Online Appendix for Costantino Pischedda, *Conflict Among Rebels: Why Insurgent Groups Fight Each Other*

This Appendix consists of six sections. Section 1 reports a list of multiparty civil wars characterized by at least one inter-rebel war. Section 2 elaborates the interview method used in the book and a list of all interviewees. Section 3 provides additional details on events discussed in chapter 4 of the book. Section 4 presents a map of the maximum extent of Kurdish rebel territorial control in the period 1961-1988, which is relevant to testing the alternative explanation for inter-rebel war offered by minimum winning coalition theory. Section 5 and 6 contain the codebook for the statistical analysis from chapter 6 and robustness checks, respectively.

1. List of Multiparty Civil Wars and Inter-rebel Wars, 1989-2015
I conceptualize inter-rebel war as purposeful, leadership-endorsed large-scale combat between distinct rebel organizations fighting against the same government. Inter-rebel clashes qualify as large-scale combat if repeated battles between units of different organizations or a major battle with hundreds of fighters occur in a given year (the involvement of most members would suffice for smaller organizations), or if one group attempts to overrun the headquarters of another group.

The list below includes all multiparty civil wars in the period 1989-2015, i.e., instances in which multiple rebel groups were active against the same government according to the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Version 17.1).[1] Civil wars characterized by inter-rebel war are in italics.

- Afghanistan, 1989-1996 (before the Taleban's takeover): inter-rebel war between Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan and the Taleban in 1994-1995.[2]

- Afghanistan, 1997-2001 (Taleban's rule): no evidence of inter-rebel war.[3]

- Afghanistan, 2002-2015 (after the Taleban's overthrow): inter-rebel wars between Hizb-i Islami and the Taleban in 2010-11 and between the Taleban and IS in 2015.[4]

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[1] Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen, "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007." *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 5 (2008): 697-710.

[2] Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 67-70; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Taleban" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/nonstate/5323). Fighting between other groups, for example Hizb-i Islami and Jam'iyyat, may have also constituted inter-rebel war too. See UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/nonstate/5321). The rebel groups active in the civil war (not all in each year) were Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Hizb-i Wahdat, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, and Taleban.

[3] The rebel groups were Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Hizb-i Wahdat, and Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami.

[4] Middle East Media Research Institute, "After Weekend's Fighting between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami and Taliban in Afghanistan's Baghlan Province, Editorial in Pakistan Daily Notes: 'The Defection of... Commanders and Fighters of the Hizb-e-Islami to the Karzai Government is... the First Concrete Success of Kabul's Extension of an Olive Branch to Militants'," Special Dispatch no.285, March 9, 2010 (https://www.memri.org/reports/after-weekends-fighting-between-gulbuddin-hekmatyars-hizb-e-islami-and-taliban-afghanistans); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Taleban" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/nonstate/5323); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "IS-Taleban" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/nonstate/14542).

- Algeria, 1990-2015: inter-rebel war between AIS and GIA in the mid- to late-1990s.[5]

- Angola, 1992-2002: no clear evidence of inter-rebel war.[6]

- Azerbaijan, 1991-1998: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[7]

- Bangladesh, 2005-2006: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[8]

- Bosnia, 1992-1994: inter-rebel war between the Croatian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[9]

- Burundi, 1994-2008: inter-rebel war between the CNDD and Palipehutu-FNL in 1996-1997.[10]

- Cambodia, 1989-1998: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[11]

- Cameroon, 2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[12]

- Central African Republic, 2006-2013: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[13]

- Chad, 1989-1990 (anti-Habré rebellion): no evidence of inter-rebel war.[14]

- Chad, 1992-1998 (anti-Deby rebellion): no evidence of inter-rebel war.[15]

- Chad, 2005-2009 (second anti-Deby rebellion): no evidence of inter-rebel war.[16]

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[5] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "AIS – GIA" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5329); Mohammed M. Hafez, "Fratricidal Jihadists: Why Islamists Keep Losing their Civil Wars," *Middle East Policy* 25, no. 2 (Summer 2018): 86-99. In the period from 1990 to 2015, the UCDP reports the following rebel groups (not all active in each year): AIS, GIA, AQIM, and MUJAO.

[6] Some clashes between FLEC-FAC and UNITA took place, but the evidence is too fragmentary to establish whether they met the definitional criteria of inter-rebel war. See Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Angola: Information on an anti-government group called Frente Liberaccion d'Enclave Cabinda (FLEC) for the period 1991-1995; on the size of the group, on whether it is affiliated with any other group, and on the treatment of group members by the government," November 1, 1995 (https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ac5010.html). The multiparty civil war, at various times, involved FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R, and UNITA.

[7] The two rebel groups (active at the same time only in 1993) were the Republic of Nagorno-Karabak and the Forces of Suret Husseinov.

[8] The two rebel groups, active at the same time in 2005, were the PBCP and the PBCP-J.

[9] Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*, pp. 159-161.

[10] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "CNDD - Palipehutu-FNL" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5524); Minorities at Risk, "Chronology for Hutus in Burundi" (http://www.mar.umd.edu/chronology.asp?groupId=51601). The rebel groups (not all active in each year) were CNDD, CNDD-FDD, Frolina, and Palipehutu-FNL.

[11] The rebel groups pitted against the Cambodian government in this period (though not all active in each year) were the KPNLF, the KR, and FUNCINPEC.

[12] The two rebel groups were IS and Boko Haram.

[13] The two rebel groups were UFDR and CPJP (active at the same time only in 2012-2013).

[14] The rebel groups were the Islamic Legion, MOSANAT, and the Revolutionary Forces of April 1st.

[15] The rebel groups were MDD, FARF, CNR, CSNPD, and FNT (not all active in each year).

[16] The rebel groups were RAFD, FUCD, and UFDD (not all active in each year).

- Colombia, 1989-2015 (communist rebellion): inter-rebel war between ELN and FARC in 2006-2007.[17]

- Congo Brazzaville, 1997-2002: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[18]

- Croatia, 1992-1995: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[19]

- Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2001: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[20]

- Democratic Republic of Congo, 2006-2008: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[21]

- Democratic Republic of Congo, 2011-2014: no clear evidence of inter-rebel war.[22]

- El Salvador, 1989-1991: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[23]

- Ethiopia, 1989-1991 (anti-Derg rebellion): no evidence of inter-rebel war.[24]

- Ethiopia, 1991-2015 (post-Derg ethnic rebellions): no evidence of inter-rebel war.[25]

- Georgia, 1992-1993: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[26]

- Guatemala, 1989-1995: no evidence of inter-rebel war.

- India, 1989-2015: inter-rebel war between HuM and JKLF in 1991-1993.[27]

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[17] International Crisis Group, "Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?", Latin America Briefing no. 16, October 11, 2007, p. 6. There is, however, some uncertainty as to whether the clashes were endorsed by the leadership of the two organizations and thus amounted to inter-rebel war.

[18] The rebel groups were Ntsiloulous, Ninjas, and Cocoyes (not all active in each year).

[19] The rebel groups were the Serbian Republic of Krajina and Serbian irregulars (active at the same time only in 1992).

[20] The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia reports that "there was also a large amount of fierce fighting between the rebel movements, competing with each other for the country's abundant resources," but does not provide any detail, making it impossible to assess whether this fighting amounts to inter-rebel war. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Government of DR Congo (Zaire) - RCD" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/586). The rebel groups were MLC and RCD, both active at the same time in the period 1998-2000.

[21] The rebel groups were CNDP and BDK, active at the same time in 2007-2008.

[22] The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia reports clashes between APCLS and M23 in 2012 causing 30 casualties, but no detail on the episode is provided and I could not find additional information, making it impossible to assess whether the fighting amounted to inter-rebel war. See UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5652). The rebel groups were M23, PARC-FAAL, APCLS, Forces of Paul Joseph Mukungubila, and Kata Katanga (not all active in each year).

[23] The rebel groups were ERP and FPL.

[24] The rebel groups were EPLF, EPDM, TPLF, IGLF, Forces of Amsha Desta and Merid Negusie, and Forces of the Harar garrison (not all active in each year).

[25] The rebel groups were AIAI, ARDUF, OLF, and ONLF (not all active in each year).

[26] The rebel groups were the Zviadists, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia (all three active at the same only in 1992).

[27] Paul Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic Defection, and the Rise of ProState Paramilitaries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (February 2012): 16-40. The rebel groups (not all active in each year) were PWG, CPI-ML-J, MCC, NSCN-IM, ATTF, NLFT, NLFT-B, UNLF, PLA, KCP,

- Indonesia, 1997-2005: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[28]

- Iran, 1990-1997: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[29]

- Iran, 2005-2011: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[30]

- Iraq, 1989-1996: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[31]

- Iraq, 2004-2011: inter-rebel war between IS/AQI and RJF in 2007.[32]

- Israel, 1989-2014: inter-rebel war between Fatah and Hamas in 2006-2007.[33]

- Ivory Coast, 2002-2004: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[34]

- Lebanon, 1989: inter-rebel war between the Forces of Michel Aoun and the Lebanese Forces in 1989.[35]

- Liberia, 1989-1990: inter-rebel war between the NPFL and the INPFL.[36]

- Liberia, 2000-2003: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[37]

- Libya, 2015: inter-rebel war between IS and the Forces of the House of Representatives in 2015.[38]

PREPAK, Sikh insurgents, HuM, JKLF, ULFA, ABSU, NDFB, NDFB – RD, NDFB-S, PULF, KNF, GNLA, and UNLFW.

[28] The two groups involved, active at the same time only in 1999, were FRETILIN and GAM.

[29] The two groups involved, active at the same time only in 1993, were the KDPI and MEK.

[30] The two rebel groups, active at the same time in 2006-2010, were PJAK and Jondullah.

[31] The three rebel groups active in this period (though not all in each year) were the SCIRI, the KDP, and the PUK. As discussed in chapter 3, the fight between KDP and PUK in 1994-1998 could be considered an episode of inter-rebel war, even if the UCDP does not list the two as active rebel groups in the years in which they clashed against each other. Nonetheless, I exclude the episode from this list to ensure consistency in counting inter-rebel wars across multiparty civil wars.

[32] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "ISI-RJF" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5255); Mapping Militant Organizations, "Islamic Army in Iraq" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/5#note19). The rebel groups active in this period (not all in each year) were the al-Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, IS/AQI, and RJF.

[33] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Hamas-Fatah" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5226). The groups active in this period (not all in each year) were Hamas, Fatah, PIJ, PRC, PFLP, and PFLP-GC.

[34] The rebel groups (not all active in each year) were MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP.

[35] See chapter 5, Lebanon case study; UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Forces of Michel Aoun - Lebanese Forces" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5384).

[36] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "NPFL-INPFL" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5385); Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 75. The two groups were active at the same time in 1990 only.

[37] The rebel groups were LURD and MODEL; they were active at the same time only in 2003.

[38] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "IS - Forces of the House of Representatives" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/14746). The rebel groups involved (not all active in each year) were IS, Zintan Brigades, and the Forces of the House of Representatives.

- Mali, 2012-2015: inter-rebel war between Ansar Dine and CMA in 2012.[39]

- Myanmar, 1989-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[40]

- Nigeria, 2004: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[41]

- Nigeria, 2011-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[42]

- Pakistan, 2006-2015: inter-rebel war between TTP and Lashkar-e-Islam in 2010.[43]

- Peru, 1989-1999: no clear evidence of inter-rebel war.[44]

- Philippines, 1989-2015: no clear evidence of inter-rebel war.[45]

- Russia/USSR, 1990-1991: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[46]

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[39] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ansar Dine – CMA" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/11957); "Ansar Dine Islamists oust Tuareg rebels from Timbuktu," *France 24*, June 29, 2012 (https://www.france24.com/en/20120629-ansar-dine-islamists-oust-tuareg-rebels-timbuktu-mnla-mali-unrest). The rebel groups were Ansar Dine, CMA, MUJAO, Red Berets, AQIM, FLM, Red Berets, and Those Who Sign in Blood.

[40] The rebel groups (not all active in each year) were KNU, God's Army, DKBA 5, ABSDF, RSO, NMSP, BMA, KIO, MTA, RCSS, SSPP, UWSA, MNDAA, NSCN-K, and PSLF. Major clashes occurred between RCSS and UWSA in 2005 and between MTA and UWSA in the early 1990s, but these episodes took place in years in which at least one of the organizations was not coded as an active rebel group in the UCDP Dyadic dataset. See UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "RCSS – UWSA" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5309).

[41] The rebel groups were Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa and NDPVF (Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force).

[42] The rebel groups were IS and Boko Haram, active at the same time only in 2015.

[43] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "TTP - Lashkar-e-Islam" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5547); Mapping Militant Organizations, "Lashkar-e-Islam" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/445#note22); "25 killed in Taliban, Laskar-e-Islam clashes in Pakistan," *The Hindu*, June 6, 2010 (https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/25-killed-in-Taliban-Laskar-e-Islam-clashes-in-Pakistan/article16241380.ece); Ahmad Nabi, "Militant groups clash in Khyber; 50 killed," *The Nation*, June 6, 2010 (https://nation.com.pk/07-Jun-2010/militant-groups-clash-in-khyber-50-killed). The rebel groups were BLA, BLF, BRA, Baloch Ittehad, IMU, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP, TTP-TA, Lashkar-e-Islam, and IMU (not all active in each year).

[44] The two rebel groups were Sendero Luminoso and MRTA, active at the same time in 1989-1993. There are reports of clashes between the two groups but no clear indication that the definitional criteria of inter-rebel war were met. See Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Peru: Presence of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Tarapoto, San Martin department, since 1983; harassment of the Social Centre and its employees; presence of the army in the region; intensification of Shining Path incursions since March 1999; reaction by the authorities; treatment of persons suspected of helping the Shining Path (1983 to October 2000)," October 20, 2000 (https://www.refworld.org/docid/3f7d4df411.html).

[45] The rebel groups (not all active in each year) were the CPP, the Forces of Honasan, Abenina, Zumel, MNLF, ASN, MILF, MNLF – NM, MNLF – HM, and the BIFM. There are reports of clashes between MILF and BIFM, but there is no clear evidence that the definitional criteria of inter-rebel war were met: in fact, the confrontations appear to have amounted to isolated skirmishes. In any case, the UCDP Dyadic dataset does not code the BIFM as an active rebel group in 2011, the year in which the clashes with MILF occurred. See Mapping Militant Organizations, "Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/601?highlight=April+19); Peter Chalk, "The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the Southern Philippines?" CTC Sentinel 6, no. 11 (November 2013) (https://ctc.usma.edu/the-bangsamoro-islamic-freedom-fighters-the-newest-obstacles-to-peace-in-the-southern-philippines/); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "MILF – BIFM," (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5574).

[46] The rebel groups were the Republic of Armenia and APF, active at the same time in 1990.

- Russia, 1994-2007: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[47]

- Russia, 2007-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[48]

- Serbia/Yugoslavia, 1991: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[49]

- Sierra Leone, 1997-2000: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[50]

- Somalia (anti-Barre rebellion), 1989-1991: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[51]

- Somalia (post-Barre insurgency), 1991-2002: no clear evidence of inter-rebel war.[52]

- *Somalia, 2008-2016: inter-rebel war between ARS/UIC and Al-Shabaab in 2009-2010.[53]*

- South Sudan, 2011-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[54]

- *Sri Lanka, 1989: inter-rebel war between LTTE and EPRLF in 1989.[55]*

- *Sudan (overlapping rebellions in the South and Darfur), 1996-2015: inter-rebel war between SLM/A and SLM/A-MM in 2006.[56]*

- *Syria, 2011-2015: inter-rebel wars involving ISIS and several other rebel groups.[57]*

- Tajikistan, 1992-1998: No evidence of inter-rebel war.[58]

- Tajikistan, 2010-2011: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[59]

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[47] The rebel groups were the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district, active at the same time only in 1999.
[48] The rebel groups were IS and the Forces of the Caucasus Emirate, active at the same time in 2015 only.
[49] The rebel groups were Republic of Croatia, the Croatian irregulars, and Republic of Slovenia.
[50] The rebel groups were RUF, AFRC, and WSB (not all active in each year).
[51] The rebel groups were SNM, SPM, USC/SSA, and SPM.
[52] The rebel groups were SPM, USC/SNA, and USC/SSA (not all active in each year).
[53] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Al-Shabaab - Hizbul Islam" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5488). The two rebel groups were active at the same time in 2008-2010.
[54] The rebel groups were SSDM/A, SSLM/A, SSDM/A-Cobra Faction, and SPLM/A in Opposition (not all active in each year).
[55] The rebel groups were the LTTE, the EPRLF, and the JVP. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "EPRLF – LTTE" (https://ucdp.uu.se/nonstate/5456).
[56] "Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur," April 5, 2006 (http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2006/218); "Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur" May 19, 2006 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2006/306). The rebel groups were SLM/A, SLM/A-MM, SLM/A-Unity, NDA, JEM, SPLM/A, Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, Republic of South Sudan, SARC, SPLM/A-North, SSDM/A, SSLM/A, and NRF (not all active in each year).
[57] See chapter 5, ISIS case study.
[58] The rebel groups were UTO and the Forces of Khudoberdiyev, active at the same time in 1997-1998.
[59] The rebel groups were IMU and Forces of Mullo Abdullo, active at the same time in 2010.

-Turkey, 1989-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[60]

- Uganda, 1989-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[61]

- Ukraine, 2014-2015: no evidence of inter-rebel war.[62]

-Yemen, 2009-2015: inter-rebel wars between AQAP and Ansarallah in 2014, between the Forces of Hadi, and AQAP, and between IS and the Forces of Hadi in 2015.[63]

2. Interview Method
This section briefly discusses the interview method adopted in the book. In research on particular policy decisions, there is typically a narrow population of relevant actors and thus random sampling is not the most appropriate approach.[64] The population of interest for testing window theory of inter-rebel war consists primarily of former members of rebel organizations who may have participated in relevant decision-making processes or may have reliable information about them. Thus I strove to interview individuals who were in positions of political leadership or military command in the relevant organizations at the time of the events.

Before embarking on my fieldwork in Iraq and Ethiopia, I compiled a list of possible interviewees, based on the secondary literature and the advice of country experts. After receiving approval from Columbia University's (where I was a PhD candidate) IRB office, I tried to get in touch with potential interviewees by being introduced to them, thus avoiding cold calls whenever possible. I then asked interviewees to suggest other individuals that they thought I should talk to, and to introduce me to them, if possible. I mitigated the perils of being trapped in a network of interlinked respondents with the same worldview by starting multiple "snowballs" of interview subjects, corresponding to different organizations and factions within them.[65]

This process led me to conduct interviews with relevant in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States, besides Ethiopia and Iraq. I conducted all interviews in person, except for one interview via Skype. All my interview with Ethiopian and Eritrean subjects were in English or in my native Italian. I conducted about half of my interviews in Iraq in English and half in Kurdish with the help of interpreters.

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[60] The rebel groups (not all active in each year) were the PKK, Dev-Sol, and MKP.
[61] The rebel groups were ADF, UNRF II, UPA, LRA, and WNBF (not all active in each year).
[62] The rebel groups were the Lugansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic.
[63] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ansarallah - AQAP" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#nonstate/5545); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "AQAP - Forces of Hadi" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/13587); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "IS - Forces of Hadi" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#conflict/13597). The rebel groups were AQAP, Ansarallah, Forces of Hadi, and IS (not all active in each year).
[64] Oisin Tansey, "Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,"
PS: Political Science and Politics 40, no. 4 (2007): 765-772; Eric Bleich and Robert Pekkanen, "How to Report Interview Research," in Layna Mosley, ed., *Interview Research in Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 90; Julia F. Lynch "Aligning Sampling Strategies with Analytic Goals," in Mosley, ed., *Interview Research in Political Science*, pp. 40-44.
[65] Bleich and Pekkanen, "How to Report Interview Research," p.87.

I interviewed 40 former political leaders, military commanders and senior cadres (a few multiple times) of insurgent organizations active in Ethiopia in the years 1961-1991 and Iraqi Kurdistan from 1961 to 1998 and a handful of lower–rank members as well as one official in the Derg-era Ethiopian army, for a total of 66 semi-structured interviews with 50 interview subjects.[66] See below for the interviewee list.

The outcomes of the anti-government struggle and inter-rebel wars as well as the vagaries of rebel groups' internecine power struggles inevitably affected my interview samples. In Ethiopia the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) crushed its Tigray-based rivals and eventually went on to take over the government in Addis Ababa in 1991; as a result, it proved much easier to access former and current TPLF leaders than former members of rival organizations and pre-1991 era government officials. Importantly, the inclusion in my sample of some prominent former TPLF figures expelled from the organization (and typically living abroad) reduces the risk of exclusive reliance on informants with very similar worldviews, biases, and incentive structures.[67] Similar dynamics characterized the Eritrean case but with different implications for access to interviewees. The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) crushed and expelled the rival Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) to Sudan and, having defeated the Ethiopian army on the battlefield, gained a solid grip on power in newly independent Eritrea. Important former ELF figures (typically involved in Eritrean opposition politics) currently reside outside of Eritrea and are more easily accessible than EPLF figures in the country, given the prevailing highly authoritarian conditions. However, I obtained access to three high-ranking former EPLF members who escaped as they were abroad during a purge of the ruling party in 2001.[68] The fact that many of the former ELF and EPLF members I interviewed joined various rival opposition organizations mitigates the perils of relying on a sample of like-minded individuals reciting a single, "official" narrative.

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[66] For biographical sketches of several of my interviewees, see Michael M. Gunter, *Historical Dictionary of the Kurds* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011); Beth K. Dougherty and Edmund A. Ghareb, *Historical Dictionary of Iraq* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013); Dan Connell and Tom Killion, *Historical Dictionary of Eritrea* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2011); and David H. Shinn and Thomas P. Ofcansky, *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia* (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2013).

[67] These individuals are: Aregawi Berhe, founding member of the TPLF, chairman of the organization in the years 1976-1979, and head of its military committee until his ousting in 1986 (interviewed by the author on August 7, 2013, in The Hague, Netherlands); Fantahun "Ghidey" Zeratsion, founding member of the TPLF and vice-chairman from 1978 until his expulsion from the organization in 1985 (interviewed by the author on August 23, 2013, in Oslo); Tesfay Atsbeha, TPLF member since 1976, military commander until his expulsion around the same time as Aregawi Berhe's and Ghidey Zeratsion's ousting (interviewed by the author on August 11, 2013, in Cologne, Germany); Gebru Asrat, TPLF member from 1975, key figure in the organization during the insurgency, politburo member and President of Tigray at the time of his expulsion in 2001 (interviewed by the author on July 30, 2013, in Addis Ababa); Mokonnen Mokonnen, TPLF member from 1975 until 1988 (interviewed by the author on September 6, 2013, in Silver Spring, MD).

[68] The three individuals are: Mesfin Hagos, founding member of the EPLF, military commander during the liberation struggle and Eritrea's Minister of Defense after independence (interviewed by the author on July 17-18 and August 6, 2013, in Frankfurt, Germany); Haile Menkerios, EPLF member from 1973, Eritrea's Ambassador to Ethiopia and the Organization of African Unity after independence and United Nations envoy at the African Union at the time of the interview (21 July, 2013, Addis Ababa); Adhanom Gebremariam, EPLF member from 1972, he held senior military command positions during the war as well as executive and diplomatic posts in its aftermath (interviewed by the author on April 24 and June 29, 2014, in New York). These three people were part of the so-called G-15, a group of 15 high-ranking members of Eritrea's ruling party that issued a public letter criticizing the country's President for his authoritarian tendencies; the other members of the group were arrested and are still held incommunicado without charges (except for one, who subsequently repented).

In Iraq I was able to interview members of most main Kurdish rebel organizations, many of them currently involved in party politics: the Barzani faction and the Ahmed-Talabani faction, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Socialist Party of Kurdistan. Even members of the only Kurdish group that was outright defeated in inter-rebel war, the Ahmed-Talabani faction, were easily accessible for interviews given that many of its members, after defeat, were absorbed in the Barzani faction, while other members and leaders joined the PUK later on.

Interview transcripts are available upon request to the author for researchers interested in replicating the findings or investigating inter-rebel relations more generally.

Interviewee List

Iraqi Kurdistan (22 subjects, 31 interviews total)
- Abdulrazaq Aziz – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was member of the Ahmed-Talabani faction from 1960, then PUK's high-ranking member.

- Adil Murad – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was first a member of Barzani's faction and then a founding member of the PUK.

- Adnan Mufti – 1 interview in Erbil, Iraq. He was a senior member of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan at the time of its insurgency against Iraq.

- Azoz Hardi – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a member of Pasok from 1981, for which he fought as a peshmerga from 1987 to 1991.

- Farid Assasard – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was responsible for PUK's communications from 1978.

- Faridoun Abd-Al Qader – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a PUK founding member.

- Fouad Yassin – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a KDP peshmerga until 1975 and then a PUK foot soldier in the years 1976-1978.

- Kurshid Shera – 2 interviews in Erbil, Iraq. He was a peshmerga in Barzani's faction from 1961 and then a KDP military commander.

- Mahmoud Osman (Dr.) – 1 interview in Erbil, Iraq. He was Mullah Mustafa Barzani's close collaborator from the early 1960s.

- Mala Baxtiar – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was an early PUK military commander.

- Mala Mohamed – 2 interviews in Salahadin, Iraq. He has been a KDP member since before the beginning of the war in 1961.

- Mam Rostam – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a PUK military commander.

- Mohammad "Hama" Tofiq – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was an early high-ranking member of the PUK.

- Mulazin Omar – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was an early PUK military commander.

- Mushin Dizai – 1 meeting in Erbil, Iraq. He was a close advisor to Mullah Mustafa Barzani and then a senior KDP figure.

- Mustafa Chawrash – 1 meeting in Sulaimania, Iraq. He has been a PUK senior military leader.

- Mustafa Seydcadre – 1 meeting in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a senior PUK member.

- Omar Said Ali – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a senior PUK member.

- Salar Aziz – 2 interviews in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a member of the Ahmed-Talabani faction and then high-ranking PUK member.

- Shoresh Hadji – 1 interview in Sulaimania, Iraq. He was a PUK commander during the Iran-Iraq war.

- Seyd Kaka – 2 interviews in Erbil, Iraq. He was a military commander in Barzani's faction, then in the PUK and the Socialist Party.

- Shaik Jafar – 2 interviews in Erbil, Iraq. He was a PUK military commander and KRG Minister for Peshmerga Affairs at the time of the interview.

Eritrea (12 subjects, 17 interviews total)
- Adhanom Gebremariam – 2 interviews in New York City. He was an EPLF member from 1972, held senior military command positions during the war as well as executive and diplomatic posts in its aftermath.

- Ahmed Nasser – 1 interview in Stockholm. He was member of the ELF from 1963, held leadership positions from 1971, including the chairmanship of the organization from 1975 to 1983.

- Asmeron Menghesteab – 1 interview in Frankfurt, Germany. ELF member from 1974, senior cadre subsequently.

- Gherezgheher Tewelde – 1 interview via Skype. He was an ELF member from 1965 and senior cadre subsequently.

- Gime Ahmed – 2 interviews Addis Ababa. He was an early ELM member, then from 1962 in the ELF holding several leadership and military positions, including in the counterintelligence office.

- Haile Menkerios – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was EPLF member from 1973, Eritrea's Ambassador to Ethiopia and to the Organization of African Unity subsequently, and United Nations Ambassador at the African Union at the time of the interview.

- Mesfin Hagos – 3 interviews in Frankfurt. He was a founding member of the EPLF, military commander during the liberation struggle, and Eritrea's Minister of Defense after independence.

- Tesfay Woldemichael "Degiga" – 1 interview in Frankfurt. He was an ELF member from 1973 and in the group's leadership from 1975.

- Tewolde Gebrselassie – 2 interviews in Addis Ababa. He was an ELF member from 1974 and senior cadre subsequently.

- Wolde-Yesus Ammar – 1 interview in Frankfurt. He was a member of an ELF underground cell from 1965, subsequently became the head of the ELF's Foreign Office.

- Yusuf Berhanu (Dr.) – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was in ELF leadership positions from 1975.

- Anonymous interviewee – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was an ELF member from 1974 and senior cadre subsequently.

Tigray (14 subjects, 16 interviews total)
- Aregawi Berhe – 1 interview in The Hague, Netherlands. He was a founding member of the TPLF, then chairman of the organization in the years 1976-1979, and head of its military committee until his ousting in 1986.

- Begasho Gurmo "Ashenafi" – 1 interview in Frankfurt, Germany. He was an EPRP foot soldier in Tigray from 1977.

- Berhanu Berhe – 1 interview in Mekele, Ethiopia. He was a TPLF rank-and-file from 1977.

- Fantahun "Ghidey" Zeratsion – 1 interview in Oslo. He was a founding member of the TPLF, then vice-chairman from 1978 until his expulsion from the organization in 1985.

- Gebreab Barnabas (Dr.) – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He has been a TPLF member since 1983.

- Gebru Asrat – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was a TPLF member from 1975 and a key figure in the organization during the civil war, then politburo member and President of Tigray at the time of his expulsion in 2001.

- Mokonnen Mokonnen – 1 interview in Silver Spring, MD. He was a TPLF member from 1975, then a senior figure in the organization until 1988.

- Mulugeta Gebrehiwot – 1 in Addis Ababa. He was an early TPLF member, a rank-and file at the time of the TPLF's fights with other groups in Tigray, then he occupied more senior positions.

- Sibhat Nega – 2 interviews in Addis Ababa. He has been in the TPLF leadership since 1975.

- Tedros Hagos – 1 interview in Mekele, Ethiopia. He was a TPLF member from 1976, then member of the group's leadership committee from 1983.

- Tekleweini Assefa – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was an early TPLF member, then senior member of the organization and head of the TPLF's Relief Society of Tigray (REST) during the war.

- Tesfay Atsbeha – 1 interview in Cologne, Germany. He was a TPLF military commander from 1976.

- Yosef Tesfai – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was an EPRP member based in the United States during the war.

- Anonymous interviewee – 2 interviews in Addis Ababa. He was an EPRP rank-and-file in Tigray.

Other Ethiopian interviewees
- Negasso Gidada – 1 interview in Addis Ababa. He was originally affiliated with the OLF, then joined the OPDM in 1991; he served as President of Ethiopia from 1995 to 2001.

- Nigatu Teferi – 1 interview in Lancaster, PA. He was a major in the Ethiopian Army until 1991 and took part in the Lash and the Red Star offensives.

3. Additional Information on the TPLF-EDU War
As discussed in chapter 4, from 1976 to 1978 the TPLF and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) fought one another, an episode of inter-rebel war that window theory cannot explain

given that it occurred between non-coethnic organizations. Below I provide additional information on this episode, which I could not include in the book for reasons of space. In particular, I discuss the factors that enabled the TPLF's victory despite its initial stark military disadvantage.

Aware of the formidable, looming threat that EDU forces being assembled in Sudan posed, the TPLF approached the group's leadership in Sudan and proposed a modus vivendi between the two organizations. One of the top EDU's leaders, Ras Mengesha, however, refused.[69] In September 1976, the EDU launched an initial limited thrust into Tigray, which the TPLF managed to repel at a serious cost in terms of members' lives.[70] The following March, the new offensive was overwhelming: with around 10,000 well-armed men, the EDU rapidly took over the Ethiopian towns of Humera and Metema (just across the border with Sudan), which hosted army garrisons, and then moved into the TPLF's stronghold in western Tigray. The TPLF initially decided to hold its ground but its defensive lines were swept away by the EDU's swarms.[71] All TPLF-related sources stress the enormous losses experienced by the organization, which had to switch to a protracted warfare approach to survive the inter-rebel fight, launching hit-and-run attacks on the EDU while relinquishing the defense of fixed positions against superior firepower.[72]

However, a major government counteroffensive on EDU's positions in June 1977, combined with gradual attrition of its forces through TPLF's guerrilla attacks, broke the EDU's back. By February 1978, the TPLF was engaged in mop-up operations in Tigray's countryside.[73] According to Nigatu Teferi (an officer in the Ethiopian army at that time), the government,

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[69] Author interviews with Ghidey Zeratsion (who led the TPLF's diplomatic outreach), Gebru Asrat (TPLF member from 1975 and subsequently in leadership positions), and Sibhat Nega (in the TPLF leadership since 1975), July 2013, in Addis Ababa.

[70] Author's interviews with Ghidey Zeratsion and Sibhat Nega. Aregawi Berhe (chairman of the TPLF at the time) reports that the EDU's contingent consisted of 250 men. In the absence of direct evidence of the EDU's decision-making it is only possible to speculate on its motivation for launching this hastened attack, before the organization's full mobilization. It may have been prompted by the group's perception of the TPLF as a "bunch of students" that would be easily put back in their place (as several TPLF-related subjects suggested), the impulse to retaliate against the TPLF's attack on Teranafit (many members of which joined the EDU), and the desire to interfere with TPLF's popular mobilization efforts in western Tigray. See Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology, and Mobilization in Ethiopia* (Los Angeles: Tsehai, 2009), pp. 107-108.

[71] Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front*, pp. 109-11. Aregawi Berhe points out that the decision to try to openly withstand the EDU's onslaught was motivated by the TPLF's desire to be seen by Tigray's peasants as willing to put up a serious fight and pay a heavy cost: "Organizing a static defense was militarily wrong, but politically correct" (author interview); Gebru Asrat (TPLF member from 1975 and subsequently in leadership positions) made a similar observation in an interview with the author (July 2013, Addis Ababa).

[72] For example, according to Tedros Hagos (TPLF member from 1976), the TPLF lost half of its fighters; Aregawi Berhe reports the loss of a third of the group's fighters and three quarters of its guns. See author interview with Tedros Hagos, July 2013, Mekele, Ethiopia; and Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front*, p. 111.

[73] The government crushing defeat of the EDU is reported in Christopher S. Clapham, *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 185.

alarmed by the fact that the EDU had reached the outskirts of Gondar, brought in units armed with heavy artillery from the Ogaden, which inflicted a debilitating blow on the rebel group; then the TPLF managed to finish the weakened EDU with guerrilla attacks.[74] TPLF-related sources acknowledge that the government attack on the EDU contributed to its demise but diverge on its importance compared to the TPLF's continuous harassment of EDU's units: some of my interviewees argue that both were important, while others claim that the TPLF's actions mattered more because by the time of the government offensive the TPLF had already weakened the EDU; by contrast, Tesfay Atsbeha (TPLF senior military figure at the time) points out that the TPLF's eventual success was made possible by the fact that the government offensive caused the fragmentation of EDU into small units more vulnerable to guerrilla attacks.[75]

Based on EDU's propaganda, mobilization efforts and the actual pattern of the offensive (as reported in the literature and in TPLF's accounts), there is little doubt about the broad outlines of the group's plan: the EDU expected to march triumphantly to Mekele (Tigray's capital) and then to Addis Ababa, rolling up on its way the TPLF, which it saw as little more than a nuisance.[76] With hindsight, the EDU optimistically miscalculated the ease of taking over the central government, but it correctly assessed its military superiority over the TPLF and the fact that the government did not pose a serious and immediate threat. TPLF-related sources consistently stress that their group was outgunned[77] and that the government had very limited ability to project power in Tigray's countryside.[78] The EDU's crucial mistake, as Aregawi Berhe suggests, probably was failing to consolidate its hold on Tigray's countryside before heading further south, thus posing an immediate existential threat to the Derg, which reacted ferociously:

> We retreated to central Tigray. Instead of pursuing us they moved south towards the government forces. Had they pressed us we could not have posed a challenge. We had taken a lot of losses and we had little ammunition. Now the Derg had an opportunity to strike back and recapture lost territory."[79]

Based on my definition, the EDU and the TPLF should not be considered coethnic, due to the former's pan-Ethiopian agenda and ethnically mixed composition. Unlike Teranafit, the EDU did not simply aim to take over Tigray, as it was bent on using the province as a launch-pad for overthrowing the Derg in Addis Ababa. A large proportion of EDU's fighters were from Tigray, yet the organization recruited also many individuals from other northern regions of Ethiopia and

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[74] Author interview, February 2014, Lancaster, PA.

[75] Author interview, August 2013, Cologne, Germany.

[76] Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 86.

[77] According to Aregawi Berhe and Tedros Hagos, the EDU had a numerical superiority of 10 to 1; all other TPLF-related sources confirm a stark imbalance of power in terms of troop numbers and armaments. See Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front*, p. 109 and author interview with Tedros Hagos.

[78] For example, Gebru Asrat notes that "the Derg was not strong at that time; it had basically lost control of rural areas in western Tigray, from Humera to Shire" (author's interview).

[79] Author interview, August 2013, The Hague, Netherlands. Tesfay Atsbeha made a similar observation (author interview).

important leadership figures were not Tigrayan.[80] Thus this episode represents a deviation from the pattern of inter-rebel war predicted by my theory. However, in a sense this is also an exception that confirms the rule: though the groups do not fit my definition of coethnicity, they competed over an overlapping pool of potential supporters – the dynamic which the abstract concept is supposed to capture. This fact is acknowledged by TPLF's sources. For example, in discussing the reasons for the EDU's ultimate failure, Tesfay Atsbeha observes that the "EDU was going for the towns, but this was a mistake: it should have controlled the countryside. The peasants would have flocked to their side. Even the TPLF militias had switched sides."[81] The EDU's ability to appeal to Tigray's peasants depended on the absence, in practice, of a sharp distinction between it and its more straightforwardly Tigrayan "precursor" – Teranafit. EDU's founder and prominent (but not sole) leader – Ras Mengesha – was the powerful Tigrayan symbol that had inspired the creation of Teranafit. Moreover, after its defeat at the TPLF's hands, a large segment of Teranafit's forces joined the EDU, where they "remained as an autonomous contingent, poised to grab Tigrai."[82]

In sum, although I lack access to EDU's sources, some elements of window of opportunity logic seem to be present in this episode of inter-rebel war. The EDU was stronger than the TPLF and the government represented only a limited threat. However, the two groups do not meet my definition of coethnicity, even if the available evidence suggests that they had overlapping bases of support.

4. Map of Territorial Control in Iraqi Kurdistan
Figure A.1 below presents geo-referenced information extrapolated from maps reported in Farid Asasard, *Political Atlas of Kurdistan Region, 1914-2005* (Iraqi Kurdistan, 2010), pp. 65-70 and 81-2 (translated for the author from Kurdish Sorani by Dr. Kamal Soleimani in New York City).[83] Chapter 3 of the book uses this information to show that Fotini Christia's minimum winning coalition (MWC) theory cannot explain the observed pattern of inter-rebel war in Iraqi Kurdistan, as in the period 1961-1988 the rebels never controlled anywhere near half of the region's territory, and thus should have allied, rather than clashed, with one another against the government according to MWC logic.[84]

Figure A.1 Maximum extent of Iraqi Kurdish rebels' territorial control, 1961-88

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[80] Aregawi Berhe *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front*, pp. 108-9.
[81] Author interview. Aregawi Berhe (*A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front*, p. 94) makes a relevant observation too: "Had the TPLF failed to fill this gap, likely another local force, for example the TLF or *Teranafit*/EDU, would have become the leading organization in Tigrai given the readiness of the people to take matters into their own hands."
[82] Aregawi Berhe, *A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front*, p. 107.
[83] Laura Vargas kindly helped me with the GIS software.
[84] Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*.

The darkest area indicates the maximum extent of rebel territorial control in the years 1961-1988, which was achieved in the spring of 1963, before the second round of fighting against the government.[85] The sum of the two darkened areas in the figure is a rough approximation of Kurdish-claimed territory, as reflected in the 1966 Bazaz Plan (named after the Iraqi Prime Minister at the time), which envisioned administrative decentralization for the Kurdish provinces, whose boundaries were to be redrawn as depicted in the map on page 81 of Farid Asasard's book; Barzani accepted the plan, which became the basis for negotiations in the following years. Therefore, the two rebel groups active at the apex of Kurdish territorial control – the Barzani and the Talabani factions – held less than one third of Kurdish territory. The Kurdish-claimed areas reported in Figure A.1 can be considered as a low-estimate of Kurdish territorial ambitions, as they do not include areas around Khanakin and Zakho that the Kurds claimed at different moments; this implies a bias favorable to Christia's theory, as a smaller territory under dispute makes it easier for rebel-controlled territory to reach the minimum winning coalition threshold.[86]

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[85] Farid Asasard, *Political Atlas of Kurdistan Region,* p. 70.
[86] The territory under rebel control (dubbed "liberated areas" by Farid Asasard) consists of zones from which the insurgents were able to exclude government forces. The Kurds had a clandestine presence even in the major towns and could conduct guerrilla-style attacks in areas outside their zones of exclusive control. These areas can be thought of as zones of mixed control. As Stathis Kalyvas pointed out, mixed areas are not necessarily zones characterized by a balance of government and rebel control (*The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): in some areas one side may enjoy a dominant position even if it cannot

5. Codebook for Statistical Analysis (chapter 6)

Creating the dataset

The unit of analysis in the dataset used for statistical analysis in chapter 6 are pairs of rebel groups (dyads) pitted against a given government at the same time.[87] The dataset covers the years 1989-2015 owing to the fact the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Non-State Conflict Dataset coverage starts in 1989.[88] I use the 17.2 version of the dataset.

The list of relevant rebel groups is from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Version 17.1). Following standard practice in the study of civil war termination, I consider a rebel group as having ceased its military activity if its fight against the government does not meet the threshold of 25 battle deaths for two consecutive years; thus rebel groups whose military activity falls below the threshold only for one year are considered as active in that year in my dataset.[89] For example, if rebel groups X and Y are active against government Z in the years 2000-2002 and 2000 and 2002, respectively, my dataset would consist of an X-Y dyad in the entire period 2000-2002 even if group Y was not reported as active in 2001.

For rebel groups that the UCDP Actor Dataset (Version 2.2-2014) codes as alliances (i.e., *alliance*=1), I "unpack" the group in its constituent organizations, as long as case specific sources confirm that they continue to operate as independent entities (thus avoiding including in my dataset groups that had merged into a new organization and ceased to exist independently). For example, I break down the umbrella group UIFSA into its three members, Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, and Hizb-i Wahdat. By contrast, I treat the CPI-Maoist as a single organization because it resulted from the merger of its constituent groups, the PWG and the MCC.

In cases of unpacked alliances, I use the values of group-level variables for the alliance to fill in the missing values for the constituent groups. For instance, if the alliance is coded as having weak leadership control in the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars, I code its constituent groups as having weak leadership.[90] For the variable indicating rebel groups' numerical strength, I allocate the alliance's rebel fighters to each constituent group in equal parts (for a 3000-fighter strong alliance with three constituent groups, I code each one of them as controlling 1000 fighters).

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completely exclude the other. However, no information is available for this more nuanced coding of territorial control.

[87] Rebel groups active in different phases of the same year, i.e., not operating as insurgent groups at the same time, do not form relevant dyads. Thus, for instance, UFDR and anti-Balaka do not constitute a rebel dyad because the former, as a member of the Seleka coalition, was in government by March 2013, while the anti-Balaka started military operations in April 2013. Similarly, the Romanian actors NSF (National Salvation Front) and the Military faction (forces of Nicolae Ceausescu) do not constitute a rebel dyad as the former was no longer a rebel group after the ouster of President Nicolae Ceausescu on December 22, 1989, at which point the latter took up arms.

[88] Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck and Joakim Kreutz, "Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 2 (2012): 351-362.

[89] See, for example, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, David Cunningham, Idean Salehyan, "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 4 (2009): 570–597.

[90] David Cunningham, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, "Non-state Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 5 (2013): 516–531.

I break down two groups – "Kashmir insurgents" and "Syrian insurgents" – for which UCDP uses collective names, into their constituent groups, which I identify by cross-examining the UCDP Actor Dataset and the entry for the corresponding actor in the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (available at https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/ucdp-conflict-encyclopedia/).

For Kashmir insurgents, the constituent groups are the JKLF and the HuM, the only two rebel groups active in Kashmir reported in the UCDP Actor Dataset and described in the UCDP Encyclopedia as included under the label "Kashmir insurgents" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/816; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/817). I code the JKLF as active until 1994, given that in that year the group called a unilateral ceasefire and abandoned militancy.[91]

For Syrian insurgents, the constituent groups are Ahrar al-Sham (2012-15), Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham (2012-15), Mujahideen Army (2014-15), FSA (2011-15), SRF (2013-15), Levant Front (2014-15), Jaysh al-Islam (2013-15), Jaysh al-Sunna (2015), Fistaqim Kama Umirat (2012-15), 101st Infantry Division (2012-15), Suqour al-Jabal (2012-15), and Harkat Hazm (2014-15). These are rebel groups (in some cases alliances) active in Syria and described in the UCDP Encyclopedia as included under the label "Syrian insurgents" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/5554; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6815; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6012; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1130; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6011; https://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/6495; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6377; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6380; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6495; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6564; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6564; https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6015).

The UCDP Dyadic Dataset codes Hezbollah as pitted against Israel in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon. I do not include the rebel group as a member of dyads with rebel groups active in Palestine, as Hezbollah is operating in a distinct sovereign country (Lebanon).

The UCDP Dyadic Dataset treats the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (AMB) and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) as distinct actors from Fatah. However, I treat the AMB as an armed branch of Fatah, rather than a separate organization, given the strong evidence to that effect.[92] Even the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia describes AMB as an "unofficial armed wing" of Fatah (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/211). I do not treat the PNA as a distinct organization either, as it was the Palestinian proto-government controlled by Fatah. The UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, while treating Fatah and PNA as distinct rebel organizations, acknowledges that "the PNA has been controlled by Fatah" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/210). Therefore, for years in which either the PNA or the AMB are reported as active rebels by the UCDP Dyadic Dataset but not Fatah, I treat AMB and PNA as stand-in for Fatah. Thus I recode an AMB-Hamas dyad in 2003 (a year in which Fatah is not reported as active) as Fatah-Hamas, using information on Fatah from the closest available year(s), in this case 2002 and 2004, to code the corresponding covariates.

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[91] Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place." I allocate half of the 5,000 fighters controlled by the Kashmir insurgents to each of the two constituent groups. Based on the secondary literature, I code both the HuM (1989-2015) and JKLF (1989-1990) as receiving support from Pakistan. See, for example, Staniland, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place" and Mapping Militant Organizations, "Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen" (https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/harakat-ul-mujahedeen).

[92] Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Secular Terrorism: Profiles of Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 2003), p. 10.

Dropped observations
I dropped the following dyads as they involved rebel groups not actually active at the same time.

- UFDR - anti-Balaka, Central African Republic, 2013: the Seleka coalition, of
which UFDR was a member, was in government by March 2013, while the anti-balaka picked up
arms in April, according to the UCDP Dyadic dataset.[93]

- CPJP - anti-Balaka, Central African Republic, 2013: The Seleka coalition, of which CPJP was a
member, was in government by March 2013 while the anti- Balaka picked up arms in April,
according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Dyadic dataset.

- UTO - PFT, Tajikistan, 1992: After initial months of rebel activity, the UTO "made up the
government side for a brief period (7 September 1992 – 18 November 1992) as it at that time
dominated the so-called 'Government of National Reconciliation', and thus controlled the capital
Dushanbe. Subsequent to that, UTO once again found itself in opposition to the government."[94]
The PFT is reported as a rebel group, as opposed to an independent non-state actor loosely
aligned with the government only for the period September- November 1992, after which the
UTO returned to the rebel camp.[95]

- CNDD - CNDD-FDD, Burundi, 1998: The CNDD–FDD is a splinter of the CNDD; the parent
organization stopped armed struggle at the time of the split, so the two groups were not active at
the same time.[96]

- Military faction of General Godefroid Niyombare – Forebu, Burundi, 2015: the military faction
launched a coup and when it failed, its plotters organized the rebel group FOREBU.[97] Thus the
two groups do not appear to have operated at the same time (the military faction was active in
May 2015 only; FOREBU is established in December 2015).

- RUF – Kamajors, Sierra Leone, 1997: The Kamajors became rebels after AFRC and RUF took
power in May 1997. When the AFRC and RUF were ousted, the Kamajors fought them on the
side of the new government.[98]

- AFRC – Kamajors, Sierra Leone, 1997: The Kamajors became rebels after AFRC and RUF
took power in May 1997. When the AFRC and RUF were ousted, the Kamajors fought them on
the side of the new government.[99]

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[93] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Seleka" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/554).
[94] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "UTO" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/345).
[95] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PFT" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1186).
[96] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "CNDD" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/431).
[97] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "FPB" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6297); "Military faction (forces of Godefroid
Niyombare)" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/6187).
[98] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Government of Sierra Leone - Kamajors" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/820).
[99] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Government of Sierra Leone - Kamajors" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/820).

- Maidan – Lugansk People's Republic (LPR), Ukraine, 2014. Maidan's violent activities ceased before the LPR picked up arms.[100]

- Maidan – Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), Ukraine, 2014. Maidan's violent activities ceased before the DPR picked up arms.[101]

Variables
- *Inter-rebel war*: The dependent variable, based on data from the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, takes on 1 in the first year in which the members of a rebel pair engaged in armed conflict against each other resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths.[102] I drop from the analysis all years of ongoing inter-rebel fighting, as they cannot experience a new onset.

- *Coethnic* is the key independent variable, taking on 1 if both rebel organizations in a rebel dyad are "affiliated" with the same ethnic group and 0 otherwise. The variable is based on data from the Armed Conflict Database-2-Ethnic Power Relations (ACD2EPR, Version 2018.1).[103]

I operationalize rebel organizations' association with ethnic groups based on organizations' ethnic claims and recruitment along ethnic lines: I consider a rebel organization as affiliated with an ethnic group if it claims to fight on behalf of that ethnic group (there is direct evidence of such a claim or indirect evidence, as an ethnic reference in the name of the organization, i.e., the *claim* variable equals 1 or 2) *and* it recruits from the ethnic group (either the rebel organization alone or both the rebels and the government recruited from the ethnic group, i.e., the *recruitment* variable equals 1 or 2). Using a broad ethnic recruitment criterion makes sense as it allows me, for example, to code as "Shia Muslim" armed groups like Amal and the Mahdi Army, which analysts typically consider as affiliated with the Shias of Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, even if both Lebanese and Iraqi governments recruited from the same ethnic group as well. Nonetheless for robustness checks I also use *coethnic (alternative)*, which flags instances of coethnic dyads in which the recruitment criterion is applied more narrowly, excluding cases in which both the government and the rebel organization recruit from a given ethnic group.

- *Splinter*: This dummy variable, based on Data from the UCDP Actor Dataset, takes on 1 if one group in the rebel pair is a splinter of the other and 0 otherwise. I coded the *splinter* variable for the year 2015, as the UCDP Actor Dataset covers the period up to 2014; this yielded no instance of new dyads with splinters in 2015. I also coded as splinters the following three dyads, thus changing the original Actor Dataset coding: (1) IS - Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham, given that al-Nusra was a branch of the Islamic State in Iraq, which eventually asserted its independence from its parent organization; (2) TTP - Jamaat-ul-Ahrar; Jamaat-ul-Ahrar is not included in the Actor Dataset, but it is reported as a splinter of the Pakistani Taleban;[104] (3) SPLM/A-North   -

[100] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ukraine: Lugansk" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/13247); "Maidan" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/5817).
[101] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ukraine: Donetsk" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/13246); "Maidan" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/5817).
[102] The same 25 fatalities threshold is adopted in Fjelde and Nilsson, "Rebels against Rebels."
[103] Julian Wucherpfennig et al., "Ethnicity, the State, and the Duration of Civil War," *World Politics* 64, no. 1 (January 2012): 79-115.
[104] https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jamaat-ul-ahrar-ja.

Republic of South Sudan, given that the Actor Dataset codes SPLM/A-North as splinter of the SPLM/A and the Republic of South Sudan was the non-state actor controlled by the SPLM/A in period from the 2005 peace agreement till South Sudan's independence in mid-2011.

- *Preponderance*: This dummy variable, based on Christia's data, takes on 1 in cases in which one warring party controls more than half of the total number of civil war combatants (including rebels and the government) and 0 otherwise.[105] It covers the period up 2011. I also create a variable *preponderance2*, which codes cases not included in Christia's data and thus displaying missing values for *preponderance*, using data on government and rebel troops (also only for the period up to 2011). Given that in all cases of *preponderance*=1 and *preponderance2*=1, the government is the numerically strongest civil war party, the variable also serves a rough indicator of government strength.

- *Troop ratio*: This continuous measure of government power relative to the rebel movement consists of the ratio of government forces and the total number of rebel fighters across all insurgent organizations pitted against the incumbent in a given year.[106]

- *Weak leadership*: This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the leadership of at least one member of the rebel pair exercises only limited control on the organization and 0 otherwise, based on data from the Non-State Actors Dataset (available up to 2011). The original variable on leadership control takes on three values: "low," "moderate," and "high;" I consider a rebel group leadership as exercising limited control if the variable equals "low."[107]

- *Common supporter*: a dummy variable indicating whether the members of a rebel dyad received support from the same state or from two members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, using data from the UCDP External Support Dataset (available up to 2009).[108] The variable does not distinguish between type of external support (e.g., access to territory, weapons, materiel/logistics, training) and it includes "alleged" external support too. I treat instances in

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[105] Ibid., 271-275. Data available up to 2011.

[106] Data on government troops from National Material Capabilities Dataset, Version 5.0; data on rebel troops from the Non-State Actors in Civil Wars Dataset (both available up to 2011). See David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett (ed.), *Peace, War, and Numbers* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972); and Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, "Non-state Actors in Civil Wars." Given that rebel groups' numerical strength changes very little over time in the Non-state Actors dataset, I fill missing values on rebel strength with available information from the nearest year within a five-year period of the relevant year. So, for illustration, if the dataset does not report information on a group's strength for the year 2005, but reports information from the year 2010 on, I fill the missing value with the 2010 value. To code the variable for dyads involving the NLFT-B in 2003 I use data from the Non-State Actors dataset for the group NLFT, as this dataset includes the NLFT in 2003, rather than the NLFT-B, which is instead included in the UCDP Dyadic dataset. Similarly, I use data from the Non-State Actor dataset for NSCN for the years before 2001 to code variables for the group NSCN-K, which the UCDP Dyadic dataset reports as active (unlike the NSCN) before 2001. For NLFT-B and NSCN-K, I follow the same procedure for all other variables based on the Non-State Actors dataset.

[107] Given that rebel groups' leadership strength changes very little over time in the Non-state Actors dataset, I fill missing values with available information from the nearest year within a five-year period of the relevant year. So, for illustration, if the dataset does not report information on a group's leadership strength for the year 2005, but reports information from the year 2010 on, I fill the missing value with the 2010 value.

[108] Stina Högbladh, Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér, "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975-2009: Presenting a New Dataset," paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 2011.

which the variable reporting names of external supporters does not contain any names (i.e., it is missing) as entailing no external support even if the variables reporting the existence of some external support (*external_exists* and *external_alleged*) are missing rather than equal to 0.

For rebel groups that the UCDP Actor Dataset codes as members of an alliance, I code *common supporter* as equal to 1 if the alliance is reported as having at least one state supporter. If a rebel group is included in year t in my dataset but the External Support Dataset reports the group only in year t-1 and t+1, I use this information to code support at time t.[109]

- *Common ideology*: This dummy variable takes on 1 if the groups in a rebel dyad are both Islamist or both socialist/communist, and 0 otherwise. I consider rebel groups as Islamist if they advance political goals inspired by their interpretation of Sunni Islam and/or aim to establish a separate state or autonomous region ruled by Sharia law. The framing of a group's armed struggle as a Jihad would also count as evidence that the group's goals are inspired by Islam. I consciously adopt a broad definition encompassing various (partially overlapping) subcategories of militant Islam, such as Salafi, Jihadi, Jihad-Salafi organizations as well as groups embracing the Ikhwani orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood, like Hamas, and both organizations with a primarily national outlook (e.g., Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and with a global focus (e.g., Al-Qaeda).[110] I code rebel groups as socialist/communist if they profess adherence to Marxism and/or aim at socialist revolution. See below for the list of Islamist and socialist/communist dyads.

- *Territorial control*: This dummy variable takes on 1 if at least one of the two groups in the rebel dyad controls some territory and 0 otherwise. Data on rebel territorial control is from the Non-State Actors Dataset (available up to 2011).[111]

- *Natural resources*: This dummy variable takes on 1 if at least one group in the rebel pair earned income through extortion, theft, booty futures, or smuggling of oil, gold, diamonds, coca, or opium, and 0 otherwise. Data from the Rebel Contraband Dataset (available from 1990 to 2012).[112]

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[109] To code external support for dyads involving the NLFT-B in 2003 I use data from the external support dataset for the group NLFT, as this dataset includes the NLFT in 2003, rather than the NLFT-B, which is instead included in the UCDP Dyadic dataset.

[110] Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries: On Religion and Politics in the Study of Islamist Militancy," in R Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 244-266; Thomas Hegghammer, "The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 9 (2009).

[111] Given that rebel groups' territorial control changes very little over time in the Non-state Actors dataset, I fill missing values with available information from the nearest year within a five-year period of the relevant year. So, for illustration, if the dataset does not report information on a group's territorial control for the year 2005, but reports information from the year 2010 on, I fill the missing value with the 2010 value.

[111] Given that rebel groups' leadership strength changes very little over time in the Non-state Actors dataset, I fill missing values with available information from the nearest year within a five-year period of the relevant year. So, for illustration, if the dataset does not report information on a group's leadership strength for the year 2005, but reports information from the year 2010 on, I fill the missing value with the 2010 value.

[112] James I. Walsh et al., "Funding Rebellion: The Rebel Contraband Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 55, no. 5 (2018): 699-707.

- *Rebel asymmetry*: This dummy variable equals 1 if the Non-State Actors Dataset codes one of the groups in a rebel dyad as "much weaker" than the government while the other group is coded as "weaker," "at parity," "stronger" or "much stronger" than the government MCC, and 0 otherwise. Data available up to 2011.[113]

- *Bipolar*: This dummy variable flags coethnic rebel dyads active in a country-year with no other coethnic rebel group.

- *Tripolar*: This dummy variable flags coethnic dyads active in a country-year with a third coethnic rebel group.

- *Multipolar*: This dummy variable flags coethnic dyads active in a country-year with at least two more coethnic rebel groups.

- *Proximity*: This dummy variable flags rebel dyads whose members operated in the same first-order sub-national district (in the United States, this would be one of the fifty states; in France one of the eighteen regions) or, if active in adjacent districts (i.e., sharing an administrative border), within a radius of 200 miles, and thus could have plausibly fought each other. I use the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (Version 18.1) to code rebel groups' districts of operation.[114] To measure the distance between rebel groups' areas of operation (towns or districts) in adjacent provinces I use google maps and information from the Georeferenced Event Dataset. To avoid skewing the proximity variable in favor of my argument, I do not consider rebel attacks against civilians, given that insurgent groups may be able to operate clandestinely and launch terrorist attacks in areas under tight government control (e.g., the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba's operations in Mumbai), but not to engage in sustained fighting against other rebel organizations there.

List of common ideology dyads

<u>Socialist/communist dyads:</u>

PWG – MCC (India). Both groups are avowedly Marxist. The PWG's extended name is Communist Party of India – Marxist-Leninist: Peoples' War Group.[115] MCC stands for Maoist Communist Centre.[116]

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[113] Given that rebel groups' strength changes very little over time in the Non-state Actors dataset, I fill missing values with available information from the nearest year within a five-year period of the relevant year. So, for illustration, if the dataset does not report information on a group's strength for the year 2005, but reports information from the year 2010 on, I fill the missing value with the 2010 value.

[114] See Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, "Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 4 (2013): 523-532.

[115] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PWG" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/193).

[116] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "MCC" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/194).

PWG – NSCN-IM (India). NSCN-IM stands for National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isaac-Muivah faction and as its name suggests is explicitly socialist.[117]

PWG – PLA (India). The PLA (People's Liberation Army, alternatively referred to as People's Liberation Army of Manipur or by the name of its political wing, the Revolutionary People's Front) is a self-proclaimed Maoist separatist rebel group.[118]

PWG – UNLF (India). The UNLF (United National Liberation Front) is a socialist separatist rebel aiming at establishing a socialist state in Manipur.[119]

PWG – NDFB (India). NDFB (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) is a socialist group, aiming at establishing a "Democratic Socialist Society" in an independent state of Bodoland.[120]

PWG – CPI-ML-J (India). CPI-ML-J (Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist-Janasakhti faction, alternatively referred to as CPI-ML-Rajanna, or Rajanna Group) is a self-declared Marxist rebel group.[121]

CPI-Maoist – PLA (India). The CPI-Maoist (Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist)) is a self-avow Communist rebel group.[122]

CPI-Maoist – UNLF (India). See above for both groups.

CPI-Maoist – KCP (India). The KCP (Kangleipak Communist Party) is a self-declared Communist separatist rebel group.[123]

CPI-Maoist – PREPAK (India). PREPAK is "a Maoist group fighting for the independence of Manipur."[124]

CPI-Maoist – NDFB-RD (India). The NDFB-RD (National Democratic Front of Bodoland - Ranjan Daimary faction) is a splinter of the NDFB. I code the group as socialist as there is no

[117] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "NSCN-IM" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/223); Manifesto of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/nagaland/documents/papers/manifesto_national_socialist_council_nagaland.htm).
[118] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PLA" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/314); Subir Bhaumik, "Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India's Northeast" in Satu Limaye, Robert Wirsing and Mohan Malik (eds.), *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), p. 232.
[119] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "UNLF" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/315); South Asia Terrorism Portal, United National Liberation Front
(https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/Unlf.htm).
[120] South Asian Terrorism Portal, "National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)"
(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terrorist_outfits/ndfb.htm).
[121] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "CPI-ML-J" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/3946).
[122] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "CPI-Maoist" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/195).
[123] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "KCP" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/317).
[124] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, India, "The People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), in particular whether this group conducts forced recruitment in the region of West Imphal; the arrest of two activists in June 2001," August 14, 2003 (http://www.refworld.org/docid/403dd1f8c.html). See also UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PREPAK" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/318).

indication that it abandoned the socialist outlook of its parent organization; in fact the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia says that the two groups had essentially the same objectives.[125]

CPI-Maoist – NDFB-S (India). The NDFB-S (the S stands for K. Songbijit, the group's leader) is a splinter of the NDFB-RD.[126] I code the group as socialist following the same reasoning used for the NDFB-RD.

MCC – NSCN-IM (India). See above for both groups.

MCC – PLA (India). See above for both groups.

MCC – NDFB (India). See above for both groups.

MCC – UNLF (India). See above for both groups.

MCC – CPI-ML-J (India). See above for both groups.

PLA – NSCN-IM (India). See above for both groups.

PLA – UNLF (India). See above for both groups.

PLA – NDFB (India). See above for both groups.

PLA – CPI-ML-J (India). See above for both groups.

NSCN-IM – UNLF (India). See above for both groups.

NSCN-IM – NDFB (India). See above for both groups.

NSCN-IM – CPI-ML-J (India). See above for both groups.

UNLF – KCP (India). See above for both groups.

UNLF – PREPAK (India). See above for both groups.

UNLF – NDFB (India). See above for both groups.

UNLF – NDFB – RD (India). See above for both groups.

UNLF – CPI-ML-J (India). See above for both groups.

KCP – PREPAK (India). See above for both groups.

KCP – NDFB – RD (India). See above for both groups.

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[125] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "NDFB – RD" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1066).
[126] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "NDFB – S" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/5826).

PREPAK – NDFB – RD (India). See above for both groups.

NDFB – CPI-ML-J (India). See above for both groups.

PKK – Devrimci Sol (Turkey). The PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; Kurdistan Workers' Party) was an explicitly Marxist-Leninist rebel group, which then took on more of a libertarian socialist outlook.[127] Devrimci Sol (DEV-SOL or Revolutionary Left) is "an advocate of a Marxist-Leninist style revolution in Turkey."[128]

PKK – MKP (Turkey). The MKP (Maoist Komunist Partisi or Maoist Communist Party) is a self-declared communist rebel group.[129]

JVP – EPRLF (Sri Lanka). The JVP (Janatha Vimukti Permamuna or People's Liberation Front)) was a rebel group "driven by a combination of Marxist/Maoist and nationalist ideology."[130] The EPRLF (Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front) was a Tamil rebel group aiming at socialist revolution.[131]

PFLP – PFLP-GC (Israel). The PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) "adhered to a combination of Marxist-Leninist ideology and Arab nationalism."[132] The PFLP-GC (General Command) had a "Marxist orientation."[133]

TPLF – EPDM (Ethiopia). The TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) "combined Marxist-Leninism with an element of Tigray nationalism."[134] The EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement) was a splinter of the Marxist EPRP and maintained "much of the original Marxist Leninist outlook" of the parent organization.[135]

TPLF – EPLF (Ethiopia). The EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) was an "Eritrean nationalist and Marxist/socialist organization."[136]

EPDM – EPLF (Ethiopia). See above for both groups.

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[127] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PKK" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/323); Alex de Jong, "The New-Old PKK," *Jacobin*, March 18, 216 (https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/03/pkk-ocalan-kurdistan-isis-murray-bookchin/).
[128] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "DHKP-C" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/334).
[129] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Government of Turkey - MKP" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/823).
[130] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "JVP" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/281).
[131] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "EPRLF" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/322); R Cheran (ed.), *Pathways of Dissent: Tamil Nationalism in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi: Sage, 2009), p. xxxvii.
[132] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PFLP" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/205).
[133] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PFLP-GC" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#/actor/206). See also "Popular Front For The Liberation Of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)," Mackenzie Institute, January 21, 2016 (https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2016/01/popular-front-for-the-liberation-of-palestine-genera-command-pflp-gc/).
[134] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "TPLF" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/410).
[135] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "EPDM" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/412); Sarah Vaughan, "The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: Its Origins, History and Significance," *Occasional Papers* no. 51, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh University, p. 13.
[136] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "EPLF" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/416).

FAR I – EGP (Guatemala). FAR I (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes) "followed orthodox Marxist tradition."[137] The EGP (Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres) also followed "a Marxist-Leninist orientation."[138]

FAR I – ORPA (Guatemala). ORPA (Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas) "was a Marxist group."[139]

EGP – ORPA (Guatemala). See above for both groups.

FARC – ELN (Colombia). The FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas) had an explicitly "Marxist-Leninist ideology."[140] The ELN's (National Liberation Army) "ideology was based on Marxism-Leninism as well as Liberation theology."[141]

FARC – EPL (Colombia). The EPL's (Popular Liberation Army) aimed "to radically transform social and political life with a Marxist-Leninist ideology."[142]

ELN – EPL (Colombia). See above for both groups.

Sendero Luminoso – MRTA (Peru). Sendero Luminoso is a self-avowed Marxist rebel group.[143] MRTA's (Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru) "aim was to defeat imperialism (primarily US and Japanese influence), achieve national and social liberty and establish a Marxist regime."[144]

ERP – FPL (El Salvador). The ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo or People's Revolutionary Army) and the FPL (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Marti or Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces) were both Marxist.[145]

Islamist dyads:

PIJ – Hamas (Israel). PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) aims at establishing an Islamic state through jihad in Palestine.[146] Hamas's goal is creating an Islamic state ruled by sharia through jihad in historic Palestine.[147]

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[137] Daniel Rothenberg, *Memory of Silence: The Guatemalan Truth Commission Report* (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 125.

[138] Ibid., p. 126.

[139] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "ORPA" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/731).

[140] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "FARC" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/743).

[141] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "ELN" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/744).

[142] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "EPL" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/746).

[143] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Sendero Luminoso" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/750).

[144] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "MRTA" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/751).

[145] Brad K. Berner, "The Ideological Origins of the Farabundo Martin Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador," December 18, 2008 (https://ecumenico.org/the-ideological-origins-of-the-farabundo-martin-li/).

[146] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "PIJ" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/208).

[147] Hamas' charter, translated and published in the *Journal of Palestine Studie*s 22, no. 4 (1993).

PIJ – PRC (Israel). PRC (Popular Resistance Committees) professed commitment to sharia law and waging of Jihad.[148]

Hamas – PRC (Israel). See above for both groups.

Ansar al-Islam – IS (Iraq). Ansar al-Islam's goal was creating an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.[149] IS's (Islamic State) code the group is one of the most prominent Jihadi groups on the world stage.[150]

Ansar al-Islam – RJF (Iraq). RJF (Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq or Reformation and Jihad Front) is a well-known Jihadi group.[151]

IS – RJF (Iraq). See above for both groups.

IS – Taleban (Afghanistan). The Taleban's objective is creating an Islamic state ruled by sharia law.[152]

IS – Forces of the Caucasus Emirate (Russia). The Forces of the Caucasus is a well-known jihadist organization.[153]

IS – AQAP (Yemen). AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) is a well-known Jihadist group.[154]

IS – Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Cameroon and Nigeria). Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (more commonly known as Boko Haram) wages jihad to "establish puritanical Islamic rule."[155]

IS – Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham (Syria). Al-Nusra is a well-known Jihadist organization.[156]

IS – Ahrar al-Sham (Syria). Ahrar al-Sham aims at creating an Islamic state in Syria.[157]

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[148] CAMERA - Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, "Popular Resistance Committee Backgrounder: 2018" (www.camera.org/article/popular-resistance-committee-backgrounder-2018/). The group is also coded as Islamist by Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ida Rudolfsen, "Are Muslim Countries More Prone to Violence?" *Research & Politics* (April–June 2016): 1–9 .

[149] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ansar al-Islam" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/233); Mapping Militant Organizations, "Ansar al-Islam" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/13?highlight=ansar).

[150] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "IS" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/234).

[151] Mapping Militant Organizations, "RJF" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/11).

[152] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Taleban" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/303).

[153] Mapping Militant Organizations, "Caucasus Emirate" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/255?highlight=emirate); Monica Toft and Yuri Zhukov, "Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation and Counterinsurgency in Russia's North Caucasus," *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 2 (2015): 222-238.

[154] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "AQAP" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/539).

[155] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1051).

[156] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Jabhat Fateh al-Sham" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1170).

[157] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ahrar al-Sham" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/5554).

IS – Jaysh al-Islam (Syria). As the its name clearly indicates, Jaysh al-Islam is an Islamist organization.[158]

IS – Levant Front (Syria). The Levant Front is a group of self-declared Islamist organizations wanting to establish a state ruled by Sharia law.[159]

IS – Mujahideen Army (Syria). The Mujahideen Army is a coalition of various self-declared Islamist groups.[160]

IS – Fistaqim Kama Umirat, (Syria). Fistaqim Kama Umirat is an "Islamist umbrella movement" whose name is based on Quranic verse.[161]

Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham – Ahrar al-Sham (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham – Mujahideen Army (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham – Levant Front (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham – Jaysh al-Islam (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham – Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham – Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria). See above for both groups.

Ahrar al-Sham – Mujahideen Army (Syria). See above for both groups.

Ahrar al-Sham – Levant Front (Syria). See above for both groups.

Ahrar al-Sham – Jaysh al-Islam (Syria). See above for both groups.

Ahrar al-Sham – Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria). See above for both groups.

Ahrar al-Sham – Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria). See above for both groups.

Mujahideen Army – Levant Front (Syria). See above for both groups.

Mujahideen Army – Jaysh al-Islam (Syria). See above for both groups.

Mujahideen Army – Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria). See above for both groups.

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[158] "Syria Crisis: Saudi Arabia to Spend Millions to Train New Rebel Force," *The Guardian*, November 7, 2013.
[159] Aron Lund, "The Levant Front: Can Aleppo's Rebels Unite?", Carnegie Middle East Center, December 26, 2014 (https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/57605?lang=en).
[160] Aron Lund, "The Mujahideen Army of Aleppo," Carnegie Middle East Center, April 8, 2014 (https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55275?lang=en).
[161] Ibid.

Mujahideen Army – Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria). See above for both groups.

Levant Front – Jaysh al-Islam (Syria). See above for both groups.

Levant Front – Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria). See above for both groups.

Levant Front – Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jaysh al-Islam – Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jaysh al-Islam – Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria). See above for both groups.

Jaysh al-Sunna – Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria). See above for both groups.

MILF – ASG (Philippines). The MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) emphasizes the role of Islam as part of its political project even more so than the group it splintered from, the MNFL.[162] In fact, the splintering process leading to the emergence of the MILF was in part related to disagreements about the emphasis on religion, as Santos and Santos note: "The split was based on differences not only of political strategy and objectives but more fundamentally of ideological orientation (secular-nationalist versus Islamic revivalist)."[163] The ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) aims at establishing an Islamic state in Mindanao.[164]

MILF – BIFM (Philippines). The BIFM (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters) has an Islam-inspired worldview, as suggested by its name, and aims at establishing an Islamic state in Mindanao.[165]

ASG – BIFM (Philippines). See above for both groups.

Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction (Afghanistan). Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan aimed at establishing a sharia-ruled state and a was a member of the broader Islamist movement opposed to Afghanistan's secular communist government in 1978-1992.[166] Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction was a splinter of the Islamist Hizb-I Islami and there is no indication that the group rejected the Islamist ideology of

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[162] Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), p. 87; Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos, *Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines* (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), p. 64.
[163] Ibid., p. 63.
[164] Mapping Militant Organizations, "ASG" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152?highlight=al+qaeda); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "ASG" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/277).
[165] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "BIFM" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1146); Mapping Militant Organizations, "Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/601#note49); Peter Chalk, "The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the Southern Philippines?", *CTC Sentinel* 6 (November 2013): 15-17.
[166] Gilles Dorronsoro, "Afghanistan's Civil War," *Current History* 94, no. 588 (1995): 37-40; Husain Haqqani "Afghanistan's Islamist Groups," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, March 23, 2007
 (https://www.hudson.org/research/9772-afghanistan-s-islamist-groups); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/292).

its parent organization; in fact, Khalis was a former theology teacher and the group is referred to as "Muslim fundamentalist" and is reported as having the objective of establishing an Islamic state in Afghanistan.[167]

Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (Afghanistan). Despite the fact that Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan "supported nationalism and democracy" and was more moderate than other mujahideen organizations,[168] it should be considered as Islamist for our purposes, because its manifesto identifies "Islam, Nationalism and Democracy" as the foundations of the group's philosophy.[169]

Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Afghanistan). Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan aspires to create an Islamic state.[170]

Jam'iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Taleban (Afghanistan). See above for both groups.

Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction – Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan (Afghanistan). See above for both groups.

Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan - Khalis faction – Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Afghanistan). See above for both groups.

Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan – Taleban (Afghanistan). See above for both groups.

TTP – IMU (Pakistan). The TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) has an explicit ideological commitment to sharia law and jihad.[171] The IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) aims at creating an Islamic state.[172]

TTP – Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan). Lashkar-e-Islam is a well-known Jihadist organization.[173]

TTP – TTP – TA (Pakistan). TTP-TA (Tariq Afridi), a splinter of the TTP, was committed to Jihad as its parent organization.[174]

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[167] Dorronsoro, "Afghanistan's Civil War," p. 38; "Afghan Rebels Say They Inflicted Heavy Damage on Airport," *New York Times*, December 30, 1982; Drew Middleton, "Study Sees No End to Soviet Stay in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, May 15, 1984.

[168] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Mahaz-i Milli-yi Islami-yi Afghanistan" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/296).

[169] Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, "Pakistan/Afghanistan: Information on the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), in particular, its activities in Quetta, Baluchistan, and whether the organization issue certificates of identity to Afghan refugees in Pakistan between 1990 and 1998," July 1, 1998 (https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad1014.html).

[170] Dorronsoro, "Afghanistan's Civil War."

[171] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "TTP" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/356).

[172] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "IMU" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/359).

[173] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Lashkar-e-Islam" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/399).

[174] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "TTP-TA" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1101).

TTP – Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (Pakistan). Jamaat-ul-Ahrar seeks to "establish an Islamic caliphate governed by Shariah law."[175]

IMU – Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan). See above for both groups.

IMU – Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (Pakistan). See above for both groups.

Lashkar-e-Islam – TTP – TA (Pakistan). See above for both groups.

Lashkar-e-Islam – Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (Pakistan). See above for both groups.

IMU – Forces of Mullo Abdullo (Tajikistan). Despite the limited information on the group, I code the Forces of Mullo Abdullo as Islamist it because its leader is widely described as an Islamist warlord.[176]

PULF – HuM (India). PULF (Peoples United Liberation Front) has the objective of creating an Islamic state in northeast India.[177] The HuM (Hizb-ul-Mujahideen) "follows a fundamentalist Islamic ideology, demanding the imposition of Islamic law and customs within Kashmir."[178]

ARS/UIC – Al-Shabaab (Somalia). ARS/UIC aimed at establishing Sharia law in Somalia.[179] Al-Shabaab is a well-known Jihadist organization.[180]

AIS – GIA (Algeria). AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) aimed at establishing an Islamic regime in Algeria.[181] GIA (Armed Islamic Group) "wanted to install an Islamic state based on sharia Law in Algeria."[182]

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[175] Mapping Militant Organizations, "Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JA)" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/679).

[176] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Forces of Mullo Abdullo" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1216); Institute for War and Peace Reporting, "Assessing Tajikistan's 'Mujahedin'," May 30, 2011 (http://www.refworld.org/docid/4de4920e2.html); Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, "Tajik Authorities Struggle to Quell Militants," *Global Voices* (Institute for War and Peace Reporting), October 4, 2010 (https://iwpr.net/global-voices/tajik-authorities-struggle-quell-militants); Lola Olimova, "Few Tears Shed for 'Tajik Bin Laden'," *Global Voices* (Institute for War and Peace Reporting), May 5, 2011 (https://iwpr.net/global-voices/few-tears-shed-tajik-bin-laden).

[177] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia (http://ucdp.uu.se/#statebased/901); South Asia Terrorism Portal (http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/pulf.htm).

[178] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "HuM" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/816).

[179] Mapping Militant Organizations, "Islamic Courts Union" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/107); Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (2007): 151-160.

[180] Mapping Militant Organizations, "Al Shabaab" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61).

[181] Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Islamic Party in Algeria Defeats Ruling Group in Local Elections," *New York Times*, June 14, 1990.

[182] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "GIA" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/538).

GIA – AQIM (Algeria). AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) is a well-known Jihadist group.[183]

AQIM – Ansar Dine (Mali). Ansar Dine is a well-known Salafist-Jihadi group.[184]

AQIM – MUJAO (Algeria and Mali). I code MUJAO as Islamist given that the group considers its struggle Jihad.[185]

AQIM – Signed-in-Blood Battalion (Mali). The Signed-in-Blood Battalion "aimed to spread jihad through all of the Sahara and impose Shariah law in North Africa."[186]

AQIM – FLM (Mali). FLM (Macina Liberation Front) professes a Salafist-Jihadi ideology.[187]

Ansar Dine – MUJAO (Mali). See above for both groups.

Ansar Dine – Signed-in-Blood Battalion. See above for both groups.

MUJAO – Signed-in-Blood Battalion. See above for both groups.

In an alternative coding, I code the following dyads as Islamist too, even if I excluded them from the main variable because of ambiguity about whether one of their members met the definitional criteria of Islamist:

IS-SRF (Syria), IS-Harkat Hazm (Syria), Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham-SRF (Syria), Jabhat al-Nusra li al-Sham-Harkat Hazm (Syria), Ahrar al-Sham-SRF (Syria), Ahrar al-Sham-Harkat Hazm (Syria), SRF-Mujahideen Army (Syria), SRF-Harkat Hazm (Syria), SRF-Levant Front (Syria), SRF-Jaysh al-Islam (Syria), SRF-Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria), SRF-Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria), Mujahideen Army-Harkat Hazm (Syria), Harkat Hazm-Levant Front (Syria), Harkat Hazm-Jaysh al-Islam (Syria), Harkat Hazm-Jaysh al-Sunna (Syria), Harkat Hazm-Fistaqim Kama Umirat (Syria), MNLF-MILF (Philippines), MNLF-ASG (Philippines), ASG-MNLF – NM (Philippines), MNLF – NM-BIFM (Philippines).

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[183] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "AQIM" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/539).

[184] Mapping Militant Organizations, "Ansar Dine" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/437); UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "Ansar Dine" (http://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1157).

[185] UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, "MUJAO" (https://ucdp.uu.se/#actor/1161).

[186] Mapping Militant Organizations, "Al Mulathamun Battalion" (http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/611).

[187] Jacob Zenn, "The Sahel's Militant 'Melting Pot': Hamadou Kouffa's Macina Liberation Front (FLM)," *Terrorism Monitor* 13, no. 22 (2015).

6. Robustness Checks

Table A.1: Replication of Table 6.2 with alternative measure of coethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
coethnic (alternative)	0.928***	0.892***	1.490***	1.453***	1.078*	1.586***
	(2.97)	(2.86)	(2.79)	(2.61)	(1.81)	(2.73)
splinter		0.998**	1.518**	1.551**	1.754***	1.551**
		(2.04)	(2.16)	(2.30)	(2.58)	(2.14)
preponderance			0.198			
			(0.39)			
troop ratio				-0.015		
				(-1.53)		
weak leadership					0.058	
					(0.10)	
territorial control						0.084
						(0.14)
duration	-0.064	-0.059	-0.011	-0.001	-0.010	-0.019
	(-1.46)	(-1.35)	(-0.17)	(-0.01)	(-0.15)	(-0.29)
N	1444	1444	952	993	824	1013

Note: Rare-event logit models, standard errors clustered by rebel pair. *=$p<0.90$, **=$p<0.95$, ***=$p<0.99$.

Table A.2: Replication of Table 6.3 with alternative measure of coethnicity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
coethnic	1.440***	1.538***	2.070***	1.433***		1.156**
	(2.67)	(2.69)	(2.64)	(2.66)		(2.14)
splinter	0.979	0.966	1.654	0.937	0.839	0.946
	(1.18)	(1.12)	(1.61)	(1.07)	(0.88)	(1.18)
asymmetry	1.392**	1.466**	1.349**	1.418**	1.388**	1.157*
	(2.20)	(2.25)	(2.22)	(2.12)	(2.07)	(1.85)
common supporter		0.334				
		(0.47)				
natural resources			1.070			
			(1.23)			
common ideology				0.297		
				(0.42)		
bipolar					2.039***	
					(3.36)	
tripolar					1.097	
					(0.95)	
multipolar					2.867***	
					(2.77)	
duration	0.012	0.003	0.017	0.004	0.015	0.016
	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.20)
N	893	819	793	893	893	647

Note: Rare-event logit models, standard errors clustered by rebel pair. *=$p<0.90$, **=$p<0.95$, ***=$p<0.99$.

Table A3: Replication of Table 6.2 with no-missing value sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
coethnic	2.001***	1.857***	1.854***	1.751**	1.884***	1.854**
	(2.74)	(2.59)	(2.58)	(2.28)	(2.63)	(2.29)
splinter		1.696**	1.673**	1.585**	1.728**	1.680**
		(2.11)	(2.15)	(1.96)	(2.15)	(2.19)
preponderance			-0.084			
			(-0.12)			
troop ratio				-0.028*		
				(-1.67)		
weak leadership					0.831	
					(1.17)	
territorial control						0.031
						(0.04)
duration	-0.004	0.021	0.023	0.036	0.020	0.021
	(-0.04)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.37)	(0.22)	(0.23)
N	639	639	639	639	639	639

Note: Rare-event logit models, standard errors clustered by rebel pair. *=p<0.90, **=p<0.95, ***=p<0.99.

Table A4: Replication of Table 6.3 with no-missing value sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
coethnic (alternative)	1.563**	1.591**	1.749*	1.541**		1.374*
	(2.10)	(2.14)	(1.72)	(2.14)		(1.86)
splinter	1.369	1.369	1.495	1.364	1.347	1.326
	(1.55)	(1.51)	(1.41)	(1.41)	(1.45)	(1.54)
asymmetry	1.673**	1.632**	1.649**	1.641*	1.609*	1.507*
	(2.10)	(2.07)	(2.26)	(1.75)	(1.90)	(1.94)
common supporter		0.003				
		(0.00)				
natural resources			0.596			
			(0.52)			
common ideology				0.060		
				(0.06)		
bipolar					1.822**	
					(2.42)	
tripolar					1.178	
					(0.93)	
multipolar					3.005**	
					(2.56)	
duration	0.010	0.010	0.005	0.011	0.012	0.014
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)
N	588	588	588	588	588	450

Note: Rare-event logit models, standard errors clustered by rebel pair. *=p<0.90, **=p<0.95, ***=p<0.99.

Table A5: Alternative measures of government strength and rebel asymmetry and excluding Syria

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4 excluding Syria)
coethnic	1.719***	1.849***	1.775***	1.708***
	(3.17)	(3.40)	(3.11)	(3.03)
splinter	1.491**	1.377**	1.539**	0.918
	(2.09)	(2.56)	(2.15)	(1.08)
preponderance2	0.123			
	(0.24)			
GDP per capita		0.000		
		(0.07)		
asymmetry2			0.149	
			(0.22)	
asymmetry				1.377**
				(2.19)
duration	-0.007	-0.088	-0.015	0.013
N	1005	1222	982	893

Note: Rare-event logit models, standard errors clustered by rebel pair. *=p<0.90, **=p<0.95, ***=p<0.99.