Peter Krause. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2017. 256 pp. Paper, \$24.95.

The decades-long quests for self-determination of the Palestinians and the Kurds, to take two high-profile examples, have been marred by acrimonious internal disagreements and intense competition, in some instances escalating to deadly clashes. Why would organizations engaged in self-determination struggles fail to cooperate against the common enemy? Peter Krause is certainly not the first scholar to tackle this issue, but his book represents a major theoretical and empirical step forward.

Krause's argument—Movement Structure Theory (MST)—is unabashedly structural: the balance of power among organizations in a self-determination movement influences how much effort they will devote to internal squabbles compared with the fight against the incumbent. Organizations' positions in the power hierarchy shape their propensity to pursue the common goal of the movement or to strive to further their own narrower organizational interests. Hegemonic movements—those with one overwhelmingly powerful organization—are most successful, as the hegemon can keep at bay subordinate organizations and focus on victory against the government as the best way to consolidate its dominant position. By contrast, movements without a hegemon get bogged down in intense competition between groups that are more concerned about improving or defending their relative standing vis-à-vis internal rivals than achieving the remote goal of prevailing against the external enemy.

Thus, Krause goes far beyond pointing out the potential for intramovement competition and its counterproductive effects. Weaving together insights from the study of international alliances, signaling, social movements, and civil wars into a theory that envisions all relevant players acting strategically, he identifies various mechanisms through which competition leads to failure: outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, outright infighting, and the limited clarity and credibility of the movement's threats and promises induced by the cacophony of separate strategies adopted by the various organizations.

Moreover, Krause's clear identification of the condition—hegemony—under which even multiparty movements can achieve success sets his work apart from other studies that point to the perilous effects of intramovement divisions but fail to provide an explanation for variation in movement outcomes.

Krause tests MST with longitudinal case studies of four movements—Palestinian (1965–2016), Zionist (1921–1949), Algerian (1944–1962), and Irish (1914–1998) – marshalling an impressive array of sources, including interviews with nationalist leaders and archival materials, besides the vast secondary literature. Consistent with the argument, these self-determination movements were most successful during hegemonic phases, while with a balanced distribution of power they tended to experience the counterproductive dynamics mentioned earlier. Most strikingly, the behavior of organizations appears to be powerfully shaped by their position in the hierarchy of power within the movement, with groups that engaged in violent outbidding when relatively weak switching to policies of restraint aimed at maximizing gains against the government once in hegemonic position.

In the final chapter, Krause offers an insightful overview of what he calls “the loose ends of MST,” aspects of his arguments that may stimulate future research. What is perhaps missing here is a more explicit discussion of the relationship between MST and theories about the causes of civil wars. Each of the four movements at some point waged war against the incumbent, but in all instances, except the Irish War of Independence, large-scale violence was the result of outbidding and chain-ganging initiatives of relatively weak groups rather than a purposeful decision of the leading organizations. Future research may shed light on whether this pattern of civil war onset is indeed prevalent and whether intramovement dynamics are merely affecting the timing of war (pulling the dominant organizations in armed conflict that they are not yet ready for) or causing a war that would not otherwise happen, by precluding the continuation of nonviolent resistance tactics.

In sum, this book is a rare combination of elegant theorizing and rich empirical analysis, which will no doubt influence scholars' and policymakers' thinking for years to come.

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A History of the Iraq Crisis: France, the United States, and Iraq, 1991–2003 by Frédéric Bozo. New York, Columbia University Press, 2016. 408 pp. \$55.00.

The history of the transatlantic standoff between France and the United States over Iraq has been told many times. In 2004, Philip Gordon and Jeremy